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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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19 January 1990

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Sakharov Draft Constitution

90UN0645A Vilnius KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 4

[Draft constitution prepared by A.D. Sakharov, edited by G. Vaynauskas: "Constitution of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia"]

[Text] "We recently sent Comrade M.S. Gorbachev a letter signed by many USSR people's deputies from Lithuania. It dealt with the fact that the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet has frequently been tackling many individual issues in circumvention of general and fundamental matters, to which pertain the status of the republics and the status of the Soviet Union, which remain ambivalent owing to the disparities and contradictions between the legal and the actual situations. For this reason it is difficult determining the content of the laws under discussion, which is leading to political and interethnic contradictions. Much time is being taken up by protracted debate. This is the case, for example, with discussion of the draft property law. We went on to write that it was time to venture upon a historic step—conversion of the USSR into a union of independent republic-states. We propose the creation under the auspices of the Supreme Soviet of a commission for preparation of the status of such a union and the enlistment in the work of the commission of deputies not disposed toward the imperial stereotype on the question of the essence of union and interethnic relations.

"I recently met in the Academy of Sciences in Moscow with Academician Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. He declared that he had drawn up a concept of a draft union constitution, familiarized me with this concept and authorized its publication. Nonetheless, it would seem to me that this draft implies a federal state."

Academician V. Statulyavichyus, USSR people's deputy

1. The Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia (Europe-Asia Union, Soviet Union, for short) is a voluntary association of sovereign republics (states) of Europe and Asia.

2. The aim of the people of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia is a happy, meaningful life, material and spiritual freedom, prosperity and peace, and security for the citizens of the country and for all people on earth, regardless of race, nationality, sex, age, and social position.

3. The Europe-Asia Union relies in its development on the moral and cultural traditions of Europe and Asia and all mankind and all races and peoples.

4. The union aspires in the shape of its authorities and citizens to the preservation of peace throughout the world, preservation of the environment, preservation of the external and domestic conditions of the existence of mankind and life on earth as a whole, and the harmonization of economic, social, and political development worldwide. The global aims of man's survival take

precedence over all regional, state, national, class, party, group, and personal aims. In the long term the union in the shape of its authorities and citizens aspires to the reciprocal pluralist rapprochement (convergence) of the socialist and capitalist systems as the sole cardinal solution of global and domestic problems. The creation in the future of a world government should be the political expression of this rapprochement.

5. All people have the right to life, freedom, and happiness. Securing the social, economic, and civil rights of the individual are the aim and duty of citizens and the state. Exercise of the rights of the individual must not be contrary to the rights of other people and the interests of society as a whole. Citizens and institutions are obliged to act in accordance with the constitution and laws of the union and the republics and the principles of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. International laws and agreements signed by the USSR and the union, including UN and union human rights pacts, have direct effect on the territory of the union and take precedence over laws of the union and the republics.

6. The constitution of the union guarantees man's civil rights—freedom of belief, freedom of speech and information exchange, freedom of religion, freedom of association, mass meetings and demonstrations, freedom of emigration from and return to one's country, freedom of trips abroad, freedom of movement and choice of place of residence, work, and study within the country, and inviolability of one's abode and freedom from arbitrary arrest and psychiatric hospitalization unwarranted by medical necessity. No one may be subjected to criminal or administrative punishment for actions connected with his beliefs unless they contain violence, calls for violence or some other infringement of the rights of other people, or high treason.

The constitution guarantees the separation of church and state and noninterference of the state in ecclesiastical life.

7. The basis of the political, cultural, and ideological life of society are the principles of pluralism and tolerance.

8. No one may be subjected to torture and brutal treatment. Capital punishment is banned on the territory of the union in peacetime.

Medical and psychological experiments on people without the consent of the subjects of the experiments are banned.

9. The principle of the presumption of innocence is fundamental at the time of the judicial hearing of all charges against any citizen. No one may be deprived of any title and membership in any organization or publicly declared guilty of having committed a crime prior to a sentence of the court having taken legal effect.

10. Discrimination in questions of pay and employment, enrollment in educational institutions and the securing of an education on the territory of the union on the

grounds of nationality and religious and political belief and also (given the absence of direct contradictory evidence stipulated by law) on grounds of sex, age, state of health, and previous convictions is prohibited.

Discrimination in the allocation of accommodation and the granting of medical assistance and on other social issues on the grounds of sex, nationality, religious and political beliefs, age and state of health, and previous convictions on the territory of the union is prohibited.

11. No one should live in poverty. Retirement pensions for persons who have reached retirement age and pensions for war, labor, and childhood invalids may not be lower than the subsistence level. Benefits and other forms of social assistance should guarantee a standard of living of all members of society no lower than the subsistence minimum. Medical services for the citizens and the system of education are organized on the basis of the principles of social justice and the availability of the basic minimum of medical services (free of charge and subject to payment), recreation, and education for each regardless of social property position and place of residence and work.

At the same time there should be chargeable systems of the enhanced type of medical service and competitive education systems.

12. The union has no aims of expansion, aggression, and messianism. The armed forces are structured in accordance with the principle of defensive sufficiency.

13. The union confirms its renunciation in principle of first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons of any type and purpose may be used only with the approval of the commander in chief of the country's armed forces given the existence of reliable information on an enemy's deliberate use of nuclear weapons, other methods of resolving the conflict having been exhausted. The commander in chief has the right to cancel a nuclear attack launched by mistake, specifically, to destroy in flight the ICBM's and other means of nuclear attack launched in error.

Nuclear weapons are merely a means of preventing an enemy nuclear attack. The long-term goal of the union's policy is the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapon of mass destruction, given a balance in conventional arms, the solution of regional conflicts, and a general easing of all factors causing mistrust and tension.

14. The operations of any secret services in the protection of public and state order in the union are prohibited. Clandestine activity outside of the country is confined to the missions of intelligence and counterintelligence. Clandestine political, subversive, and disinformation activity is banned. State services of the union participate in the international fight against terrorism and drug-trafficking.

15. The right to self-determination is a fundamental and priority right of each nation and republic.

16. A republic joins the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia on the basis of a union treaty in accordance with the wishes of the population of the republic at the decision of the republic's highest legislative authority.

Supplementary conditions of the entry into the union of a given republic are formalized by a special protocol in accordance with the wishes of the population of the republic. The constitution of the union provides for no national-territorial units other than republics, but a republic may be divided into individual administrative and economic areas.

The decision on a republic's entry into the union is made at the constituent congress of the union or at a congress of union people's deputies.

17. A republic has the right to withdraw from the union. A decision on a republic's withdrawal from the union should be made by the republic's highest legislative authority in accordance with a referendum on the territory of the republic no sooner than a year after the republic has joined the union.

18. A republic may be expelled from the union. A republic is expelled from the union by a decision of the Congress of Union People's Deputies by no less than two-thirds majority, in accordance with the wishes of the population of the union, no sooner than 3 years following the republic's entry into the union.

19. The republics which join the union accept the constitution of the union as the basic law in effect on the territory of the republic together with the constitutions of the republics. The republics entrust to the central government the accomplishment of the basic tasks of the country's foreign policy and defense. A uniform monetary system exists throughout the territory of the union. The republics entrust to the central government transport and communications of union significance. Aside from the above conditions of entry into the union common for all the republics, certain republics may entrust to the central government other functions and also fully or partially amalgamate organs of administration with other republics. These additional conditions of membership of the union of a given republic should be recorded in a protocol to the union treaty and based on a referendum on the territory of the republic.

Together with citizenship of the union a republic may establish republic citizenship.

20. The country's defense against foreign aggression is entrusted to the armed forces, which are formed on the basis of union law. In accordance with a special protocol, a republic may have republic armed forces or individual combat arms, which are formed from the population of the republic and stationed on republic territory. The republic armed forces and subunits are part of the union

armed forces and subordinate to a single command. The armed forces are wholly supplied with arms, clothing and provisions in centralized manner on the basis of funds of the union budget.

21. A republic may have a republic monetary system together with the union monetary system. In this case the republic banknotes are legal tender universally on republic territory. Union banknotes are legal tender in all institutions of union jurisdiction and are accepted in all other institutions. Only the union central bank has the right to issue and cancel union and republic banknotes.

22. A republic, unless stipulated otherwise in the special protocol, possesses complete economic independence. All decisions pertaining to economic activity and construction, except for activity and construction pertaining to functions entrusted to the central government, are made by the appropriate republic authorities. No construction of union significance may be undertaken without the authorization of the republic organs of administration. All taxes and other monetary proceeds from enterprises and the populace on the territory of a republic go to the republic. An amount determined by the union budget committee on terms specified in the special protocol is paid by the republic to the union to support the functions entrusted to the central government.

The rest of budget revenues are entirely at the disposal of the republic government.

The republic has the right of direct international economic contacts, including direct trade relations and the organization of joint ventures with foreign partners. The customs rules are union-wide.

23. The republic has its own system of law enforcement authorities (police, MVD, penitentiary system, procuracy, and judiciary) independent of the central government. Sentences in criminal cases may be set aside by way of union presidential pardon. Union laws, given their confirmation by the supreme legislative body of the republic, and republic laws are in effect on the territory of the republic.

24. On the territory of the republic the official language is the language of the nationality indicated in the name of the republic. If the name of the republic indicates two or more nationalities, there are effectively two or more official languages in the republic. In all republics of the union the official language of interrepublic relations is Russian. Russian has equal status with the official language of the republic in all institutions and enterprises of union jurisdiction. The language of interethnic communication is not specified constitutionally. In the Russian Republic Russian is simultaneously the official language and the language of interrepublic relations.

25. The union and autonomous republics, national autonomous oblasts, and national okrugs of the former USSR are originally the structural components of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. The national-constitutional process begins with the proclamation of the independence of

all national-territorial structural parts of the USSR forming sovereign republics (states). Based on a referendum, some of these parts may unite with one another. The division of a republic into administrative and economic areas is determined by the republic constitution.

26. The borders between republics are permanent for the first 10 years following the constituent congress. Subsequently a change in borders between republics, unification of republics, and the division of republics into smaller parts are effected in accordance with the wishes of the republics' population and the principle of nations' self-determination in the course of peaceful negotiations with the participation of the central government.

27. The union central government is located in the capital (chief city) of the union. The capital of any republic, the capital of Russia included, may not simultaneously be the capital of the union.

28. The union central government incorporates:

- 1) a congress of union people's deputies;
- 2) a union council of ministers;
- 3) a union supreme soviet.

The head of the union central government is the president of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia. The central government possesses the plenitude of supreme power in the country, not sharing it with the executive bodies of any party.

29. The Congress of Union People's Deputies has two chambers.

The first chamber or Chamber of the Republics (400 deputies) is elected per the territorial principle—one deputy per electoral territorial okrug with an approximately equal number of voters. The second chamber or Chamber of Nationalities is elected on a nationality basis. The electorate of each nationality with its own language elects a particular number of deputies; namely, one deputy per 2 (full) million voters of the given nationality and additionally a further two deputies of the given nationality. This overall quota is allocated by consolidated multi-nomination okrug. The elections to both chambers—general and direct on a choice basis—are for a term of 5 years.

Both chambers sit jointly, but on a number of issues determined by standing orders of the congress vote separately. In this case a decision of both chambers is required for enactment of a law or decree.

30. The Congress of People's Deputies of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia has the highest legislative authority in the country. Laws of the union not affecting provisions of the constitution are enacted by simple majority vote of the official list of each chamber and take precedence over all legislative instruments of union significance other than the constitution.

Laws of the union affecting provisions of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia and also other changes to the wording to articles of the constitution are enacted given a necessary majority of no less than two-thirds of the votes of the official list in each chamber of the congress. Decisions thus adopted take precedence over all legislative instruments of union significance.

31. The congress discusses the union budget and amendments thereto, using the report of the congress budget committee. The congress elects the chairman of the union Council of Ministers and the foreign and defense ministers and other high officials of the union. The congress appoints commissions for the performance of one-time assignments, specifically for the preparation of bills and the study of conflict situations. The congress appoints standing commissions for the elaboration of forward plans of the country's development, for the elaboration of a budget and for permanent supervision of the work of the executive authorities. The congress monitors the work of the Central Bank. Unbalanced emission and the withdrawal from circulation of union and republic banknotes are possible only with the congress' approval.

32. The congress elects from its members a presidium. The members of the congress presidium chair the congress and exercise organizational functions to support the work of the congress and its commissions and committees. The members of the presidium do not have other functions and do not hold any executive positions in the government of the union and the republics and in parties.

33. The union Council of Ministers incorporates a foreign ministry, defense ministry, ministry of defense industry, finance ministry, ministry of union transport, and ministry of union communications, and also other ministries for the performance of functions entrusted to the central government by individual republics in accordance with the special protocol to the union treaty. The Council of Ministers also incorporates union Council of Ministers committees.

The candidacies for all ministers, other than foreign minister and defense minister, are proposed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and confirmed by the congress. The chairmen of Council of Ministers committees are appointed in the same procedure.

34. The union Supreme Soviet has four chambers:

- 1) Chamber for Criminal Affairs;
- 2) Chamber for Civil Affairs;
- 3) Arbitration Chamber;
- 4) Constitutional Court.

The chairmen of each chamber are elected on a choice basis by the Congress of Union People's Deputies.

The hearing of problems and cases of a union and interrepublic nature are within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

35. The president of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia is elected for a term of 5 years in the course of direct general elections on a choice basis. Prior to the elections, each presidential candidate names his deputy, who runs on the same ticket.

The president may not combine his position with executive office in any party. The president may be removed from office in accordance with a referendum on the territory of the union, a decision which has to be made by the Congress of Union People's Deputies by a majority of no less than two-thirds vote of the official list. A ballot on the question of a referendum is conducted at the demand of no fewer than 60 deputies. In the event of the death of the president, his removal from office, or his inability to perform his duties owing to illness or other reasons, his authority passes to his deputy.

36. The president represents the union in international negotiations and ceremonies. The president is the commander in chief of the union's armed forces. The president has the right of legislative initiative in respect of union laws and the right of veto in respect of all laws and rulings of the Congress of People's Deputies adopted by less than 55 percent of the official list of deputies. The congress may put to a repeat vote a law which has been vetoed, but not more than twice.

37. The union's economic structure is based on a pluralist combination of state (republic, interrepublic, and union), cooperative, joint-stock, and private (personal) ownership of the implements and means of production, all types of industrial and agricultural equipment, production premises, roads and means of transport and communications and information exchange facilities, including the mass media, and ownership of consumer items, including accommodation, and also intellectual property, including copyright and inventors' law. State-owned enterprises may be leased to collectives or private individuals for a limited or unlimited period.

38. The land and its interior and water resources are the property of the republic and the nations (peoples) living on its territory. Land may be transferred directly, without intermediaries, to the ownership for an unlimited period of private individuals and state, cooperative, and joint-stock organizations with payment of land tax to the republic. The right to inherit the ownership of land by children and close relatives is guaranteed private individuals. Land in ownership may be returned to the republic only in accordance with the wishes of the owner or given his breach of the rules of land tenure and given the necessity of use of the land by the state at the decision of the republic's legislative authority with the payment of compensation.

39. Land may be sold to a private individual and labor outfit. Restrictions on the resale and other conditions of the use of land which is private property are determined by republic law.

40. The quantity of private property not manufactured, acquired, or inherited in violation of the law belonging to one person is completely unrestricted (except for

land). The unrestricted right to inherit homes and apartments which are private property with the unrestricted right to settle heirs therein and also all implements and means of production, consumer items, banknotes, and stock is guaranteed. The right to inherit intellectual property is determined by republic law.

41. Everyone has the right to dispose of his physical and intellectual labor capabilities as he sees fit.

42. Private individuals and cooperative, joint-stock, and state-owned enterprises have the right of unlimited hire of workmen in accordance with labor legislation.

43. The use of water resources and also other renewable resources by state-owned, cooperative, leased, and private enterprises and private individuals is taxed by the republic. The use of nonrenewable resources is subject to a payment to the republic.

44. Enterprises with any form of property have equal economic, social, and legal conditions and enjoy equal and full independence in the distribution and use of their income after tax and also in the planning of production, the listing and marketing of products, provision with raw material, procurements of semimanufactured commodities and components, and in personnel matters and in wage rates, are subject to uniform taxes which should not exceed a total amount of 30 percent of actual profits, and are equally materially responsible for the ecological and social consequences of their activity.

45. The system of the management, supply, and marketing of products in industry and agriculture, except for enterprises and establishments of union jurisdiction, is organized in the interests of the immediate producers on the basis of their product management, supply, and marketing authorities.

46. The principles of the market and competition are the basis of economic regulation in the union. State control of the economy is exercised via the economic activity of state-owned enterprises and by means of legislative support for the principles of the market, pluralist competition, and social justice.

Estonian Poll on Sakharov, 2nd Congress

90UN0609A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 19 Dec 89 p 4

[Report by A. Saar: "Public Opinion on the Congress"]

[Text] The purpose of the given telephone poll conducted by the Journalistics Information Center late last week was to reveal people's attitude toward the work of the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies. The death of Academician A. Sakharov brought unanticipated corrections to our questionnaire. We asked our subscribers to evaluate A. Sakharov's role in our public life:

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Made valuable contribution to society's democratization, perestroika	92	56	92
Added to increased instability in society, interfered with perestroika	2	15	1
Don't know	6	30	7

The figures are obvious. And they correspond closely with the responses to other questions.

How regularly do you follow the work of the 2nd Congress?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Constantly	18	42	15
More or less constantly	42	27	44
From event to event	36	26	37
Not following	4	4	4

How democratically do you feel the work of the Congress is proceeding?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Democratically	0	26	4
More or less democratically	41	42	32
Undemocratically	47	13	41
Don't know	12	19	23

Are you familiar with N. Ryzhkov's speech on the recovery of the economy?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
For the most part, yes	19	45	27
Heard something	45	25	35
Not familiar	36	25	36
Don't know	0	5	2

What sort of economy do you advocate for the Soviet Union?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non-Estonians	Rural Residents
Immediate introduction of market economy; complete economic accountability on all levels	79	40	90

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non- Estonians	Rural Residents
Phased execution of economic reform proposed by USSR Government	11	38	4
Strengthening principles of centralized economy	1	6	2
Don't know	9	16	4

How do you feel about complete economic accountability for Estonia?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non- Estonians	Rural Residents
Completely support	87	51	88
Probably support	9	26	9
Probably don't support	2	6	0
Don't support at all	0	5	9
Don't know	1	13	3

The Congress is discussing the introduction of a rationing system for essential consumer goods. What is your opinion?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non- Estonians	Rural Residents
For rationing system	61	41	52
Against rationing	21	42	26
Don't know	18	17	22

Have your hopes with regard to the work of the Congress been justified?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non- Estonians	Rural Residents
Yes, completely	2	8	2
Yes, probably	12	16	7
No, probably not	20	24	29
No, not at all	53	31	43
Don't know	13	21	19

How can the results of the work of the Congress change Estonia's development?

	Tallinn Estonians	Tallinn Non- Estonians	Rural Residents
Only positively	8	22	11
Both positively and negatively	43	26	42
Only negatively	14	2	11
Results will have no influence	14	22	11
Don't know	21	28	25

Those who consider A. Sakharov to be a source of destabilization in public life are convinced that the Congress is working democratically; they are for the most part opposed to IME [Self-Managing Estonia], and are advocates of the Government program or the centralization of the economy and are convinced that the Congress will not influence Estonia's development. Their hopes for the Congress were mostly justified, and, to give them their due, by comparison to others, they are the best informed about what is happening at the Congress. They follow its work constantly, and for the most part are familiar with N. Ryzhkov's speech. This is entirely natural, since there are primarily elderly people among this group of respondents. But there are young people as well.

Moscow Opinion Poll on Political Reform

90UN0060A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by A. Demidov: "We Think the Way We Live: Muscovites' Opinion: The Sociopolitical Aspect"]

[Text] Public opinion has become an active "participant" in our sociopolitical relations, if only because, given our new electoral system, it is public opinion, in the final analysis, that determines how the organs of power are formed. Which political forces and faces turn up at the helm of public administration is to a significant degree determined precisely by public opinion. Without knowledge and consideration of this phenomenon, there can be no serious policy and no well-founded regulation of the state of any community of people. First to understand this were the people's deputies of the USSR, who have deemed knowledge of public opinion critical information.

At the initiative of the Moscow City Party Committee of the CPSU, a sector for the study of Moscow public opinion has been created. First and foremost we study opinions and judgments on the course of political reform in the country. We can identify three stages through which reform has already passed: the enactment of laws on elections for people's deputies and on amendments and additions to the USSR Constitution; the electoral campaign and elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet; and the convening and first session of the Supreme Soviet.

What are the fundamental parameters characteristic of the state of public opinion with respect to these sociopolitical transformations?

Muscovites look most favorably on the processes under way in international affairs, in the political sphere, in the area of democratization and in the development of glasnost. Here positive responses clearly exceed negative. We would say that, in the course of the implementation of the electoral system reform, skepticism as to the effectiveness of the newly enacted laws was gradually dispelled. If at the outset only 18 percent of Muscovites polled approved of the new laws and their impact on the

perfection of the political system and the democratization of social life, then after the elections only 8 percent noted no change compared with earlier electoral campaigns. Eighty-four percent of Moscow citizens surveyed expressed satisfaction—complete or partial—with the results of the elections. Here many pointed to certain shortcomings in the electoral system itself and in the organization and conduct of the elections. Criticized most often were the okrug assemblies, the election of deputies by public organizations, the biased attitude of official organs toward certain candidates, and the low cultural level of the pre-election struggle.

The people of our city (those polled, of course), have noted undeniable development in glasnost. At the same time, more than half of the capital's residents feel that glasnost will keep developing only up to definite limits.

Rated most highly was the state of affairs in international relations. Of that opinion were more than 70 percent of the participants in the sociological surveys.

Our fellow Muscovites have a much less positive view of our economics and nationality problems. Thus, more than two-thirds of Muscovites recognize the state of the economy to be bad and only 6 percent good. Half of the respondents at the beginning of the year felt that the overall state of the economy in comparison with the previous period had worsened. Practically speaking, those polled voiced their greatest grievances against all aspects of city life but especially to supply of industrial goods, the protection of the environment, and the provision of food and housing.

Muscovites feel keenly the exacerbation of nationality relations in the country. Here they rate the effectiveness of the measures taken to regulate regional nationality conflicts very low.

Extremely interesting are the views of capital society on the results of the first Congress of People's Deputies. Most poorly rewarded were the expectations that the congress would define a way to overcome our economic and nationality problems. Thus, before the conference 51 percent were confident of a solution of economic problems, whereas after only 32 percent were. And for nationality problems it was 55 and 27 percent, respectively. However, on the issue of the creation of a legal and democratic state, expectations and their realization, according to Moscow, coincided.

There are sufficient grounds to establish one fact: positive evaluations of the political sphere, international affairs, and the democratization of public life have clashed with economic and nationality problems and been transformed into doubts as to the fate of perestroika as a whole.

If one were to mention the most acute aspects of the present sociopolitical situation, then among them one could name: Muscovites' dissatisfaction with the activities of the organs of power; their treatment of informal organizations; collisions related to multipartyism; and

the possibilities of factions arising. People are also alarmed by the existing privileges, the right to hold meetings and demonstrations, the variations on the forms of property, and the problems of the limitichki, the limitists.

Analysis of the state of public awareness with respect to sociopolitical relations lets us draw several conclusions relevant to the present day. The politicization of public awareness is related to a sharp rise in the interest of broad strata and groups of the population in the results of the implemented policy. A manifestation of this tendency has been not only the demonstrated interest of everyone, even groups of the population that were extremely passive in the recent past toward the events and processes of political life but also the direct participation in those events and processes. We have seen an utterly untraditional participation in electoral campaigns, an exceptional rise in the number of spontaneous movements and organizations, inclusion in them of broad strata of the population, and an extremely broad spectrum of opinion, frequently expressed in unaccustomed forms. All these are new factors in contemporary life.

Of course, only a relatively small portion of politically active people are directly involved in the political sphere. According to our data, about 1 percent. True, one "Moscow" percent amounts to approximately 100,000 activists.

The most important aspect of the present-day state of public awareness in the sphere of socioeconomic relations is the switch from the old (outward, undoubtedly) unanimity of opinion to a multiplicity of opinions and judgments, depending on the social interests of concrete groups of the population. For example, according to the majority of Muscovites, the Congress of People's Deputies brought out the real positions of diverse population groups. Sociological research also reveals the bearers of the various tendencies in political awareness. Tentatively, we can identify the following gradations in the criterion of revolutionariness: radicals, moderates, and conservatives. As yet the work at establishing the connection between the bearers of given opinions and their membership in specific social, socioprofessional, demographic, and other population groups, is incomplete. Therefore we can draw only preliminary conclusions.

Thus, in the course of the pre-election campaign and elections we have determined that the group of skeptics, those with no faith whatsoever in the possible effectiveness of the measures for realizing political reform along its basic lines (laws, new electoral system, new principles of formation of organs of power, activities of the elected body of deputies, the reality of the power of the Soviets, etc.) comprised approximately 15 percent of the population. If we do not count that portion of those polled who expressed no position, then we can assert that approximately 80 percent of Muscovites, to greater or lesser extent, have not lost hope in the effectiveness of political reform.

We discovered that about 10 percent of Muscovites are unequivocal supporters of preserving the old foundations for sociopolitical relations. In particular, 13 percent of those polled are opposed to the creation of factions at the congresses ("the main thing is unity"), and 12 percent are against the participation of representatives of spontaneous movements in the elections for people's deputies. A very large group (about one-fourth) are supporters of partial changes in our sociopolitical life. A good half are for unconditional changes.

Also noted was a clear tendency toward a decrease in trust with respect to the proclaimed programs of political and social reform. This is linked above all with economic progress and the provision of essentials to the population. Although in the political sphere skepticism has decreased in the course of implementing the stages of political reform, since coming up against the absence of progress in the economic sphere it has been sharply transformed into an attitude that could be formulated thus: "Enough meetings, it's time to work." In favor of this approach were 55 percent of those surveyed; against, 36 percent. This tendency in mass consciousness overtly testifies to the fact that perestroika's success in public life, including politics, now depends above all on the successful resolution of socioeconomic problems.

Public moods and emotions frequently determine the form of action for entire social groups of the population and social communities on a higher level—all the way up to nationality groups. The mere changeability in assessments of various events and individual personalities, which was especially obvious in the course of the congress's work and which was possible to record thanks to the regularity of the surveys (every other day), is testimony to this. Public moods, their dynamics, were used to advantage by many candidates for people's deputy in the course of the electoral campaign.

Moods and emotions, evidently, are basic sources of populism—a new phenomenon of public life but one quickly gathering strength.

Discussion of Latvian Democratic Union Second Congress

90UN0428A Moscow *MOLODAYA GWARDIYA* in Russian No 10, Oct 89 (signed to press 28 Sep 89) pp 18-30

[Article by V. Zaburdayev: "Subverters of the CPSU and USSR"]

[Text] "A Young Hero Awakening!..." The second congress of the so-called Democratic Union [DU] just like the first one, which was held in May 1988, was prepared in profound secrecy. Only the initiated knew the date when it would be held. The place for holding it was chosen with particular care. Prior experience was taken into account. At the first congress, after all, which was held in Moscow, they did not manage to settle all the issues, since the local authorities, when they learned about the unusual assemblage, asked its participants to

leave not only the hall, but even the capital. Nevertheless, if one is to believe the leaflets of the DU, which so far have been distributed without hindrance throughout the country, more than 150 delegates and guests from nearly 30 cities took part in the proceedings of the first congress. They adopted a declaration, a program, and the statutory principles of the DU....

The Central Coordinating Council of the Democratic Union decided to hold the Second Congress of the DU in Latvia.

The train from Moscow was arriving in Riga in the morning. Through the train window, I regarded the snowless fields—this January it was springlike in the Baltic region. We pulled into the station. I left the train and went to a pay phone. I dialed the number that had been given me. A rich bass voice answered. He told me where to go, whom to find, what to say. The platform was crowded with people waiting for the electric train for Yurmala. One group of people stood apart. In their midst was the man described over the telephone. I went up to him and said what I was supposed to. These are all our people, my "escort" explained to me. I noticed that the people were mainly young and conversed with one another like old acquaintances. So what, it was not surprising that people who had met before should assemble for a congress.

As we were approaching the station, Bulduri, my acquaintance nodded to indicate that we had arrived. The car of the electric train quickly emptied. "There is the hotel where the congress will be held!" our guide said, gesturing in that direction. The delegates were crowded in one of the rooms to register. Here, they were also selling the union's publications—the newspaper SVOBODNOYE SLOVO, BYULLETEN DS, and leaflets. They gave me one of the leaflets. It had been produced on a personal computer, printed out, and Xeroxed. I was curious to see what it said. I read: "The Democratic Union (DU)—an opposition political party based on its founding congress...sets itself the principal task of changing the present system.... It brings together people with differing political convictions; the following ideological platforms exist within the party: democratic, Communist, Social-Democrat, Christian-Democrat, liberal democrat...."

The delegates are mainly young people, of Komsomol age, as they say. After registering, everyone went up the steep and creaky wooden staircase to the second floor. A small semicircular room crowded with chairs, and there were beds placed end to end. An occasional table served for a dais. There were no empty seats. New arrivals fitted in as best they could: they sat on bedside tables, they found room on the window sills. It was stuffy in the room. Someone suggested opening the door to the balcony before the session began. A pine forest was visible through the windows, there were white birches among the Yurmala pines. The waves of the sea were lapping the shore somewhere not far off. The red-white-red Latvian national flag was mounted on the wall.

Then the conversations fell silent, and V. Terekhov rose to chair the meeting. That same Terekhov who, according to PRAVDA, once served a sentence for common theft. Just think, here he was now a follower of the DU, and not merely a follower, but a member of the organization's coordinating council!

"Dear ladies and gentlemen!" V. Terekhov addressed those assembled. "In the name of our union's leadership, I present apologies for the discomfort. But we will not waste any time, down to work. Since we expect the congress to be broken up by the authorities. So, our congress is being attended by delegates representing the more than 500 members of the party...."

Lengthy loud applause resounded.

It turned out that guests had also come to the congress. The most numerous delegations were from the Movement for National Independence of Latvia and the Latvian People's Front. There were also representatives from the Estonian People's Front.

It is now so obvious that one can say that the increase in people's social activity is a typical feature and one of the most striking signs of the times. It is as though they had begun to shake off sleep. Unusual proposals, statements and original judgments which even yesterday might have been considered seditious are making their way into public life. Just recall: just 4 years ago before any initiative could emerge, it had to tear its way through the brambles of the bureaucratic apparatus and receive its go-ahead. Now many things are permitted. And as an echo of that various clubs and associations have emerged, most of them formed by young people. Restless people, excited about the changes in our life, no longer willing to resign themselves to the stagnation, refusing to accept conformity, and rejecting near survival, have been drawn into them. Put figuratively, the numerous informal structures are the "illegitimate children" of perestroika. In a way, they are like a counterbalance to such official organizations as the party and soviet structures, Komsomol, the trade unions, DOSAAF, the Society for Protection of Nature and Monuments, the Sobriety Society, people's control authorities, and others which both out of duty and obligation are supposed to do their job, but either have not wanted to or for some reason have been unable to. This is, if you like, a natural reaction to many of the problems that have come to a head, including political problems. But besides that and in addition to the fact that the changes are taking place very slowly, spokes are being put in the wheels of perestroika in some places, whether covertly or overtly, and outright sabotage is even encountered. The "informals" are signs of an awakened self-consciousness in the people, of gushing initiative and civic responsibility. There is every reason to compare them with an awakening young hero. Unfortunately, however, all the spontaneous groups do not reflect the essence of that young hero from the bylina.

The young hero from the bylina knew quite well what he was doing, his cause was just, and he had a noble, wonderful ideal—to rid the fatherland of evil spirits! But now some of the informal associations have begun to advance rather dubious values, to make people nervous and impatient, to play on their ethnic sentiments, to incite mutual enmity. In rallies, the hotheads have begun to demand elimination of the Communist Party and Komsomol, the establishment of parliamentarianism after the model and in the likeness of the West. It turns out that they have begun to spread evil instead of good.

Ultimatums and Protests

The DU could hardly have found a better place to hold its congress than the Baltic region! Except perhaps in the Transcaucasus.... In both places, it has become possible to juggle sometimes doubtful slogans which treat tendentiously the ambiguous landmarks of the republics and facts of contemporary life. It is in the Baltic region that many of the informals have begun to use for their own purposes the mistakes of government institutions and public organizations, including Komsomol. Just take the Movement for National Independence of Latvia, whose members were guests of the Second DU Congress. Its program is not merely antagonistic to the republic's Communist Party; it is antisocialist. At the beginning of the year, did the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet adopt the decree "On the Activity of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia" for a joke? It states that the movement is a sociopolitical organization which denies the possibility of the perestroika of society through popular sovereignty in the form of the soviets. A number of provisions in such documents as the program, bylaws, and resolution which were adopted at the congress of the movement held at the beginning of this year contradict the Latvian SSR Constitution. For example, the program and bylaws envisage as the ultimate goals "reestablishment of the independent democratic Latvian state," creation of parliamentary democracy based on the principles of the 1922 Constitution of the Latvian Republic. Contrary to the republic's Constitution, the programmatic documents proclaim to be unlawful the nationalization of the means of production, which under the law are socialist property and constitute the basis of Latvia's economic system. And what does the resolution of the congress entitled "On Military and Alternative Service" proclaim? The right to refuse military service in the Soviet Army!

The Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet called upon the movement to bring its program, bylaws, and resolutions into conformity with the Constitution; otherwise, the decree stated, the organization's activity would be prohibited!

A serious warning, no denying that. But just what guarantees are there that the activity of the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia will change after "the provisions are brought into conformity"? None at all! What is more, reality is confirming it. In its

work, the organization stops at nothing, not even outright discrediting of the authorities of the state. For instance, the movement's INFORMATSIONNYY LISTOK No 7, published 9 March of this year, carried the story of K. Freymane, a member of the movement's council, about how she had occasion to visit "the staff headquarters on the corner of Brivibas Street" and about the attacks she was subjected to there. A similar version about persecution of the Riga schoolgirl for taking part in the picketing around the staff headquarters of the Baltic Military District, whom they had taken from the school allegedly "for questioning in the ChK," was broadcast over "Radio Free Europe" in Lettish on 15 March. And ATMODA, bulletin of the People's Front of Latvia, printed an "open letter" of teachers in Riga High School No 77, attended by K. Freymane, to the chairman of the Latvian SSR KGB. It also published an article charging the personnel of the State Security Committee, who supposedly have not ceased persecuting a young girl who is not guilty of anything.

S. Zukul, chairman of the republic's KGB, was accordingly forced to make a statement for the press. It was published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA. It specifically stated that this was not the first attempt to discredit the republic's State Security Committee. On one occasion, for example, the director of the Museum of the History of the City of Riga and Marine Navigation sent an inquiry to the Latvian KGB because that institution's furnaceman, A. Buldinskiy, had justified an absence of more than 2 weeks by stating to the administration that he had been detained that entire time by the KGB. In actual fact, it was an invention of an absentee.

As for the "scandal" about persecution of the Riga schoolgirl, the republic's KGB conducted an official inquiry. It turned out that the text of the "open letter" was adopted in a meeting of the faculty council of the Riga High School No 77 and was based solely on what K. Freymane had said. The girl alleged that she had been detained by an officer of the KGB with the help of two policemen, that she had been taken to the headquarters of the State Security Committee, and had been questioned there.

None of which was confirmed. Not a single officer of the KGB had received the assignment or permission to summon K. Freymane for an interview. What is more, there was no record of her entering or leaving the building of the KGB. In the explanation which K. Freymane wrote in her own hand, the description of the rooms to which she was supposedly taken for questioning does not square with reality.

"I can declare with a full sense of responsibility that the very act of publishing unverified information in the open press is a manifestation of purposive activity serving to undermine the authority of a government institution, which is what the State Security Committee is," this is the conclusion drawn by S. Zukul, chairman of the Latvian KGB, concerning the "scandal."

Scandals, ultimatums, picketing, protests, and ultimately rallies and demonstrations—these weapons are not exclusive to the arsenal of the movement. The Democratic Union also makes vigorous use of these "gentleman's" weapons in its activity. It is hard for a reasonable man to believe, but that is how it is: its members are all but enthusiastic in counting up the number of fines imposed on them for violating law and order, the number of arrests and detentions by police officers. And although the "movement people" represent an organization that adheres to views that are far from moderate, even they were stunned and shocked at the speech delivered by V. Novodvorskaya, member of the DU Central Coordinating Council. She said in particular:

"The Soviet leadership takes positions which are purely imperialistic and will never voluntarily restore to the enslaved peoples...their sovereignty.... Either you and I will be able in the near future to bring that regime down, and the fall of the Kremlin dictatorship is just as important to the peoples of the Baltic region as to those who live in Russia, or we can expect a paroxysm of terror.... And never forget that your fathers and grandfathers defended the independence of the state of Latvia with weapons in their hands.... The goal of separation of the Baltic states from the USSR and the goal of changing the system of government within the Baltic states and within the entire empire—must be proclaimed quite openly...."

This speech by one of the theoreticians of the Democratic Union, which is what V. Novodvorskaya considers herself, was published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, which is published in Riga. It did not receive any specific condemnation from the informals, even though a certain segment of them were shocked by it. To some degree, these thoughts are even in tune with members of the People's Front of Latvia, whose representative at the Second DU Congress presented greetings on behalf of his organization.

The idea of creating the front was born in the circles of the Latvian informals at the beginning of last year. At that time, the NF was seen as a large-scale organization that would oppose the command-administrative method of management and the bureaucratic apparatus. It was assumed that the front would raise the real problems of society and organize democratic forces that would strive to carry out the changes that have become urgently necessary. In the middle of last year, an initiating group was formed that took responsibility for organizing the People's Front of Latvia. It had no clearly distinguished leader with a name well-known enough throughout the republic. That was its weak point. But the group's strong suit was that it recruited in drafting its program practicing economists who understand perfectly the priority needs of the economy. The program of action which the group proposed put main emphasis on the economy, since it rightly felt that the roots of most of the republic's problems, including the shrinking of the use of the national language, the decline of the national culture, and bad blood in interethnic relations, lay precisely in the economic sphere. This group was soon joined by

another group consisting of creative intellectuals—writers, poets, and artists. The latter group paid particular attention to humanitarian problems, and the economic part of their program was rather vague. And its slogans were catchy, incendiary, capable of arousing people's fascination. When the two groups merged, urgent preparations began for the Founding Congress of the People's Front of Latvia. In a short time, the number of members supporting the NF [People's Front] increased to tens of thousands and soon the number exceeded 100,000.

It must be said that the NF was conceived as an interethnic organization, but in fact the overwhelming majority of its members were Letts. The reason for this is that the idea of the rebirth of the Lettish nationality served as a powerful force rallying the Letts around the NF. This had a great deal to do with the fact that Letts comprised 94 percent of the delegates at the founding congress.

Quite a bit has already been written about the Congress of the Latvian People's Front, which was held last October. An assessment has also been made of it—euphoria. And indeed, how otherwise is one to describe everything that occurred at it? The delegates went to the speaker's platform one after the other. Most of them repeated almost one and the same thing: the Lettish people, who have suffered from repression, who did not raise up their heads during the stagnation, must today experience their rebirth and are experiencing it. The delegates to the congress for some reason stressed particularly that only the Lettish people have suffered from the repression, only the Latvian culture is in need of rebirth. One inevitably got the impression that the speakers were convinced that the Lettish nationality is special. This impression was intensified by the extremist statements of many of those who spoke. And how could they not be made in that atmosphere, when the ideas of one speaker were repeated many times over. The speech by I. Chizhevskiy, delegate from the republic's Kraslavskiy Rayon, who spoke about what it was like during Hitler's occupation of Latvia with all but tears of tender emotion, accused the Russians of all the troubles the Lettish people have experienced. And for 2 days all of this was carried from 0900 hours until late at night over Latvian television and radio! Speeches like that of I. Chizhevskiy were puzzling both to the Letts and to the Russians. Telegrams expressing protest and indignation began to arrive at the television studio and the congress' coordinating center....

One can only be surprised that the delegates to the congress were not aware of the fact that today Latvia is the homeland not only and not exclusively of the Letts. Over the 40 years since the war, two generations have already been born of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and people of other nationalities for whom Latvia is their native land. That is why the thesis "Latvia to the Letts," which was the leitmotiv of most of the speakers, was interpreted by the russophone population, which now comprises about half of the republic's inhabitants,

as the intention of the People's Front, which is predominantly Lettish in its composition, to drive people who were born and brought up here out of their own home. The very next day the leaders of the republic began to correct the People's Front speakers in order to smooth over this attack. In the press conference which they gave together with the elected leaders of the NF, it was clearly stated that the Latvian People's Front set itself distinctly apart from extremist statements, that no one intended to forcibly compel Russians to move out of Latvia, that it was clear to the People's Front that the Lettish people could solve its own problems as a nationality only in unity with the Russian and other nationalities.

The Congress of the People's Front adopted programmatic documents. And soon the interdepartmental commission for registration of newly formed public associations adopted a decision to register the bylaws of the NF. That registration signified that the NF was recognized as having been created, that is, having been transformed from an informal organization to an officially recognized juridical person, with all the ensuing consequences, including the right to take part in the election campaign. Which is how it would have been if it were not for the intervention of the Latvian SSR procurator; recognizing that the bylaws of the NFL [Latvian People's Front] did not meet the requirements of the Constitution, he filed a protest with the republic's Council of Ministers against the decision of the interdepartmental commission and was able to prevent it from taking effect.

What compelled the procurator to take such a step? First of all, the NFL was registered as a sociopolitical organization. This is contrary to the Latvian SSR Constitution. Second, the NFL actually opposes the leading role of the CPSU. To be specific, the front's bylaws stated that the Communist Party and other public organizations collaborate with the NFL mainly through their members as intermediaries. That is, to put it in simple language, the NFL does not envisage collaboration with the Communist Party, but felt that if such cooperation with the NFL was necessary to the latter, then, for God's sake, let the Communists first join its ranks!

There is no denying it, this is an interesting way to pose the question. But it was still more interesting in fact. Many Communists, most of them young, along with Komsomol members, because of their poor legal training did not understand many of the provisions of the NFL Bylaws and Program, its goals and tasks, which had been disguised in juridical and political language, and they continued to be members of the People's Front together with members of an organization which proclaimed itself to be political (!)—the Movement for National Independence of Latvia and the group "Helsinki 86," which, using membership in the NFL as a cover, were openly subjecting the population to anti-Soviet and separatist propaganda.

It is difficult to describe the indignation expressed against the procurator! They accused him personally of persecuting the NFL, of operating "from the positions of

the Interfront," which, incidentally, was created soon after the appearance of the NFL and which was mainly joined by the russophone population. Which is clear. For the People's Front, which claimed sole leadership in the republic, creation of the Interfront was a serious hindrance in accomplishing its ambitious goals. The Interfront was a bone stuck in its throat, and that is why the leaders of the NFL, its theoreticians and officials, did everything possible to slander the Interfront in the media.

However that may have been, the Presidium of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet dissolved the interdepartmental commission of the Ministry of Justice, and it also annulled its decree registering the Bylaws of the NFL. But the front itself was not dissolved. It continues to operate. What is more, in the same spirit. It sympathizes with and understands the slogans and demands of the Democratic Union.

Groups have been appearing in the streets which express their own demands, protests, and views in public, by means of posters and slogans. The main organizers of the meetings, rallies, and street marches are all once again members of the group "Helsinki 86," the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia, and the NFL.

"Our attitude toward all those social movements is unambiguous and principled," I. Kezbers, secretary of the Latvian SSR CP Central Committee, declared in one of his interviews published in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, "we welcome and offer every kind of support to everything that is beneficial to perestroika, although, to be honest, we could get along without some of them. We need the efforts of the People's Front, of Interfront, and of the other movements and associations, whose activity is aimed at speeding up perestroika, at developing democracy, at strengthening our socialist system. Everything that is extremist, like the slogan 'Latvia for the Letts,' everything that contradicts the 19th All-Union Party Conference, will never receive our support, and we have already stated our position on this repeatedly. We cannot allow society to split over any of the principles—ethnic or social. And we will fight extremism in its every form, setting against it the vigorous and, most important, constructive position of Communists, who incidentally are numerous both in the People's Front and also in Interfront. We do not have the right to fail to respond to any political rhetoric which is not backed up with a constructive program."

Meanwhile, life has been serving us unexpected surprises. Like this one. Students in the Lettish and Russian divisions of Riga School No 82 once declared: "We do not want to go to the same school." You see, they do not understand each other very well, and their interests do not always coincide, and the dual system of instruction does not have the best impact. In short, everything is working for division. And how do the teachers view this? They entirely support this point of view. Following the founding congresses of the Latvian People's Front and Interfront, the school faculty seems to have broken up

into two camps. And then members of the Komsomol committee of the Lettish division failed to appear for their regular work and expressed a desire to split up the Komsomol organization. And the instructors immediately perceived this as a clear guide to action. The split occurred in the next Komsomol Assembly: the Komsomol organization was divided into Letts and Russians. But how does this square with the fact that Komsomol is a sociopolitical organization, and its division along ethnic lines can only have one result: destruction of the main organizing principle of the VLKSM—democratic centralism...?

And at the beginning of the summer the Board of the Duma of the Latvian People's Front adopted an appeal to all members of the NFL which specifically said that the Latvian People's Front, relying on the programmatic principles adopted by the founding congress, had acted on the basis of the federal principle. But events in recent months indicate that the desire of the Baltic region as a whole and of Latvia in particular to achieve those goals has been encountering ever fiercer political, economic, and ideological opposition from the center and internal reaction. Without naming the "forces of internal reaction," the Duma called for the groups and divisions of the NFL to discuss the question: involvement of the Latvian People's Front in the fight for full political and economic independence of Latvia.

In an expanded meeting of the Buro of the Riga City Committee of the Latvia CP, a decision was adopted in which it was noted that the appeal of the Duma Board was a serious step toward destabilization of the political situation. It follows from that appeal that the Duma Board is changing its political conception concerning the further development of the republic's sovereignty, and is actually calling for Latvia to withdraw from the USSR.

Yes, the growth of social tension is obvious. And its sources are to be found not only in the Baltic region or in the Transcaucasus, but also in a number of Russia's large cities. The development of democracy cannot be seen as a synonym for license, as a permit for anarchy, for undermining constitutional legality and the legal order. However, the slogans of democratization, glasnost, and the broadening of human rights and freedoms are being used more and more frequently by varicolored little groups of those who while claiming to be advocates of perestroika, are in actuality its unbridled opponents. Those who would like to turn democracy into a lack of discipline, glasnost into the right to pin on labels, and who would like to put rights and freedoms in a one-way stream headed toward lawlessness. The events in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which have tragically taken the lives of innocent people and caused the country moral and material damage difficult to repair, the nationalistic actions in the Baltic region, Moldavia, and other regions are on the conscience of the self-styled leaders—extremists and nationalists, who have been concealing their true face behind the mask of devotion to perestroika. Nationalistic manifestations have begun to be characterized ever more noticeably by anti-Soviet and

antisocialist coloring. In that respect, the Democratic Union whose second congress was held in Yurmala, is a most vivid example.

For What Is the DU Striving?

V. Terekhov, who chaired the Second DU Congress, continued:

"More than 100 delegates and guests have come to Yurmala from certain cities in the country, delegates both with a deciding vote and also with an advisory vote."

The agenda was approved, the rules were established. The floor was given to V. Novodvorskaya for her report on the political situation in the country. The audience applauded.

"What should our political party do?—that is the question that we must know how to answer." V. Novodvorskaya spoke quietly, but she was clearly audible in the hushed room. The delegates were recording her speech with tape recorders and notepads.

"The present regime will not undergo any reform," V. Novodvorskaya continued. "The specific situation is such that in 2 or 3 years the economy will collapse. The economy is becoming uncontrollable. When a crisis situation occurs in the country, we will offer the masses a realistic program. If necessary, we will call for a general political strike. The general political strike is our objective. We must prepare society for fierce confrontation with the authorities...."

No, V. Novodvorskaya made no mistake at all and did not qualify it when she referred to the DU as a political party! The bylaws of that organization clearly state that the DU is "a political party that stands in opposition to the totalitarian government system of the USSR." The union considers itself the "political opponent of the CPSU." The true goal of the DU is to remove the CPSU from the political arena, to completely change the social system. The declaration of the DU adopted by the second congress specifically states: "In favoring the ideas of radical democratic transformation of society, the DU defines the content of its activity as 'political opposition' to the government system of the USSR." The declarations repeat the political principles: "A member of the Democratic Union repudiates not only Stalinism, but also the cult of Lenin and Leninism as the foundation of the ideology and the system."

The DU is an organization which has been formed and which has its own program, its own political and statutory principles, it has its money fund, its publications, its reliable ties with a number of foreign organizations and foreign news media. Two interesting details. The delegates came to the congress at the expense of the union. The day after the congress began, foreign radio stations reported its opening!

The newspaper PRAVDA, speaking about the Leningrad branch of the DU, wrote: "Members of the Leningrad branch of the DU discuss quite seriously in their meetings the possibility of taking power by force of arms. Some members of the union openly call for creating groups of fighters and have been trying to recruit them from among servicemen. And as a consequence of all that the constant collisions with the authorities, scuffles with the police, call not only for political, but also physical settlement of accounts with the Communists. What kind of opposition in the normal sense of this word could this be? As we see, we are dealing with an extremism that knows no restraint."

The DU uses all possible means of propagandizing its extremist ideas and views: rallies, what are called "tusovki," something like Hyde Park in London, leaflets, and a newspaper. Incidentally, something about the union's periodicals. Today, the publications issued by its members number more than half a score. The most widely distributed are BYULLETEN DS and the newspaper SVOBODNOYE SLOVO. The printed product can be purchased not only in a special kiosk which operates in an apartment in Moscow, but you can also subscribe if you like. To be sure, the price is not very cheap—one copy of SVOBODNOYE SLOVO costs 1 ruble. The members of the DU put a high price on their ideas! The publications actually spit on the present system, never ceasing to pour streams of murky lies now on one organization, now on another. Sometimes they sling mud even on specific individuals.

A method, after all, that is rather well-known. The bourgeois press makes extensive use of it: lie, shout, something will stick!

Unfortunately, I do not have any data that would make it possible to determine how effective the extremist propaganda of the DU is. But, judging by conversations at the congress concerning the influx of new members, it is a problem. At present, the propaganda is not working. The delegates even criticize their own "press."

Someone might perceive the DU as an ordinary informal organization. But it would be naive to think so. Just as naive as it would be to list it among the authors of certain ideas. For example, the idea of "doing away with the CPSU." It has long been known that this idea was not born in our country, but in foreign subversive centers. One such center is the NTS. "The People's Labor Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS)," we read in one of the leaflets hardly bigger than a matchbox that are distributed by followers of the DU—"began back in 1930 to fight for establishment of a lawful system in our homeland, but by contrast with the CPSU, the NTS knows that radical transformations are impossible unless social forces and initiative independent of government power, all the way to new political parties and organizations, have a broad part to play in them." And if one turns to the magazine POSEV, a publication of the NTS, many things fall into place. Nearly every issue recalls that the NTS is fighting to remove the regime that exists in the

USSR, that NTS groups are operating in our country underground. They are recruiting in the effort devoted people, they are distributing literature and leaflets. Was NTS material the basis of the programmatic documents of the DU? An article entitled "Perestroika and the Political Opposition," published in POSEV last year, shed some light on this at least. "In Russia," it states, "the first thing that needs to be done is a basic reform, a primary reform whose essence would be to remove the Communist Party from affairs. Only a political opposition can set itself such an objective."

As we see, there is not such a great discrepancy in objectives between the NTS and the DU. It is already well-known that there is close contact between the activity of Western special services aimed at torpedoing perestroika and the work of the Democratic Union. It does not seem difficult to draw from this an accurate conclusion as to what the DU is striving for. Our readers have probably figured that out already. Here, for example, is what A. Ivanov and A. Mezentsev of Petrozavodsk write: "The DU refers to the 'dissidents' of the seventies as its ideological predecessors. At the same time, the connections between the 'dissidents' and international Zionism have been written about in considerable detail. These ties have now been transferred to the DU, their successor. Western financing, deliveries of copying equipment, propaganda and political support are going to the DU in hopes that in the 5th year of perestroika there will be real chances in our country for transforming socialism into capitalism. Western figures could not be more frank. Recently, in an interview with central television one American businessman said: 'Perestroika? I am for it! What do I think it is? Well, it means that the leadership of the USSR has realized that socialism has no prospect and is coming back to capitalism.'"

Many readers have in fact noted such a tendency. A majority of the newspapers and magazines published in Moscow at one time "attacked" Pamyat, in concert and synchronized with Western radio stations, and now they say literally nothing about the Democratic Union. But is this accidental? And readers themselves reply: "No, it is not accidental!" The point is that the leaders of the DU have noted more than once that the ideological platform of such publications as OGONEK, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, and YUNOST is very close to the platform of the DU. Quite a few of the articles in those publications, which give a distorted idea about our history and which destroy ethical values, work in the mainstream of accomplishing the program of the DU.

Readers are not far from the truth. V. Novodvorskaya, speaking in the DU Congress, said openly that the union not only had an underground press, but also a legal one, which was very close in spirit. She even enumerated those publications which are closest, which "are doing a great deal already." They are OGONEK, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and YUNOST. One can in fact be open when among one's own!

At one of the rallies of the DU, I had occasion to hear an exceedingly interesting comparison to the effect that before perestroika there was a kind of vacuum, an emptiness in social life in some respects resembling a jug—a vessel in the form of a pitcher that has a lid—which now everyone can fill with the content that suits him according to his own understanding, discretion, and conviction, to the effect that the ideas of the DU represent the content that is necessary.

No, that is not how it is, the soul of man is not like a jug! No, we have not been living in a vacuum! Every man has had his ideal! The pity is that for some people it degenerated into getting by, and the best efforts were committed to achieving sufficiency and moving up the ladder. In keeping with that, young people's dreams, good intentions, pure motivations were forgotten. Mercantilism and a cynical view of life became widespread. Yet everyone was not infected with the bacillus of getting by! There were quite a few people who did not like that way of life, who could not reconcile themselves to baseness and inertness, who fought the various kinds of violations and abuses, corruption and the Mafia, who defended, as far as was possible, their own honor and dignity, and who took the part of the insulted and injured.... No, the human soul is not a pitcher. It is not possible to pour one thing out of it and pour something else in!

It seems that the ideologists and inspirers of the DU were very much interested in catching young souls in their net. It is not by accident that the congress adopted a decision to enroll members beginning at age 17. There were in fact proposals to begin even at age 16! The issue was raised of what would be done with members of Komsomol who wanted to join the union? After all, the speaker said, withdrawing from Komsomol could deprive a young person of the opportunity to study and receive a diploma. But if the road to the union is blocked for them, others argued, we would be depriving ourselves of an influx of new members from Komsomol. At the height of this dispute, a delegate from Novosibirsk stood up:

"Do you know how many members of Komsomol there are in the DU now? They represent one-third! University students gladly join our union. Why would we not allow enrollment to those Komsomol members who recognize our political principles and bylaws? I myself became a member of the DU when I belonged to Komsomol. But recently I withdrew from Komsomol...."

The dispute seems to have been resolved.... So that one cannot overestimate the influence of the DU on young people. What is Komsomol doing to oppose this?

The members of the Democratic Union are calling for freedom, democracy, and glasnost. That is what they say. But in actuality they are secretly preparing acts of all kinds, they are issuing leaflets and newspapers containing anti-Sovietism, they are holding meetings and even a congress! Incidentally, the congress held recently shed light on how the preparations were made for it. One

of the former members of the DU admitted in a treatise he wrote and which was entitled "New Pages From the Life of the Democratic Union or Revelations of a Former Member of the Central Coordinating Council": "When in the evening of the day before the elections I went to the apartment where the primary discussions were taking place, they were hard at work and were apparently not expecting me. But as soon as I arrived, they told me to make ballots for the elections. The essence of the fraud that took place was that there were far more ballots than voters. This made it possible to add additional ballots to the ballot box, and during the count to covertly remove the same number of ordinary ballots or not to count them. For such an operation, they clearly had to have the necessary people on the commission for counting the ballots. The elections could not have gone better."

That is how the membership of the Central Coordinating Council of the DU was formed in one of the intermediate stages.

These "revelations" are valuable because they come from the mouth of a man who, as they say, had a deep feeling that this was the kind of newly created organization that was expected to "change the present system." "At first, I took part in demonstrations, and I did more than just take part, I organized two well-known ones: on 21 August and 5 September (1988)—along Tverskiy Bulvar," the former DU member writes. "It was terribly stupid to walk along the street, shouting slogans such as 'Down With the Red Terror!' or 'Freedom to Czechoslovakia!' and then to sit in a stuffy jail cell, to go to court, to be given one's 15 days under the law or a fine of, say, 200 rubles, which you did not have. For what? So that people passing by would shy away from you or give you the finger...?"

As a matter of fact, it is all stupid! But still tens and hundreds of young people were participants in the unsanctioned rally in April in Pushkin Square in Moscow which was organized by the DU. By the end of the day, more than 700 persons had been detained for violating public order. Among them were quite a few young people from other cities and with no definite occupation. As a result, there were administrative arrests of 25 persons, 20 were fined (the size of the fine ranged from 20 to 1,000 rubles), and 15 people were warned.

Relying on the well-known principle that states that unethical means cannot lead to an ethical end, it is quite possible to close the circle of concepts and finally remove the curtain from the Democratic Union. The closeness to this organization of certain informal extremist groups, which are ready to do the union service after service, including making space available for holding their underground congress..., also seems to be getting clearer.

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Reevaluating Domestic Functions of Armed Forces

Keep the Military in Traditional Role

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 89
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[Article, published under the heading "Theory and Practice of Renewal: The Debate Club of *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* on the Question Functions of the Army: Dialectics of Development," by Col O. Belkov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "The Army Should Do Its Job"]

[Text] Times indicate that the question concerning the functions of the army is a problem which presently concerns many. With good reason this was raised at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The army should do its job. This is the principled position of the Soviet leadership as set out by M.S. Gorbachev from the rostrum of this congress. Its practical implementation presupposes clear and firm notions of precisely what is the job of the army. As is known, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies instructed the Supreme Soviet to work out an assessment of the decision taken at one time to commit Soviet troops to Afghanistan and set up a special commission on examining the circumstances related to events in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989. It is a question of ascertaining how necessary and valid were the political decisions to bring in the army in either instance.

On the theoretical level, it is a question of whether or not there are limits for the use of the army and what these are. In this context one can understand the sense and significance of the debate over the question concerning the army's functions. Without claiming a complete elucidation of this broad and difficult problem or an infallibility of the judgments voiced, we would like within the limits of the limited exchange of opinions in a journal to draw attention to several facets of this.

At the Congress of People's Deputies and at the First Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet some speakers spoke with pride about the army's participation in carrying out economic tasks and gave impressive examples of victories on the labor front. Others were indignant wondering if this was a matter for the army? If each year for an extended time many thousands of truck drivers are diverted into harvesting jobs or if the men called upon to defend the motherland are not participating in combat training, can one not help but wonder whether this would be felt in providing motor transport for the needs of the troops or on the combat skills of the units sent for combat duty? Are the activities of reservists called up for "assemblies" to participate in agricultural work service in the Armed Forces and the carrying out of an honorable civilian duty?

I personally favor the second viewpoint. The state and the people need the army to ensure their security. Ultimately there should be other institutions for carrying out

the national economic problems of society. The Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Questions of Defense and State Security must work out and carefully estimate how justified and necessary it is to employ soldiers as manpower. Even now, as they say, even the naked eye can see, on the one hand, that the involvement of the Army in carrying out plan quotas for the economic departments (military constructions workers, for example, carry out tasks in the interests of over a score Union ministries) is being turned for them into a permanent source of unskilled and cheap manpower and they will work steadily to see that this source does not dry up. At one time with the aid of additional paramilitary formations, construction was developed on heavy industry projects and later the Baykal-Amur Mainline was laid and now roads are being built in the Nonchernozem. Is this not the reason, as was pointed out at the Congress of People's Deputies, that we continue with a shortage of a high-quality induction group to call up into the construction troops a large portion of young persons with physical and moral defects and with criminal records.

Are these persons armed defenders of the motherland? Certainly they do not undergo military training and do not have weapons. The conclusion arises: if the army is freed from "rescuing" the plans of the economic departments then there would be a noticeable reduction in the size of the Armed Forces and the military budget would decline. This meets the interests of a complete conversion to economic management methods within the nation and the strengthening of confidence in our country as well as a further lessening of tension on the international scene.

On the other hand, due to well-known causes and numerous economic failings, society has shifted a portion of the concerns about the army to the army's own shoulders. Yes, we still cannot abandon the troop ancillary farms as together with the military sovkhozes they supply all the personnel with meat, vegetables and other foodstuffs. We are forced to build housing, schools and preschool institutions for serviceman families, to run the utilities system of the military camps and so forth. But all of this even with the richest imagination cannot be viewed as carrying out the intrinsic task of the army, that is, to learn what is needed in a war.

At present, more and more insistently the question is being discussed of the army's professionalism. The arguments are nothing more than naive by those who favor an army which "can be completely professional only simultaneously being a productive force working just as professionally in the peacetime area. But what sort of military specialist is this who is professionally involved, for instance, in raising cabbages or is a house painter? If it is a matter of using the ideas and principles of military organizational development for creating a labor army, then, it seems to me, such ideas are something from the past. We "went through" this during the period of war communism and the dominance of a command-administrative system which endeavored to turn the

entire society into a barracks. An army which produces more than the expenditures on its upkeep under present-day conditions is both impossible and ill-advised. And an army as a military organization in which a nonmilitary function prevails in its activities can only be a speculative formation which in its essence is illogical.

In this context, I would like to raise the so-called educational function of the army. The ability and readiness of a person to carry out his civil duty in defending the motherland requires definite knowledge, abilities and skill. A notice of induction is not a free trip to a sanatorium and military service does not mean a release from the difficulties of life. Linked to the highest sense of responsibility for the fate of the motherland, it is becoming evermore intense in intellectual, psychological and physical terms.

The Armed Forces are carrying out extensive and effective work to develop the appropriate personality qualities. These are of individual and social significance and represent a value outside of the army structures. Military service broadens and enriches the vital experience of young people, it, as a rule, has a beneficial effect on developing their moral views and values and hones character. However, all of this is not an end in itself but rather a necessary and obligatory result of the vital activities of the military organism. The attempts at absolutizing this expressed in assertions about the educational function of the army cause serious doubts. For example, take such a widely known aphorism as "the army is a school of indoctrination." There is a real content for this and this was expressed in the thesis of the 27th CPSU Congress to make certain that our army is a school for indoctrinating civil responsibility, courage and patriotism. However, the given thesis is a figurative assessment and not an essential characteristic of the Armed Forces and makes no claim to completeness or thoroughness.

In the first place, this does not name the object at which the educational effect of the army is aimed and namely the personnel, the men in uniform. And although they are replaced every 6 months, a broadened interpretation is not correct. Long ago the notion was formulated which is still truthful today: it is not the army that is the school of society but rather society is the school of the army. Moreover, the army is not an educational and indoctrinational institution, it is not a school in the strict sense of the word. The development of a soldier is related primarily to the shaping of definite ideological-political, moral-combat and psychological qualities and precisely those which are needed chiefly for combat.

Secondly, army education (army schooling) is not either an obligatory condition for the development of a citizen or an obligatory prerequisite for the normal functioning of society. Far from all the young men undergo military service and this in no way prevents them from becoming proper citizens of the nation.

The theoretical "justification" for the educational function of the army has given rise to completely inadmissible proposals. Some, for example, complain that the army does not make sufficient use of its enormous potential for preparing young men for future work under civilian conditions. Here they emasculate the intrinsic content of military service which is viewed solely as a prelude for "real life." Others propose "changing the priorities in political education with the servicemen in the interests of demilitarizing mass awareness and indoctrination in a spirit of peace." But such appeals of a pacifist stripe are aimed objectively at turning the army into an organization incapable of employing military force, when circumstances might require this. Still others purely deny the educational effect of the army. Thus, recently there have been more frequent attacks on military patriotic education. But why has patriotism been so closely linked to the word military? Is it because the army has been an unique generator of patriotism? Or, on the contrary, have the military and the army endeavored to monopolize patriotism and completely subordinate it to the interests of their department? In no way. This has been the result of a lack of attention by other social institutions to instilling patriotic feelings in people and a reticence and inability of the conservative forces who brought the nation to stagnation to rely on the patriotism of the masses.

The creating and maintaining of a state's definite military force on a proper level is an objective necessity. As long as a nonviolent world has not become the norm, the rule continues to operate which V.I. Lenin formulated thus: a regular army is inherent to the strengthening power of any class. Consequently, the question is not whether or not there should be an army but rather when and how it can be employed and for the sake of what?

Here theoretically there are two motives: when the enemies of the existing order are the first to raise their weapons or when its supporters intend to impose their order on those who absolutely do not accept this. In both instances it is a question of coercion and the object of this can be the social strata and the political forces inside the nation and outside of it. Correspondingly, one speaks of the internal and external functions of an army. Their specific content is not a given state that is set once and for all. It reflects changes occurring in the economy and social structure of a society, the dynamics of the objectively arising military political situation in the world and in individual regions and the development of military affairs.

The question of the internal function of the army in the literal sense of this word is extremely complex. This is the question of the possibility of the development of a situation where it becomes justified, proper and necessary to employ the army for defending the existing system against its enemies among its own citizens. The obvious contradiction is that our ideology and morality repudiate armed violence against the people. At the same time, the events in Nagorny Karabakh, in the Fergana, Novyy Uzen and certain other regions of the nation show

the necessity of special and decisive measures to prevent mass social disorders and ensure the security of the society and the personal rights of the citizens. A one-sided assessment of this contradiction has led individual authors to biased conclusions distorting the role of the army in society and undermining the authority of the Armed Forces, the prestige of military service and the link between the army and the people. A number of articles have stressed the notion of the isolation of the army, its supposed covert nature and corporative spirit which impede the possibility of a dialogue with society.

What can be said on this question? It is impossible not to point out what is. Science should provide an explanation of reality. However, science cannot in the interests of playing up "establish" the necessity of what should not be. The elevating of any political phenomenon to the rank of a political norm is fraught with very serious consequences. This is precisely the case with the pseudoscientific establishing of the internal function of a socialist army.

In reality there is no such function. The Soviet people can be confident that in the army no one will move against our people. Democratization and glasnost, the growing openness and the elimination of the excessive secrecy in the activities of the Armed Forces will strengthen this certainty.

In speaking about "on whose side the army may be," it is essential first to determine who could act against perestroika, from where this would come and what force they would have for this. Moreover, one must not overlook the fact that the army is a weapon of the state. The forms and limits of its use are determined by state power in the form of its legislative and executive bodies. They, precisely they, and only they are empowered to take the decision on the employment of the army. In a state of law, the army should be subordinate to the democratically elected government.

In practice it is possible to have a triple violation of this principle.

1. The army is turned into a self-contained force, it escapes from under subordination to the government and carries out a state coup. But world experience indicates that such an action by the army is possible only under the corresponding social conditions, when the civilian structures of power are lacking or are completely impotent.

2. The leadership of the nation in becoming isolated from the masses discredits itself. Having lost the moral right to lead, it endeavors to protect itself and "discipline" the people with the aid of the army. The army, in being established to protect the people, is turned into their jailer. This is the obvious hypertrophy of its function. In order to prevent such a metamorphosis, it is essential to have legal mechanisms which exclude the arbitrary, voluntaristic use of the army.

3. The army is employed to stop mass social disorders, that is, it carries out the functions of protecting public order. Incidentally, the former legislated merging of the army and the interior troops as components of the Armed Forces had negative consequences. This required from the interior troops a definite readiness for action to defend the socialist fatherland and to a certain degree impeded their specific development as forces of public order. At the same time, such an identification in the eyes of the political leadership eliminated the real boundaries and made it possible to use the army for carrying out the tasks of the interior troops.

Thus, if the army "leaves the barracks" in peacetime, even if this is for the most humanitarian purposes, it is not doing its job. Our army has only one external function. This has always been viewed as the defense of the socialist fatherland and the victories of socialism against the encroachments of world reaction. There was a time when this defense was conceived of as waging a rapid war "with little blood on foreign territory." Then the task was set of dealing a crushing blow to any aggressor and force the potential enemies to reckon with us. At precisely that time the political weight and influence of the nation on the international scene was to be maintained by relying on military force and the unchecked development of this undermined the other components of state security. The affirming of the new political thinking has fundamentally altered the previous views and this has been reinforced in the new, strictly defensive military doctrine of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. Correspondingly, the view of the external function of the army has changed. The Armed Forces, without losing their direct purpose, act at the same time as a restraining factor. They are charged, as was emphasized at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, with ensuring strategic stability in the world and guaranteeing the security of the Soviet state and its allies.

In recent years, we have adopted and have begun to put into effect the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, the Armed Forces are being cut back, we have begun to withdraw our troops from friendly countries and their organizational structure has been brought into conformity with the strategic concept of a defensive doctrine.

All the measures being carried out in this direction must be strictly balanced. As long as there are no guarantees for the irreversibility of the positive changes in the world, we must not unilaterally give up our concern for the proper defense of the nation. Certainly precisely the fear of the aggressors of the inevitable retaliation which our army has inspired and does inspire is one of the most important factors of Soviet security and in preventing aggression. Until a political mechanism which makes war impossible has been established, we are forced to maintain and support the USSR Armed Forces on the proper level.

Internal Role of Army Examined

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 89
(signed to press 26 Sep 89) pp 19-20

[Article by Col (Ret) P. Skorodenko, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "In the Aims of Protecting Socialism"]

[Text] The question of the internal function of a socialist state's army, particularly in recent years, has become a question of rather sharp debate both within the socialist countries and outside. The content of the internal function of the army as the armed organization of a socialist society must be viewed in close relation to the stages of socialist construction, to the balance of class, political forces in one or another country as well as with the political situation on the international scene as a whole.

Generally recognized in theory and confirmed by practice is the fact that the army of a socialist state carries out the function of suppressing the armed resistance of the antisocialist forces during the transitional stage from capitalism to socialism.

The internal function can be manifested in various forms from such acute ones as a civil war, the suppression of armed revolts up to the "passive" effect on counterrevolutionary forces by the very fact of the army's existence. Vivid examples of this are the Civil War during the first post-October years in our country, the struggle against the armed opposition in People's Poland in the second half of the 1940s and in China at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. To one degree or another, it was necessary to resort to armed force for suppressing the remnants of the exploiting classes who put up violent resistance to the new social system in a number of other countries during the initial period of socialist construction.

As the socialist society developed, the internal function of the army has gradually withered away. Here the degree of the reduction of the scope of its tasks within the nation has depended both upon the degree of the maturity of socialism (the depth of the political, socioeconomic and spiritual changes) as well as upon the potential of the internal forces opposing socialism. Examples are known when in individual periods of history, under the conditions of an exacerbation of the domestic political and international situation, the armies of the socialist countries have been called in for carrying out domestic political tasks.

The most characteristic in this regard was the activities of the Polish Army during the crisis in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s, when martial law was declared throughout the entire nation, and the Military Council of National Salvation was established. Even before the adoption of these measures, the Fourth Plenum of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Central Committee (October 1981) pointed out: "The Armed Forces,

in carrying out the internal function of protecting the constitutional people's power, are the guarantee of stabilization in the nation."

During the period of martial law, the commissars who were the representatives of the Military Council of National Salvation and pointed to the wojewodstwo [administrative unit], ministries and departments, supervised and coordinated the activities of the local authorities, without replacing the existing state apparatus with their own structures. The appeal to the army for help was of a temporary and extraordinary nature and was not aimed at replacing the existing mechanism of socialist democracy by the army.

We feel that it is an invalid thesis of the antisocialist forces that the introduction of martial law in Poland was an action against the people. This was revolutionary violence against a rather narrow stratum of the population and primarily the counterrevolutionary upper clique. Activities were halted only in those organizations which were involved in preparing for a state coup.

The public opinion poll conducted at the beginning of February 1989 showed the workers' understanding of the role of the army during the crisis period in Poland. Some 75 percent of those polled voiced their confidence in the army. None of the nation's political institutions including the PZPR, the Sejm and the government had such authority. The Report of the PZPR Central Committee to the 10th Party Congress commented: "An invaluable possession for the soldier is the trust of the people. This has found proper confirmation in the very

responsible carrying out of tasks during the period of martial law and in performing the historic duty of saving the nation."

A different role was played by the Czechoslovak People's Army in the autumn of 1968. The rightist portion of the party and government leadership actually did not take measures against the counterrevolutionary coup and the approaching civil war while the supporters of the decisive defense of socialism did not possess within the nation a military force capable of resisting the pressure of reaction. The Document of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] Central Committee "Lessons of Crisis Development in the CPCZ and in Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress" states that during this period the combat capability and moral-political state of the Czechoslovak People's Army declined. "This is an historical fact," commented the Minister of National Defense M. Dzur later, "that in 1968 a counterrevolution occurred in Czechoslovakia and we were unable to oppose it with our own forces."

Experience indicates that in crucial stages in the development of socialism, the army should be ready to perform the internal function against forces acting with weapons in arms against the socialist system. Whatever the actions will be by the army in each specific instance depends upon the degree of acuteness of confrontation between the opposing sides and upon the degree of the threat to the victories of socialism.

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Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Discusses Draft Laws*90UN0238A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 13 Oct 89 p 1*

[Article by R. Zharetskaya: "Too Soon to Dot the I's: Reflections After the Summary Session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Legislative Proposals"]

[Text] The same auditorium, the same topics, but the discussion's participants were different. Last week, the discussion of draft laws important to the republic was transferred from the working group to the parliament; to be precise, to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Legislative Proposals.

...Just as it is supposed to be, each deputy has the text of the drafts at hand, in a separate little book—the working group's proposals. The comments coming directly from the voters were bound separately. The commission members operate with all these documents in moving from one article to the next. The work progresses with tortuous difficulty. And there are several reasons for this.

You cannot remove the subjective factor from the equation—the commission members' legal preparation. Many deputies have themselves acknowledged it to be insufficient for the serious legislative work which has fallen to them today. In recognition of all their responsibility, they have summoned common sense and experience to their aid, and have consulted their consciences. Yet too much effort has been spent on comprehending the statutes of this or that draft, and understanding amendments to it, so that less energy is left for seeking better versions. We must try to avoid in the future the defects installed by the former command-administrative system, which have become so obvious today. The body of the new legislative commission must comprise—such is the opinion of its present members—the finest legal scholars, sociologists, economists, and practitioners, who will be elected by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a new, more democratic law.

The most important thing for the reader today is to find out what constructive things the commission has managed to accomplish, in spite of the existing objective and subjective difficulties.

A number of amendments to the drafts have been adopted, which, in the commission's view, will expand the opportunities for a democratic election in the upcoming electoral campaign. Thus, the proposal to include in the election ballot for Belorussian SSR people's deputies no less than two candidates (in order to allow an alternative in the okrug's election) was supported. It is proposed that in repeat voting, the candidate for whom over 50 percent of the voters participating in the election cast their ballots be considered elected.

The commission immediately rejected some of the working group's proposals. For example, that the oldest deputy open the first Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet

session after the elections. The commission considered preferable a constitutional proposal: The first session after the elections (before the election of a Supreme Soviet chairman and his deputy) is conducted by the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission.

In some statutes, the commission went further down the road of democratization than did the working group. For example, stormy debates unfolded over Article 13 of the Draft Law on Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies, to be precise, the section of it which speaks of holding accountable those who appeal for and advocate boycotting the elections. As frequently happens in parliament, a legal debate helped the deputies in their determination.

"People can be held accountable for boycotting the elections—incidentally, this is done in other countries—if the citizen's right to elect is simultaneously a duty. According to our own legislation, this is a right, but not a duty," goes one argument.

"That is not what we are talking about, colleague," another lawyer, a commission member, objects to the guest. "Each person is free to decide for himself how to use his electoral right. In the given context, we mean something else—that the law's norm prevent anyone's encroachment, anyone's pressure on other voters' manifestation of their will. No one must be subjected to moral oppression for his choice, whether it is good or bad..."

The commission members are already getting into the conversation: "Yet isn't all of this taken into consideration in the very beginning of Article 13: 'Individuals hampering by use of force, deception, threat, or any other means the free execution of the Belorussian SSR citizen's right to vote for and be elected Belorussian SSR people's deputy or conduct an election campaign...bear the responsibility established by law.'"

In discussing matters in such a fashion, the commission decides to exclude the part of the phrase which evoked doubt. Nor did the fact that 31,000 workers' suggestions came in on this score play an insignificant role here. In the given case, in agreeing with the voters' amendments, rather than with the working group, the legislative commission thus expresses the voters' will, by believing in their political maturity. Hand on heart, we admit, did everything go on everywhere without dirty rumors, direct insults, or indirect threats? After all, democracy assumes a high quality of political fight. It is desirable that all the forces preparing for the upcoming election campaigns master the skills of the culture more quickly.

On more than one occasion during their meetings, the commission returned to the matter of with whom the candidate for deputy may lodge a complaint about what are in his view irregular actions of the okrug or district commissions—with the Central Electoral Commission or with the court?

"Naturally, with the commission," was the viewpoint of some deputies.

"If we want to build a law-governed state, a person can defend his rights only in court, including the right to elect and be elected," was the opinion of others.

"The candidate is judged all of sudden—that is hard to believe!" yet others express their doubt.

All viewpoints managed to be reconciled when they recalled that the both the Central Electoral Commission, and the Belorussian SSR Supreme Court are elected by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. It was decided that on electoral matters, the candidate would address the commission, and for all other matters, like any other citizen, he would address the court.

The deputies did not suddenly determine such a principled situation as the the okrug pre-electoral meetings. Having weighed out the working group's proposals, and the entirety of the voluminous package of collective and individual opinions, the commission introduced a compromise version: If more than ten candidates are nominated in the okrug, okrug pre-electoral meetings may be held.

From the very first day, many spears were broken in the commission, just as in society, incidentally, over a position such as elections from public organizations. It always seems simpler from the outside. But imagine that you have been given the right to decide. Individual citizens and labor collectives, public organizations and creative unions are appealing to your conscience with letters and resolutions. And you are almost convinced that the article should be excluded. But here A.Y. Andreyev, chairman of the council of the Belorussian veterans' organization and a man respected in the republic, rises and cites a figure of 2.2 million people. In the name of this guard, he asks the commission, "Is it fair if the least socially defended portion of the population, as we know, is not represented by its own deputies in the republic's highest organ?"

And that is not yet all. On the commission chairman's desk lies a telegram from the Committee of Soviet Women, requesting the preservation in republic drafts of the article on elections from public organizations: Women are hardly any better protected than veterans in our society...

And the lawyers will tell you that the article on elections from public organizations can be excluded only in violation of the corresponding article in the USSR Constitution. Would you take such audacity upon yourself? The commission did not. However, it did not agree that the article in the republic draft should remain in its previous form. The following votes were cast: of the 15 attending, 5 favored preserving the article, 4 abstained, and 6 were opposed. But the matter remains open, since in order that the commissions decision be considered as adopted, more than half of those in attendance must vote.

And several more impressions. The most gratifying is the noticeable growth of our parliamentary culture. There is still not enough of it to invite prominent lawyers from the working group and together correlate positions once again. Yet there is enough of it to hear out those who came on their own, without particular delicacy.

I cannot but mention the representatives of the new parliamentary thinking—USSR people's deputies A. Dobrovolskiy, A. Ablameyko, Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet deputy G. Yeremeyev, who participated in the commission's work on a voluntary basis. Their correct bearing, respect for the status of the commission members, their aspiration to seek pithy arguments in debate—after all, these are also the components of parliamentary culture so necessary to us today.

And of course, it is impossible today not to consider the future parliament's interrelations with the press. You would agree that it is humiliating to beg for the commission's concluding document and hear the reply, "The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies will receive it." And what newspaper writer doesn't know how easy it is to stumble into errors while preparing a report without reference material.

But our brother has something to think about, too. For example, is it really worthwhile to rush off to inform the reader that such-and-such a decision has been made about such-and-such an article after visiting only one or two working sessions, and not waiting for results? When this is only a working version, to which the commission may return, as is its right? And if the opinion changes, what will be the ethical relations among the reader, the deputy, and the correspondent?

...In summing up one of the sessions, Legislative Proposal Commission Chairman I.F. Yakushev said: "We (the commission—R.Zh.) are not claiming an ultimate truth. Proposals may become law only when the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet expresses its opinion on them. And this means that the work on draft laws is entering a new, most responsible phase."

Estonian Youth Union Draft Program

90UN0612A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 21 Nov 89 p 3

[Draft program: "On the Eve of the 21st Congress of the Estonian Komsomol: The Draft Program of the Estonian Communist Youth Union"]

[Text] At the 29 October meeting of the delegates to the 21st Congress of the Estonian Komsomol from the Tallinn city Komsomol organization, the decision was made to form a working commission which would take up the preparation of documents precisely expounding the position of the Tallinn representatives, and their vision of the republic's future Komsomol. The following became the authors of the proposed draft: A. Gaysin, member, Estonian Komsomol Buro, first secretary, Estonian Komsomol Kalininskiy Rayon committee; N.

Gogulan, director, Center for Political Culture, Estonian Komsomol Central Committee; M. Grigoryev, secretary, Komsomol committee; A. Kanyuchka, director, Central Youth Institute; A. Kurushev, second secretary, Estonian Komsomol Kalininskiy Rayon committee; I. Radkin, first secretary, Morskiy Estonian Komsomol Rayon committee; M. Sults, first secretary, Estonian Komsomol Tallinn city committee, and R. Trubetskoy, second secretary, the Estonian Komsomol Tallinn city committee. In preparing this draft, individual statutes of the program documents developed by creative groups of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moscow, and Leningrad, and by scientific staffers of the VKSh [Higher Komsomol School] and VKSh NITs [Scientific Research Center] of the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee, and the "Surgut Alternative" group were used.

There is no need to preface the Draft Program with an explanation of what organization its authors are talking about; the Program speaks for itself. However, the change in name from the LKSME [Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia, Estonian Komsomol] to the KSME [Estonian Communist Youth League] calls attention to itself. The authors are not making a fetish out of names, yet they do feel that the name must reflect the essence of the organization, its political face.

United over the communist idea, the draft's authors are for the exclusion of the word "Leninist" from the title, which does not at all disparage this concept, but rather expands the concept of "communist." Can there indeed be something "Leninist" which is not "communist"? "Communist"—this is both Marxist, and Leninist, and, if you like, Bukharinist. And many more communists in our country and abroad have made their contribution to the creative development of communist theory.

The Draft Program of the Estonian Communist Youth Union

Manifesto

The idea of communism has long since exchanged its white, spectral garments for red clothes. Red is the color of life, yet it is also the color of spilled blood. Under the banner of communism, revolutions have been victorious, and the world of socialism was born. Under the banner of communism, monstrous crimes against peoples, against human rights and freedoms have been committed. The communist idea aroused, emancipated progressive thought. The communist idea became, in the arsenal of ignorant intriguers and enforcers of the "purity of Marxism-Leninism," and science's unprincipled rogues, a cudgel, and at times, a lead bullet for different thinkers.

Knowing all of this, and rejecting "communism" Stalin-style, "communism" Khrushchev-style, and "communism" Brezhnev-style, we, the young advocates of perestroika, raise once more the patched, decrepit, bullet-riddled banner of communism in order to take our own path, differently from our grandfathers and fathers, toward that "bright tomorrow" of which they dreamed, but did not reach.

In understanding communism, we follow Marx and Engels, and without any reservations concerning the historical eras separating us, we repeat verbatim: "For us, communism is not a **CONDITION** which must be established, not an **IDEAL** to which reality must conform. We call communism the **ACTUAL** movement which destroys the current condition." (K. Marx, F. Engels; Collected Works, Vol. 3, p. 34).

From Marx we take the fundamental principle of communism—"the complete and free development of each individual" (ibid., Vol. 23, p. 605), and declare it our **fundamental principle**.

In modern conditions, adhering to this principle means for us:

- putting the young person, the defense of his rights, the realization of his interests and creative potential for society's benefit at the center of all our actions;
- influencing the formation and the implementation of a state youth policy, political and public organizations, and labor collectives;
- fighting for the revolutionary renewal of society, since perestroika is in the interests of young people.

We openly recognize our link with the Communist Party's perestroika course, but we just as openly proclaim: Do not expect from us blind execution of party directives. The only place for the slogan "The party said, 'This must be!'" and the Komsomol replied, "Yes, sir!" is in the archives. We proceed to perestroika not behind the party, but with the party; doubting, criticizing, proposing, but chiefly—acting. We recognize the truth of the Leninist words that "the minority—the party—cannot introduce socialism. Tens of millions can introduce it, when they learn to do this themselves." (V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works, Vol. 36, p. 53). We are prepared to devote our strength and energy to such study.

Our organization is open to all who are prepared to support our Program. Yet we are not now aspiring to a monopoly in the youth movement, and are prepared to work out on an equal basis with all non-communist, apolitical youth organizations, groups, and movements a platform of the Youth Front in support of perestroika.

We are open to the world; we recognize ourselves to be a part of the international youth movement, and free of sectarian prejudices. Humanism, mankind's salvation in the face of advancing global catastrophes—for us, these are genuinely communist ideas.

I. Priorities

In pursuit of the fundamental principle of our organization—the complete and free development of each individual—we are founded on the humanistic ideals cultivated by mankind's millennial experience, on the common task of building socialism with a human face.

Freedom of Identity

We understand freedom of identity as being the degree of its social independence, ensured by guaranteed opportunities and conditions for a person's self-realization in society.

The young person's freedom is limited not only by socially necessary prohibitions, without which there is no morality, no law, no guarantee of personal security for everyone. It is also limited by the concentration of power in the hands of the older generations, by distrust of youth, of their capacities to actually participate in the administration of affairs of state and society, by the shock at their style of life, thoughts, and moral principles. These stereotypes restrain not only the development of young identity, but of society as a whole.

We do not appeal to older generations to immediately part with their preconceptions toward youth. Such appeals would be naive. Yet we do favor:

- the creation of the socially necessary conditions for a young person's normal start in life, the removal of age barriers upon his selection of a form and place of activity, other than those limitations designed protect the young person from physical and psychological overload;
- the recompense for any productive labor of a young person to be based exclusively upon its volume and quality, with the young person himself, and not his representatives, (parents, school, public organization, etc.) to receive the money earned, with the exception of cases in which he voluntarily refuses payment for labor;
- the material and financial support of youth initiatives on the part of the state and public organizations in all spheres of public life;
- state and societal non-interference in the area of youth culture, and in the young identity's creative searches, the creation of new life styles and "oases" of a new habitation environment acceptable to some youth groups or others, to the point at which this "seeking one's self in the world" comes into contradiction with the law.

Equality

Only the demand for equality leading to the destruction of class privileges is communist. "Any demand for equality going further than this inevitably leads to absurdity." (K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 108). We therefore do not appeal for an equalization of all; we reject any sort of leveling.

Not only the equality of citizens' rights is of importance to the young person, but the equality of legal opportunities with other age groups of the population: After all, he must learn to utilize them.

We therefore favor:

- the development and adoption of an integrated system of legal acts in which are strengthened not the new, basic rights and freedoms for the young person, but the supplemental mechanism and guarantees that they will implement the general citizens' rights and freedoms;
- reliable and complete information for youth on all matters of public life in a format acceptable to the young person;
- reliable and complete information for society on youth, its socioeconomic situation, views, and interests, ideas and initiatives;
- youth's direct representation (including a guaranteed quota) everywhere that the mechanisms of representative democracy are in effect.

Fraternity

We are against the fraternization of the omnipotent and those without rights, the criminal and his victim. We are against embraces creating the semblance of unity where it is none, nor can there be.

We understand fraternity to be a person's conscious indissolubility of his fate with the fate of the persons surrounding him, the fate of his people, other peoples, and mankind as a whole.

Today, the fate of each of us is placed in direct linkage with the advancing ecological crisis, with the exacerbation of interethnic relations, with the loss of many cultural and moral values.

We therefore favor:

- immediate state and societal measures in the field of saving the natural environment from the destructive influences of man, the immediate cessation of ecologically harmful production and work to implement projects without any ecological basis, and the legislative acknowledgment of ecological damage and the squandering of natural resources as being particularly serious crimes against the state and human rights;
- the creation of national natural parks, ecologically clean zones, and ecologically pure foodstuffs (first and foremost for children);
- a healthy way of life for youth, the cultivation of the health maintenance industry, mass physical education and tourism, youth leisure, social and medical measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism, smoking, drug and toxic substance abuse, and psychological stress at work and in school;
- the resolution of interethnic conflicts by political means on the basis of the peoples' will of their sovereign rights, and national-state formations;

—society's cultural and moral recovery, turning to popular experience, age-old wisdom, and humanist traditions, the state's influence upon society's cultural development first and foremost by economic means.

Happiness

We understand happiness to be the joy of life, success, satisfaction from the realization of a person's creative potential in labor and learning, confidence in one's own powers, in friends and loved ones, in one's people, in the rightness of the course chosen by the person, by the country, and by mankind.

We favor:

- the priority of young friendship, the priority of love, the priority of the family before any state or social structures; the recognition of societal interference in a person's private matters, and in family as being amoral up to the point at which this interference is dictated by considerations of defending the legal rights of the personality;
- compassion for the sick, the handicapped, the aged; social recognition of and genuine aid for the realization of their rights;
- the abolition of legal interference in sexual life, so long as there is no incidence of crime against a person.

II. Organization

The KSME is an independent, voluntary, sociopolitical organization of Estonian youth in which young people have united in the name of society's renewal and social progress, and for the realization and protection of youth's interests and rights.

The KSME is a **communist** organization.

The theoretical basis of our ideological activity is free of the dogma of Marxism.

We favor:

- developing the modern concept of building socialism;
- overcoming ideological dogma in the social sciences, agitation, and propaganda;
- the consecutive and complete rejection of the ideology of Stalinism both in theory and in practice.

The KSME is a **political** organization, an element of the republic's political system. As political figures, we:

- are devoted to the ideas of communism, freed from false interpretations;
- are aimed at the construction of a society in which the "free development of each is a condition for the free development of all";
- are struggling for a portion of authoritative empowerment in society;

—are utilizing the political methods of struggle;

—are advocating specific youth interests through the realization of our political platform—the genuine transformation of society.

The KSME is an **international** organization by the very essence of its work. We are united around an idea, on political views, and not along national lines.

The KSME is a **voluntary** organization. We are a union of politically like-minded people. To be a member of the organization means to recognize its Program and to support it with real actions.

The KSME is a **united** organization with a flexible and democratic structure reflecting the hopes of its members, based upon the priority of the primary organization.

The KSME is an **independent** organization. We understand the Komsomol to be a voluntary association of communist youth unions of sovereign republics. We recognize the Program and Charter of the Komsomol, developed with our participation, but we have our own Program and Charter. We resolve independently all issues of our internal structure and the functioning of our elected organs. We create our own material base and have our own budget.

We build our interrelations with the Communist Party on the principle of the youth union's **complete** independence. This is relations of fellowship, union, and partnership on the basis of the ideological proximity of program directions, and a communality of political values and goals.

A monopoly on the expression of the interests of all youth is unacceptable to us. The KSME favors the creation of legal conditions for the existence of any youth organizations whose activity does not contradict the republic's constitution. We declare our aspiration to conduct a dialogue with organizations being formed and those already in existence. We will have relations and collaborate with them depending upon their programs and concrete actions.

III. For a New Image of Socialism (our orientation points)

We have united into an organization in order to make life better for everyone. We feel that society's development must proceed on a socialist path. Yet this will be a path toward modern socialism.

What do we imagine renewed socialism to be; in the name of what goals are we gathering in our ranks people who think and act?

We are convinced that in the **political sphere** the fundamental trend must be the democratization of the political system, of state and public life, we therefore consider it necessary:

- to make a transition to an active multi-party system, state, and public life, strengthening it in the USSR and Estonian SSR Constitutions, granting political and public organizations and movements equal and genuine rights;
- to generate parliamentary democracy on the basis of a multi-party system; a political organization must receive the right to administer the state from the people by means of general and democratic elections;
- to transform the current, factually unitary state into a federated one, a union of sovereign republics and states;
- to build a law-governed state, to develop new USSR and Estonian SSR Constitutions, to adopt law on the basis of alternative drafts with an emphasis on public opinion;
- to create as de-centralized a state as possible, transferring all absolute authority to organs of people's self-management, according them the necessary political and economic rights;
- to generate a civilian society, and mutual responsibility of the citizen and the state.

We cannot keep our distance from the complex problems of **nationality interrelations**, because youth is always at their epicenter. Youth is the first to be poisoned by chauvinism, nationalism, and racism; it is the first to be exploited to inflame the fires of national enmity, and it is the first to be consumed by those flames.

We are convinced that the basic principles of nationality conflicts lie not in the nationality itself, by in the socioeconomic sphere. We are therefore decisively against substitution of the social with the national, and favor:

- the association of residents of the Estonian land centering around a common understanding of the path toward society's transformation;
- the legal protection of the free development of the indigenous nation of Estonia; the recognition of the nation's right to self-determination and the choice of its forms;
- the creation of a political mechanism for the defense of the national dignity of all of Estonia's national groups, and the development of their cultures;
- the guarantee of equal civil rights for representatives of all nationalities living in the republic.

We consider the main task of the **economic policy** to be the creation of such a mechanism as would interest each person in productive and quality work. This mechanism may be a socialist market economy.

Yet if in the policy the main issue for us is one of power—whether or not it belongs to the people—then in the economy, the issue is one of property. Only having

grasped hold of this link can the economy be pulled out of the quagmire of crisis. That is why we stand in favor of:

- an authentic transformation of state property into the people's property, where the empowerment of the people-proprietor is realized through the organs of the sovereignty of the people;
- a division of state property into common union property, union republic property, territorial property, and enterprise property, which the people control through the corresponding organs of power and administration;
- equitable development of all forms of socialist property in the economy;
- the republic's economic independence, broad production self-management in enterprises and other organizations and real independence with regard to republic and local administration.

For us, the implementation of any political and economic program is not a goal in itself. This is a means for the resolution of urgent **social problems**. We consider to be priorities:

- the implementation of the principle of social justice;
- smoothing social differences among individual rayons of the republic, and the elimination of the backwardness of small settlements;
- an active state policy for providing employment;
- providing all republic residents with a subsistence minimum;
- concern for the citizens' material well-being, and moral and physical health;
- the creation of conditions for a dignified life for people who, for various reasons, are incapable of being socially assertive;
- support for harmonious family life as one of the most important human values;
- the realization of a socially equitable housing policy; the creation and maintenance of a healthy housing environment;
- the restoration and provision of harmonious development of man and nature.

A humane social policy is the measure of society's genuine movement toward **freedom, equality, fraternity, and happiness**.

IV. The Organization and You

Such is our Program. You know our political views, our priorities and orientation points in the genuine transformation of society. Yet you are quite right to ask, what can this organization give you as a citizen and an individual. We reply:

- the protection of civil rights;
- preparation for and involvement in the administration of affairs of the republic, labor, or academic collective;
- the nomination of your candidacy to organs of state and public self-management;
- the opportunity to demand the execution of resolutions and decisions on matters of youth and all society in the name of the organization;
- participation in political actions conducted by the organization, including ones suggested by you;
- actual help in the realization of your interests in the fields of politics and culture, economic activity, and entrepreneurship;
- well-organized leisure activity.

Do not forget, however, that the authority and possibilities of our organization are going to be grounded in the idea that its members will do what is useful and necessary for people. Thus, the organization is right in expecting from you:

- conviction in the rightness of our common cause;
- a position of principle in advocating communist views;
- capabilities, knowledge, and skills;
- honesty and responsibility to yourself and the people. Now you must decide, and whether or not this becomes your organization depends upon you.

We know that we have set difficult tasks for ourselves.

We know that communist ideas are undergoing a test of strength.

We know that a great deal must be done, a great deal must be changed, and that this will not always be pleasant and innocuous.

Yet we are certain that we will contribute to the renewal and the deepening of the values of socialism. We are resolutely prepared to prove that we deserve trust and support. We do not wish to embody dogmatic, lifeless schemes. We wish to build, to develop, and to strengthen genuine socialism.

Our republic is our home. And what that home will be like is very important to us. We speak of this in all seriousness

and with all responsibility for each young person who has decided, or will decide to be with us, the Estonian Communist Youth Union.

Moldavian SSR Gosplan Chief Outlines Republic's Self-Financing Program

904A0094A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 24 Oct 89 pp 1-2

[Interview with Vyacheslav Georgiyevich Kutyrkin, deputy chairman of the MSSR Council of Ministers and chairman of MSSR Gosplan, by A. Dashkevich: "The Logic of Cost Accounting (Khozraschet)"; date and place not given]

[Text] Today, thanks to the social reorientation of the economy, we have all become particularly aware of the need for truly radical changes in our way of life. Practical implementation of the principles of regional cost accounting is called upon to play an important role in this. Its elements and instruments amount to more than just the sum total of the particular programs and actions. Political, economic, and even legal factors become involved here, and to a certain degree even determine success. Just as in anything important, here again the level of information of the population concerning the goals and tasks of this effort is taking on particular importance, because today as never before perestroika needs everyone's constructive participation. Which is precisely why the editors have designated coverage of the socioeconomic problems of perestroika to be one of the main lines of its effort. The department entitled "Logic of Cost Accounting" will become a permanent feature in the pages of the newspaper; articles by scientists and economists, by managers in the economy, by party and soviet officials, and by journalists analyzing the practice and experience of the new economic forms based on the principles of self-financing and self-support will be published in it, the problems of establishing true independence will be discussed, and experience in performing social tasks will be analyzed.

We inaugurate this department with our correspondent's interview with V. Kutyrkin, deputy chairman of the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of Moldavian SSR Gosplan.

[Dashkevich] You seem to agree, Vyacheslav Georgiyevich, that perestroika has everywhere aroused in people an enormous interest in the economy. And this is taking place in every social cross section of our society. This reaction, of course, has great importance, since only interest in and understanding of the nature of the problems and methods of solving them can augment the ranks of those who will not merely become observers, but will fight selflessly and creatively to accomplish economic and social transformations. As shown by the mail the editors have received, our newspaper's readers are very interested in the effort to convert the republic to regional cost accounting. Could you in that connection

name the main things which the republic and its inhabitants will get from accomplishment of this measure, which evidently is one of the main components in the economic reform.

[Kutyarkin] The essence of the republic's conversion to the principles of self-financing and self-support can be expressed in concentrated form by two tasks. The first of them consists of the need to expand essentially the sphere of independence and responsibility of the republic in economic activity, to endow it with broad rights in solving the real problems of the region's economic and social development, in pursuing the interests of all ethnic groups and social strata, and the active participation of the public and its representative bodies in managing the economy. The essence of the second task is to achieve close dependence of the level of income, and therefore of the prosperity of the republic's population, on the state of development and efficiency of utilization of the production potential that has been built on its territory.

The base of economic activity that is directly subordinate to republic administrative agencies is becoming substantially broader as this takes place. Sectors of the economy directly related to meeting people's urgent needs are being transferred to it: the sectors producing food and consumer goods, rendering services, carrying on capital construction, as well as intrarepublic transportation and communications, other parts of the production infrastructure, and the entire social sphere. Applied to Moldavian SSR, this means concentration in republic administrative agencies of those sectors which today produce on the order of 85 percent of the gross social product and national income created in the republic, including 80 percent of the total volume of industrial output.

The procedure for formation and use of financial resources and budget appropriations is undergoing fundamental change. The base which the republic budget draws upon to form the revenue side is becoming substantially broader. It will include charges for land, water, labor, and other resources, as well as the charge on fixed productive capital, contributions from the profit (income) of all enterprises located within the republic, the income tax on individuals, workers and employees, deductions from the turnover tax, revenues from exports, and local taxes and levies. At the same time, the republic will independently define the direction for use of budget resources available to it both for current and long-term needs. It is important to emphasize here that Moldavia's bodies of government and administrative agencies will have the right to go beyond the guaranteed nationwide level in increasing the wage levels of personnel in the nonproduction sphere—teachers, physicians, and so on, and family supplements, to increase the standard rates of expenditure of resources to maintain hospitals, boarding schools, culture centers, and other institutions in the social sphere, to establish additional

benefits for disabled persons and the elderly, and benefits for individuals unable to work who do not qualify for pensions, and so on.

What I have said indicates that the scale of budget revenues, and consequently, the scale of the republic's capability of performing the tasks of augmenting the economic potential and raising the standard of living of the people, will be directly dependent on the state of development and efficiency of utilization of the production complex that is already in place. In other words, we will live as well as we work, no better, but no worse.

In the political sphere, the republic's transition to the principles of regional economic activity is a step along the road to development of socialist federalism and to a strengthening of the republic's sovereign rights.

[Dashkevich] There have already been reports in the republic press to the effect that an effort has been launched to also prepare for the transition of the republic's economic complex to full cost accounting and self-financing. These articles also say that in addition to the summary working group, which includes the republic's leading economists, another three commissions have been created to draft alternative strategies of the republic's transition to cost accounting. The work done by the alternative commissions has in fact been the basis of the present blueprint. In letters to the editors, there have been many questions about who determined the optimality of the particular proposals of the commissions, how was this done, which project aroused the greatest interest, and were there points on which opinions diverged?

[Kutyarkin] As a matter of fact, information concerning this has already been published in the pages of the republic press. I would mention that the elaboration of a conception for transition of administration of the republic's economic and social development to the principles of self-financing and self-support was the concern of the summary working group of the Moldavian SSR government and three adjunct creative groups—scientists and practitioners—economists, financial experts, lawyers, and representatives of public organizations and creative unions. They were headed by distinguished economists: A. Gudym, deputy chairman of Moldavian SSR Gosplan; G. Singur, director of the Economics Institute of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences; and S. Kirke, department head at Kishinev State University. On the basis of the alternative versions drafted by those groups and in view of the experience of other union republics and the nationwide project drafted with the help of the Moldavian SSR, a version was drawn up of a unified draft of the conception for the republic's transition to management of socioeconomic development on the basis of self-financing and self-support. It is today in the final stage of refinement. At the same time, a draft is being prepared of the Moldavian SSR law on this matter. In November, the two documents will be submitted to the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet.

There is no question that the final versions of the drafts of the Conception and the Law are the work of a large creative team. In the various stages of their preparation there were rather diverse points of view concerning a number of problems. The discussions were particularly pointed concerning the issue of forms of ownership, the sectoral structure to which various branches and components of the republic's economic complex belong, the principles governing formation of budget revenues at various levels, and a number of other issues.

It is important to emphasize that acceptable positions were arrived at—on a strictly democratic basis—for these and other problems, although a number of them are not free of disputes even today. It would appear that on the basis of nationwide discussion and during the further effort the draft of the law will be refined further to meet the vital needs of Moldavian SSR within the framework of a socialist state that is a federal union.

[Dashkevich] The working version of the project for transition to regional cost accounting was ready last February. Nearly 6 months have passed since that time. It is obvious that many of the measures in that project are already being carried out. What in your opinion is the most important thing in that effort? Have there been interruptions? If so, who is to blame and what was the reason for them?

[Kutyarkin] As I have already remarked, a package of measures is being carried out in the republic to prepare Moldavian SSR for transition to the principles of regional self-financing beginning in 1991. In addition to the drafting of the Conception, various elements and directions of regional cost accounting are also being worked out in practice. For instance, Drokiyevskiy and Sorokskiy Rayons were converted at the beginning of this year to self-financing of regional development and formation of local budgets on a normative basis as an experiment. At mid-year, the experiment was extended to Rybnitskiy and Orgeyevskiy Rayons, and then to Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon as well. The methodology and practice of shaping regional plans for economic and social development are undergoing fundamental change. They are becoming comprehensive in nature, the sphere of wholesale trade and means of production is being expanded—in the plan for 1990, it will embrace about half of the volume of physical resources envisaged for transition to this form of supply. In the process of transformation of the organizational structure for management of the republic's economy on the basis of a number of ministries and departments, especially in the APK and light industry, state and cooperative-state administrative structures operating on cost accounting have been created. The entire sphere of material production has been converted to cost-accounting principles, and the nonproduction sphere will be converted to the new economic conditions by the end of this year. All charges for resources—labor resources and natural resources, productive capital and 20 percent of the sum total of payments from profit of enterprises under union

jurisdiction, and so on, are to go to the revenues of the republic budget even in the stage of forming the budget for 1990.

It is also important that the full scope of administration of development of the agroindustrial complex and light industry, compilation of the regional program and state order for paid services rendered to the public and also the plan for contract work of construction organizations, and a number of other matters which the draft of the law referred to calls for transferring to republic jurisdiction are coming under republic control during this very year. Proposals are now being prepared for formation of the republic production association "Moldmash," which is to include a number of machinebuilding enterprises which are now under jurisdiction of union ministries and departments.

At the same time, not everything is going as we would like. Complications have cropped up, not without the efforts of the relevant work collectives, with the transition of enterprises in the building materials industry to the republic economy, such as the Rybnitsa Cement Sheet Combine and the Rezina Cement Plant. There have been delays in establishing sound rates for relations of enterprises in the production sphere with republic and local budgets and the set of standard rates of expenditure for current and long-range purposes of local soviets. In our view, the methodological principles for setting growth rates of physical resources to develop the economic complex of the republic and its individual regions are also in need of additional work.

There have also been other problems which are being worked on by both union and republic entities.

[Dashkevich] Today, certain distinguished Soviet economists are saying that the country began the transition from the command-administrative system to an economic system of management from the wrong end. The main argument they advance to confirm this is the idea that cost accounting is a fiction without reform of prices and taxes and without creating a sound ruble. What do you as an economist think about this?

[Kutyarkin] It is a rather complicated issue, debatable in many respects, and it probably deserves broad and serious examination as a topic to itself. I will note only one thing: I am thoroughly convinced that comprehensive and thorough reform of the present system of prices and pricing is a mandatory condition of success in carrying out the economic reform that began on the initiative of the Communist Party. Unless prices and rate schedules are brought strictly into conformity with the socially necessary expenditures of labor, i.e., the cost of products and services, it will not be possible to evaluate objectively the state of economic development and the contribution of every work collective, region, or republic to performing the tasks of the entire nation. I hope that economic scientists and the appropriate union entities will speed up termination of the dispute that has dragged on and will make the long-awaited decision on

this question. As for taxes, this subject matter is now under consideration in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and I hope it will be decided.

[Dashkevich] Investment policy is a most important element in economic activity based on cost accounting; its success is largely determined by the rise in the concentration of capital investments. But in the republic they continue to be scattered over numerous construction projects, project activation times are becoming longer, and this means that financial and physical resources are tied up. For instance, 20 percent more resources were allocated this year than in the previous year for new construction projects. As of 1 July, the volume of unfinished construction reached 959.2 million rubles, which is equal to approximately 80 percent of the annual volume of capital investments in construction. I would like to know in that connection: Is Gosplan not determining and forecasting the results of investment policy?

[Kutyarkin] Without denying the existence of the shortcomings referred to, they are beyond dispute. I will note that the report data on the absolute volume of unfinished construction should not be evaluated from just one angle, but need comprehensive and thorough analysis.

As a matter of fact, according to the statistical data, the plan for the current year has allocated 22 percent more capital investments for new construction projects than in 1988. This resulted from two circumstances. First, 83 percent of their total volume consists of investments made from enterprises' own resources. This is already a reflection of the opportunities which the new economic mechanism has given to work collectives themselves to decide both the direction and time for use of their funds. Second, to eliminate the lag in development of the republic's social sphere it was necessary to build up sizable partial construction, and this causes a growth of unfinished construction at the beginning of the planning year in those sectors, a growth that from our point of view is justified.

You will agree that never in the past have we simultaneously begun during a year to build 56 schools, 117 preschool institutions, and 134 health care and cultural institutions. Such a scale also requires partial construction in corresponding proportions. Or take this example. In municipal-service construction, we also observe a growth of unfinished construction, but a substantial portion of it is related to the fact that under a program adopted by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet we have undertaken construction of capital-intensive water supply systems, treatment installations, and gas supply facilities, which are extremely necessary given the problematical environmental situation. Of course, this shortcoming of ours is no reason to disregard the chronic lag in assimilating the capital investments that have been allocated for these purposes, while at the same time construction times have been stretched out intolerably.

The problems of concentrating capital investments and reduction of unfinished construction have been repeatedly reflected in the practical efforts of the republic's gosplan. To be specific, for the republic economy alone the detailed plan for the current year calls for the volume of unfinished construction to drop by 28 million rubles from the reported data for 1988, or 7 percent, and on the whole it would be brought within the standard allowance assigned to the republic. A reduction has been achieved for such sectors as local industry, highway transportation, communications, municipal services and utilities, health care, etc. When proposals were being prepared for financial recovery, 26 new construction starts with an estimated cost of more than 40 million rubles were additionally omitted from the plan for capital construction in the current year. At the present time, as we shape the draft plan for 1990, in sectors for production purposes alone we have dropped from the previously outlined projections more than 30 new construction starts with a value of 57 million rubles. All of this will unconditionally result in a reduction of the absolute volume of unfinished construction.

Of course, the measures that have been taken do not exhaust all the possibilities for reducing the amount of unfinished construction and do not diminish the acuteness of this important problem of the economy. Priority in resolving it further must go to specific joint efforts of all participants along the construction assembly line.

[Dashkevich] Taking into account that the republic's transition to the principles of self-financing and self-support will make it possible to carry out social programs more effectively as well, let us touch on the question of solving the housing problem. And here we would like to put a direct question: At the present rate of construction of housing in the republic, and recently it has shown a clear trend to decline—is the housing program outlined for the year 2000 realistic? What problems do you see here, and what are the ways of resolving them?

[Kutyarkin] Under the program referred to, 173,000 housing units with a total area of 10.9 million m² are to be activated during the current 5-year planning period. Over the next decade (1991-2000), about 450,000 housing units with an area of 28.1 million m² are to be built. The republic has never known such a scale and pace of housing construction. In the first 3 years of the 12th FYP that have already passed, nearly 95,000 housing units have been opened to occupancy. Activation of housing has risen 29 percent over the same period of the last 5-year planning period.

At the same time, the plan for activation of housing over this period was fulfilled at a level of only 93 percent, and there was a shortfall of 65,000 housing units. Because of this and a number of other factors, the number of those who are waiting, those who need improved housing conditions, has not only not diminished, but has even grown. According to a recent assessment of the socioeconomic commission of the Moldavian CP Central Committee, this necessitates a sizable upward adjustment of

the housing construction targets for the 13th and 14th FYP's so as to take into account the actual state of affairs at the local level, the demographic situation, the gap that has formed between the rate of construction and the number of people waiting, and the republic's transition to the principles of self-management and self-financing.

There has been a serious delay in increasing the volume of housing construction because of the lack of balance between the capacity of construction contractors and the growing volume of construction, because of the lag in development of enterprises of the construction industry and building materials and cast-in-place housing construction, because of the shortage of a number of building materials for private housing construction, and because of the critical lag of municipal-service and utility construction in the new housing developments of the republic's cities and rural areas.

It is of paramount importance in solving these problems to strengthen the material and technical base of the construction industry and building materials industry, to saturate the market with local building materials, to expand services in the area of housing construction, and to augment the capacities of construction organizations. The republic's government is waging an effort along precisely those lines to see that the housing program is carried out.

[Dashkevich] Passions are not dying down in the pages of the republic press concerning the personal computer plant being built in Kishinev. Quite often diametrically opposed opinions are being expressed. Yet such an enterprise could play a significant role in solving the region's economic and social problems. It would be interesting to learn your opinion on this issue.

[Kutyarkin] Probably we should speak about this today from the standpoint of the topic of our conversation.

Regional self-financing and self-support must not result in the region's being cut off. The specialization which the republic now has is an inevitable and objective feature of social development. So, on the all-union market today Moldavia is one of the major producers of foodstuffs. Life itself has created prerequisites for development in our republic of highly intensive sectors of agriculture—vegetable-growing, fruitgrowing, viticulture, and the industry for processing these products. At the same time, the republic possesses even today a sizable surplus of labor resources, but it does not have the necessary minerals and fuel and power resources of industrial significance. This imposes the necessity, in addition to further development of the highly intensive agroindustrial complex, to rapidly augment the base of those segments of machinebuilding which do not have high materials intensiveness, but are science-intensive and labor-intensive. For that reason, the fact that the republic's development will be achieved by virtue of income earned, and its financial resources will depend directly on the end results of operation of all enterprises located on its territory, activation of such a major enterprise in

precision machinebuilding as the personal computer plant, whose volume of production in final value will be 1.5 billion rubles, or almost equal to the volume of output of the republic's machinebuilding complex now in operation, will make it possible to substantially increase the republic's economic potential and financial capabilities, so that it will be possible to solve the urgent social problems more effectively.

What is more, our economic development will also become more stable and rapid, whereas now they are seriously subject to fluctuations and are dependent upon agricultural production. It is also very important that more than a third of the total volume of investments to build the personal computer plant are going for construction of nonproduction facilities. Plans call for building about 14,000 housing units (for a projected work force of 12,700 persons), preschool institutions with a capacity of almost 3,000, schools with a capacity of 7,600, a tekhnikum and vocational and technical schools, a Pioneer camp, and other facilities belonging to the social infrastructure. The enterprise being built is already making its contribution to development of the plant and equipment of the Kishinev Polytechnical Institute.

There can be debate about the site where the project is located, not about its necessity to the republic. As an economist, I am in favor.

[Dashkevich] And finally. The transition of the republic's economic complex to full cost accounting will increase sharply the importance and role of departments concerned with economic planning and recordkeeping and will require some sort of essential adjustments in the style and forms of activity of Gosplan. What innovations in this connection will be made in the work of the body under your direction?

[Kutyarkin] The republic's self-government and self-financing presuppose a transition from directive planning to regulating the priority directions and proportions in economic and social development using planning and market mechanisms, by means of a flexible tax policy and credit policy, long-term economic standards and allowances, targeted subsidies, and state orders within the framework of relevant target programs.

In the context of the substantial broadening of the rights of the basic production unit—enterprises and associations, the center of gravity in the activity of Gosplan is being shifted to drafting long-range planning documents, solving major economic, scientific-technical, and social problems, which determine the qualitative changes in the base of the republic's economy, its structure, and the location of the productive forces.

Making use of state orders, with their priority material and technical supply, developing direct economic ties and wholesale trade, and refining reference figures and economic standard rates and allowances, we will be entering into our planned relations with enterprises and associations. It is through these categories that the level and soundness of this kind of administration of the

republic's economy will be determined. Another important direction for applying the energies of Gosplan is the effort to build and constantly improve the economic mechanism, to bring about all the necessary prerequisites for the effective activity of work collectives and the republic as a whole in the context of full cost accounting, self-financing, and self-support.

The shift of the center of gravity in Gosplan's effort to economic methods of management and the change in the methodology and practice of economic planning have also made it necessary to improve Gosplan's organizational structure. The main thing here is to depart from the narrowly sectoral orientation of the apparatus and to strengthen the summary and functional subdivisions. All of these measures are being subordinated to the ultimate goal—turning Gosplan into a true scientific-economic command headquarters for the republic, an entity capable under the new economic conditions of performing complicated and crucial functions of managing the economy and writing the rules and shaping the conditions of economic relations for all the components in the republic's economic complex.

Today, of course, we are still far from achieving what we would like and what we need. We are only at the beginning of the road of restructuring planning, the thinking of personnel in the agency is undergoing adjustment, the most acceptable forms and methods are being explored, and a new style of work is evolving.

Ukrainian SSR Official on New Election Procedures
90UN0473A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
15 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with Central Electoral Commission Member V.I. Kirnenko by Ya. Oleynichenko: "A School of Popular Wisdom"; date and place not given]

[Text] Preparations for the elections are in full swing in the republic. The new electoral mechanism recently adopted by the 10th Session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet will soon be filled with specific, practical content. Our correspondent met with V.I. Kirnenko, a member of the Central Electoral Commission for Election of People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR and chief of the Department on the Work of the Soviets at the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and asked him to respond to a number of questions.

[Correspondent] Valentin Ivanovich, what is the principal aim of the republic's new electoral legislation?

[Kirnenko] As everyone knows, the principal aim of the reform of the political system is to restore the sovereignty of the Soviets. The Law on Amendments and Additions to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and the new electoral legislation are intended for affirming the fundamental ideas and principles which shall be the bases for both the mechanism of popular representation

in organs of power at all levels, and the democratic nature of socialist popular rule as a whole.

The Soviets of People's Deputies elected on the basis of the new legislation shall be essentially new organs of popular rule, in terms of their make-up and structure and the forms and methods of their activity. They too shall have to operate in the new conditions. Life itself has brought to the forefront questions of supplying the populace with food, goods and various kinds of services; housing construction and restoration of the environment. Therefore, the chosen representatives of the people must be as close to the people, their problems and concerns, as possible. Today this is not only a social question, but a political question as well.

[Correspondent] How does the new legislation reflect the processes taking place in the political, socio-economic and intellectual spheres of society: the changes in the people's philosophy, their increasing activeness and national self-consciousness?

[Kirnenko] Democratization and glasnost are permeating the very deepest strata of social life. This rapid process is very clearly visible in the example of the collective and open work on the new electoral legislation. Let us ponder on just one figure: more than 15 million people, practically every other voter in the republic, took part in the examination of the draft laws, which lasted for more than two-and-a-half months.

In August of last year, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium set up two working groups. Taking part in these groups are prominent scholars from the republic: legal specialists, practicing jurists, specialists in the national economy and culture, deputies of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and officials from Soviet organs. They prepared several variants on the basis of which draft laws were drawn up and published for popular examination—in the course of which working collectives and social organizations, party and Soviet organs and private citizens sent in over 235,000 responses, suggestions, and comments; in addition, nine separate draft laws were received from groups and individual citizens. Many of the suggestions contained in these draft laws were taken into consideration by the Supreme Soviet, and are reflected in the new electoral legislation.

[Correspondent] Please cite the most important ones.

[Kirnenko] First of all the draft laws do not contain certain norms which were the subject of controversy in the course of the election of People's Deputies of the USSR; for example, the clause on district pre-election meetings. And in the course of revising the drafts, in consideration of the suggestions and comments from the voters, a number of additional provisions were stricken from the draft, or were subjected to significant revision. Thus, the provision on election of people's deputies from social organizations was removed. In accordance with suggestions from the voters, the norms regulating the numerical composition of collectives and the competence of voters' meetings at their place of residence were

corrected. Collectives consisting of 200 workers or more have the right to nominate candidates for deputy—thereby eliminating the injustice which existed in previous elections, when working collectives with many members were at times deprived of the opportunity to nominate their representative to the highest organ of state power.

The republic Supreme Soviet has agreed with a suggestion from a group of People's Deputies of the USSR, and has introduced a provision in the law whereby expenses connected with preparation for and conduct of elections shall utilize, in addition to budgeted funds, the assets of enterprises, social and other organizations which become members of the corresponding electoral commissions.

At the same time, the suggestion to hold direct elections for representatives of Soviets of People's Deputies at all levels was rejected. Such an election procedure would place the chairmen of the Soviets above the deputies, would lead to excessive concentration of power in one person's hands, and would diminish the role of the representative organs of state power.

Also taking part in discussion of the draft laws at the session were representatives of local Soviets who were neither People's Deputies of the USSR, nor members of the republic Supreme Soviet. Thus, B.A. Kozhanov, ispolkom chairman of the Zhovtnevy Rayon Soviet in Kiev, introduced a suggestion on conducting (as an experiment) election of deputies by territorial and industrial districts. As is well-known, the Supreme Soviet has adopted a special resolution on this question, authorizing such an experiment.

During the course of discussion, certain deputies considered it expedient to raise the age-qualification for citizens to be elected people's deputies in the republic (not 18 years of age, as proposed in the draft, but 21). This proposal was rejected, inasmuch as adopting it would deprive a large number of young people of the electoral franchise. Here it would be appropriate to cite the norm of the Law, introduced for the first time to electoral legislation: this is granting the right to nominate candidates for deputy to collectives at academic institutions—along with working collectives, social organizations, meetings at one's place of residence, and to military servicemen. Moreover, they have proposed adding vocational-technical schools to the secondary specialized and higher educational institutions.

[Correspondent] The electoral campaign, one would assume, begins with preparation and organization of elections. On whom has the responsibility been laid for the rather complex role of putting the new electoral mechanism into operation?

[Kimenko] As is well-known, one of the basic provisions fixed in the Law on Democratization of the Electoral Process, is the transfer of organizing the preparations for and conduct of elections, to the organs of the voters

themselves—the electoral commissions. During examination of the articles which concern the establishment and activities of the commissions, proposals were received on limiting the rights of district electoral commissions. The Supreme Soviet did not agree with this, nor with the opinion on eliminating the oblast and the Kiev and Sevastopol City Soviets from formation of a Central Electoral Commission. The Law states that this commission shall be established by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet upon the representation of the above-mentioned local Soviets or by their presidium; also taking into consideration proposals from working collectives, organs of social organizations, collectives of academic institutions, voters' meetings at their place of residence, and military servicemen.

Articles concerning the alternative nature of elections were examined with special care. The new mechanism must support the procedure under which several candidates run for election in an electoral district. The norms adopted will ensure observance of the principle of alternative candidates: they are set forth in Articles 34 and 35. Without going into detail, I would like to call attention to the provision which contains the essence of these articles: At meetings or sessions for nominating candidates, an unlimited number of candidatures may be proposed; at the same time, a working collective, assemblies of residents or military servicemen and so forth may nominate only one candidate; there may be several candidates for deputy for an electoral district, but there can be no less than two. This also depends on the number of working collectives and voters' assemblies which nominate them.

[Correspondent] It is well-known that the question of the pre-electoral programs of candidates for deputy was hotly debated at the session. What was the cause of the dispute?

[Kimenko] The provision that these programs must not contain calls to overthrow or change by means of force the Soviet state and social system. Nor was there a one-word answer to the question on who should be given the right to reverse the decision on registration of a candidate for deputy in case he violates this requirement—the district electoral commission or the judicial organs.

The Supreme Soviet has approved a norm, in accordance with which the question of reversing the decision on registration shall be examined by the Central Electoral Commission upon representation of the district electoral commission, in accordance with the decision of the republic Supreme Court with respect to the fact that the program positions of a candidate for deputy is actually in conflict with Soviet legislation. Concerning the procedure for determining the results of the election, certain deputies expressed the opinion that candidates who receive the most votes should be considered elected as a deputy. However, the Supreme Soviet has decided that it would be more democratic if more than half the voters

taking part in the election cast their ballots for a candidate deputy. This norm is also reflected in Article 50 of the Law.

[Correspondent] What are the basic innovations in the legislation on elections to local Soviets in the republic?

[Kirnenko] The principles of the electoral system here are the same as in the Law on Election of People's Deputies for the Republic. But there are also a number of innovations.

First of all, the number of deputies elected to local Soviets will be reduced, on the average, by one-third; likewise for People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR. This will allow them to be, in accordance with Lenin's formulation, truly working organs, and more efficient and objective in resolving questions of local affairs. Under conditions of self-government this is of considerable importance.

In accordance with the new Law, election of deputies to rural and settlement Soviets may be conducted both by electoral district, and by the general list, without forming districts. And really, if for a rural Soviet covering a small territory with a small population 15 or so deputies must be elected, then why divide the territory of the Soviet into 15 districts? Of course it makes more sense to hold elections here according to the general list of all voters. However, the Soviet must decide this itself.

Soviets in the middle links—the rayon and city Soviets (cities of oblast subordination)—were touched by the innovations as well. Previously formation of district electoral commissions was mandatory here. According to the present law, formation of district electoral commissions at rayon and city Soviets are not mandatory. If they are not formed, their functions will be carried out by the rayon and city electoral commissions.

In accordance with the new laws and the resolution adopted by the Supreme Soviet, preparations for the elections are now under way in the republic. The success of the preparations will hinge upon careful observance of the requirements of the law by the Soviets, electoral commissions, candidate deputies and voters; upon a high state of organization and precision in conducting all pre-election measures; and upon a high state of political consciousness and activeness of all electors.

'Statistical Breakdown' of Georgian Supreme Soviet Members

18130027A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 18 Nov 89 p 15

[Article by Emzar Kheledeli: "A Few Notes About the Deputies"]

[Text] Everything today is assessed in terms of statistics. Readers might find it interesting to look at a few statistics regarding the composition of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation:

Of the 440 deputies to the Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation, 220 are workers and kolkhoz members—that is, 50.5 percent.

Elected deputies to the Supreme Soviet include 14 Abkhazians, 9 Ossetians, 30 Russians, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Belorussian, 17 Armenians, 10 Azerbaijanis, 1 Estonian, 2 Jews, 3 Greeks, 1 Kurd, and the rest are Georgians.

A total of 77 have a higher political education. Of these, 49 have held the post of deputy to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet at various times, for a total of 121 times. For doing deputy work, each deputy gets 100 rubles every month. Hence, these 77 deputies alone have been paid 1.902 million rubles from Georgia's general treasury.

Seven of the deputies are generals. They are: V.L. Gulevich, a member of the Youth Affairs Commission and a member of the Georgian CP Central Committee; G.A. Zgerskiy, a member of the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet and a member of the Georgian CP Central Committee; V.N. Karatmazov, the military Commissar for the city of Moscow and a member of the Commission for Housing and Communal and Municipal Services; A.N. Kleymanov, a member of the Commission for Construction and Construction Materials Industry and a candidate member of the Georgian CP Central Committee; M.M. Sotskov, a member of the Legislative Initiative Commission; and L.L. Sharashenidze, a member of the Georgian CP Central Committee Audit Commission (he has served as a Supreme Soviet deputy for ten years). Of the seven military men, then, five are Russian, one is a Belorussian, and one is a Georgian. So they have held the post of Supreme Soviet deputy eight times and taken 48,000 rubles out of our republic's general treasury.

Now let us see what posts have been or are being held in party, soviet, and administrative organs by the 235 deputies who have a higher education.

Three of the deputies have held the post of First Secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee; two of the deputies have held the post of Second Secretary; six have held the post of ordinary secretary; 36 have served as ministers; twelve have served as heads of Central Committee departments; ten have served as chairmen of state committees; 13 have served as first, second, or ordinary secretaries on city party committees; 31 have served as first secretaries of rayon committees; 1 is the chairman of the Cinematographers' Union; four have served as chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic; five have served as deputy chairmen of a Supreme Soviet Presidium; one has served as a Supreme Soviet chairman; four have served as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet; seven are rectors; seven are academicians; two are farm directors; three are kolkhoz chairmen; six are city, rayon, and sectorial council chairmen; four are first deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers; and three have served as first secretaries of the Komsomol Central

Committee. One is the republic Procurator; one is the chairman of the Supreme Court; one is the Chief State Arbiter; two deputies have taken turns in the post of Supreme Soviet Presidium secretary; two deputies have taken turns in the post of chairman of the republic Trade Union Committee; one is a theater director; six deputies are newspaper editors; one is the chairman of the republic Inventions Committee; one is a correspondent for PRAVDA; one is chairman of the Georgian SSR People's Control Committee; one is the manager of the republic bank; one is an Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; one is the first deputy chief of the Political Administration of the USSR Civil Aviation; 11 are members of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro; nine are candidate members of the Buro; 57 are members of the Central Committee; 27 are candidate members; seven are members of the Central Committee Audit Commission; one is secretary of the republic Trade Union Council. This is the statistical breakdown on 235 deputies who have a higher education.

Joint Tajik CP, Komsomol Plenum Resolutions

Decree on Youth Role

90US0169A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 13 Oct 89 p 1

["Resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Communist Party of Tajik Central Committee and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee: On the Tasks of the Republic's Party and Komsomol Organizations in Elevating the Youth Role in Perestroyka and Democratization of Public Life"]

[Text] The process of perestroyka and renewal, democratization of the republic's sociopolitical life, and the growth of the population's national self-consciousness have cast light with all acuity upon serious problems in the economy, public relations, the social and spiritual sphere.

The negative consequences of the period of development preceding perestroyka and some of its problems found their sharpest reflection in youth, the critical mass of which makes up almost 25 percent of the republic's population, and in the number employed in the national economy, more than 40 percent. These problems are that one in every ten young people is neither working nor studying; that youth comprises the overwhelming portion of workers in the production sphere with poor work qualifications and consequently, low pay; that the housing problem affects young families most severely, and that youth's actual participation in the process of government is diminishing at all levels.

The extended lack of attention to youth problems on the part of official institutions, young men and women's insufficient opportunity to realize their creative potential in a timely manner on an equal basis with other social groups, and the existing limitation of the participation in labor, political and creative activity breed in the youth environment social apathy, uncertainty of the

future, a disrespectful attitude toward people of the older generation, and within some youth sectors, attempts to seek spiritual strength in religion.

Under the conditions of the complex sociopolitical situation in the republic, attempts are being made by destructive forces to exploit the dissatisfaction of a portion of youth by using their situation to increase tension in individual labor collectives and populated areas.

Party and state organs, public organizations of the republic have not managed to react in a timely fashion to the processes taking place in the youth environment; they have not compiled a prediction for their development on the basis of profound scientific analysis. In the republic there is no integrated youth policy; plans for socioeconomic development practically do not take into consideration the specifics of youth problems, they do not reflect the paths and forms for realization of the vital socioeconomic and spiritual demands and needs of youth.

With insufficient political and legal authority, the Komsomol organizations have been in no condition to fully express the interests of all youth. Other effective organizational structures for working with youth are lacking in the republic. Moreover, serious problems have accumulated within the Komsomol organizations themselves, reducing their readiness and requiring that radical measures be taken.

The committees of the Komsomol could not find active means to intensify their influence on the ideological, moral, and physical indoctrination of youth; the experience and best traditions of the older generation are poorly exploited.

The vital link with the Komsomol has weakened in the republic's party committees and organizations; in fact, any constructive collaboration between them is absent; didacticism and petty guardianship predominate in relations, and a commanding tone is allowed.

The specifics of the youth problem are not finding their needed reflection in the activity of the trade unions, the republic ministries, departments, and other managerial organs.

Creative unions and a large brigade of the republic's intelligentsia are at a remove from concerned participation in resolving the problems of indoctrinating youth. Activating work among female youth is a concern.

The joint Plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee resolves:

1. To consider that the serious problems in the republic, both in the socioeconomic and ideological spheres of public life have their highest degree of negative influence on the situation of youth, requiring that radical measures be taken immediately on the part of all republic party and state organs, and requiring the preparation of a Law on Youth.

2. To develop the basis for a republic youth policy based upon the following principles:

- complete political trust of youth and its responsibility to society;
- ensuring priority of political and socioeconomic interests of youth;
- constant expansion of the social welfare spectrum granted youth on account of its future contribution to the creation of the republic's national income.

To ratify the body of the commission for developing a draft basis for the republic youth policy.

To consider in the Tajik CP Central Committee and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee the proposals of the commission for drafting the foundations, after which to submit the draft for broad discussion.

3. To recognize as necessary and recommend to the republic commission for developing a concept for the transition to the principles of self-management and self-financing; to stipulate apportionment in a special section of statutes ensuring the guaranteed resolution of youth's most burning problems, in particular, those of youth living in villages. Problems include employment in the area of public production, provision of housing to young families, and rendering financial assistance to youth.

Departments of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee are to actively participate in its development and realization.

4. All party committees and organizations, communists working in the republic's state and economic organs should give priority to working with youth, and should view youth as an important progressive political force of perestroika. Assistance should be rendered, including financial assistance, assistance to the initiative of Komsomol organizations in matters of creating association of a production nature, renting individual production lines, creating joint enterprises, living complexes for youth, and other undertakings.

5. Party committees and organizations should build their interaction with the Komsomol on the basis of a common ideological-political platform, mutual respect and complete political trust. Contact between party and Komsomol organizations must be exercised in the form of an equal dialog, excluding didacticism. The party organizations implement their political and ideological influence on the Komsomol primarily through communists working in youth organizations.

To consider advisable democratic methods of ensuring youth's proportional representation in the formation of leading organs of party and social organizations.

6. During the course of an election campaign, the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee Buro, obkoms [oblast committees], gorkoms [city committees], and raykoms

[rayon committees] should precisely determine the degree and form of participation of the Komsomol organizations in resolving sociopolitical problems of a general republic nature.

7. Party organizations, higher educational institutions, institutes of the republic Academy of Sciences, and creative unions should exert influence in order that there exist in the scientific and creative activity of these institutions and organizations an investigation of youth problems with the direct participation of youth itself; work should be created to assist their resolution. The leading intelligentsia should actively participate in all phases of the process of youth indoctrination.

To entrust Communists B.B. Karimov, Gosplan chairman, and T. Nazarov, republic minister of education to work out the issue of bringing the plan for accepting students into higher educational institutions into correlation with the opportunities for their material-technological support and the requirements of the national economy.

8. In affirming the vital importance of the both the cause of indoctrinating the coming generation, and for the republic's further economic and spiritual flourishing and the elevation of the level of public education, to turn the attention of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers to the fact that necessary and possible measures for the development of the material bases of schools and other educational institutions, the creation of conditions to strengthen in them qualified teachers, and to attract the best scientific forces to teaching activity are not being taken by soviet and economic organs at all levels in accordance with current demands.

9. To consider it advisable to have in the structure of the republic and local state government an organ for youth affairs. To propose to the Council of Ministers to consider the given matter with the participation of departments of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee.

10. To entrust communists heading ministries and republic departments to consider the issues stemming from the given resolution within one month's time, as well as that which has been expressed during the course of the plenum, and to determine the measures for their resolution.

G.F. Muravyev, chairman of Tajik SSR Gosstroy, should turn additional attention to the course of construction of designated social-cultural facilities, and take measures to ensure the occupation of the building of the school of the Komsomol aktiv in 1990.

The appropriate party organizations are to control the execution of this instruction.

The joint Plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee expresses

its confidence that communists and Komsomol members, working in equal measure for the fate of perestroika in the republic, acknowledging their important role in it, and on the basis of constructive collaboration, unite their efforts for the republic's further development, and an increase in the standard of living for its young generation, and of all the population.

Resolution on Youth Union

90US0169B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHKISTANA in Russian 13 Oct 89 p 1

["Resolution of the Joint Communist Party of Tajik Central Committee Plenum and the Tajik SSR Komsomol Central Committee 'On the Leninist Communist Youth League of Tajikistan'"]

[Text] The preparation of a new shift is a most responsible task of the entire party, of all society. This is a matter of the utmost importance for the party and for youth itself, the pledge of society's renewal.

In the current political situation, when truly revolutionary processes are taking place, the Tajik CP sees in the Komsomol its reserve, the actual strength capable of making a great contribution to the cause of perestroika.

The party sees in the Komsomol a school of communist indoctrination, an innovative organization where creative, innovative people receive support, where glasnost and openness are combined with the practical realization of youth's interests, actively drawing it into the political and economic transformations.

At the same time, the changes taking place in the republic's Komsomol still lag behind the growing processes of perestroika. A significant portion of the members of the Komsomol belong to the union formally. Rigid centralism, an ossification of structures, the imperfection of the system for formation of leading organs, and the blind copying of forms and methods of the work of party organizations has led to the Komsomol's loss of the role of the political vanguard of youth. To a great extent, party committees bear responsibility for the present situation.

The rigid, authoritarian style of party leadership, infringing upon the rights of the independent activity of the youth organization, a constricting sieve, through which Komsomol cadres of all levels and regulation of forms and methods are sifted, led to both the reduction of the authority of the party itself in the eyes of youth, and to a decline of influence in the youth environment, to a loss of faith in its opportunities, and, in some places, in the need for its existence.

Many communists working in the Komsomol saw the situation, perceived it, but could not break through. Constrained by the corresponding party committees, by rigid "order-execution" relations, they objectively promoted congelation, the conservation of the situation which had come about.

In addition, to a certain degree, the Komsomol was fixed within the state command-administrative system, having become a sort of appendage of the economic organs.

The constant mobilization of Komsomol members for purposes of patching up holes in the economy was conducive to this. Having an outwardly vivid, patriotic cover, these campaigns were fulfilled by the Komsomol organs primarily by command methods, for which the Komsomol has neither the power nor the authority.

The Joint Plenum of the Tajik CP Central Committee and the Tajik Komsomol Central Committee feels that today the Komsomol must not be a department for governing youth, but an "free, independent action organization formed on a strictly voluntary basis from the politically active, creative forces of youth."

This must be the vanguard political organization of youth, close to the party, working under its ideological influence and on a common ideological platform.

The interrelations between party and Komsomol organizations need radical changes. They must become comradesly relations of two communist organizations situated in a strategic union.

Party organizations, and all communists should begin with the realization that the youth union is not an exact duplicate of the party, that it has similar, but not copied methods of working with the masses and means for influencing them.

It is incumbent upon party organs to promote the acquisition and fortification of political character in the youth organization, the expansion of the Komsomol's real participation in the execution of power through the soviets, through their representatives to the STKs [councils of labor collectives], kolkhoz boards, cooperatives, etc.

It is necessary to actively include the Komsomol organizations in the management of public affairs at all levels, in the development and implementation of the decisions of the party committees and organizations.

While conducting the most important political campaigns, the party organizations should develop a united strategy, and act as a bloc with the Komsomol as if with its closest natural ally.

The Plenum recommends that the party organs in their everyday practice refrain from:

- Interfering in the resolution of cadre issues on positions not included in the nomenklatura;
- Binding the Komsomol to any forms or methods of work;
- Demanding information in an unsystematic and disorderly manner;

—The practice of hearing the reports of Komsomol organizations on the implementation of the normative documents of superior party organs.

It must exercise its political and ideological influence through communists working in the Komsomol. And that should not be done by watching their every step, but by relying on the fidelity to the political line, and Communists' heightened consciousness and responsibility.

The party layer in the Komsomol organs is to be formed primarily by accepting into the party the most worthy youth leaders.

The party committees and organizations should support and expand the Komsomol organs' rights in the resolution of the socioeconomic problems concerning youth, and to fully promote the activation of the Komsomol's economic activity.

The party's directions on matters of principle must be brought to the Komsomol organs through the resolutions of party meetings and superior selected party organs in the form of recommendations, and must not be of a normative nature.

Direct instructions and orders on current matters issued by workers of the party apparatus are excluded.

In the event that disagreements emerge among corresponding party and Komsomol organs, the matters are considered in superior party and Komsomol committees.

Turkmen Supreme Soviet 1 Dec Session Information Report

90US0314A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in
Russian 2 Dec 89 p 1

["Information report on Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] The 11th Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet 12th Session was held on 1 December in Ashkhabad in the Supreme Soviet meeting hall.

The session was opened by O. Ovezgeldyev, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet. S.A. Niyazov, A.G. Babayev, R.A. Bazarova, Kh. Durdyev, A. Kurbanova, Yu.K. Mogilevets, S.M. Nesterenko, K.M. Orazov, V.N. Rebrik, B.M. Sakhatmuradov and V.S. Chertishchev, members of the Turkmenistan CP Central Committee Buro, and Kh. Akhmedov, candidate of the Turkmen CP Central Committee Buro, took part in the session.

In accordance with the proposal of O. Ovezgeldyev, presiding, who spoke at the behest of the Council of Elders, the Supreme Soviet confirmed the following session agenda:

1. Chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers.

2. State Plan of the Economic and Social Development of the Turkmen SSR in 1990 and the progress of fulfillment of the Turkmen SSR State Budget in 1989.

3. Turkmen SSR State Budget for 1990 and fulfillment of the Turkmen SSR State Budget in 1988.

4. Ratification of edicts of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The procedure of work of the session was confirmed, and the Supreme Soviet embarked on examination of the first item on the agenda—the chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers. A report on this matter was delivered by S.A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee and member of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. With regard for the results of the discussion in the republic of the alternative candidacies for the office of Council of Ministers chairman accepted for examination by the preceding special session of the Supreme Soviet, S.A. Niyazov, on behalf of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, submitted for the session's examination the candidacies of Kh. Akhmedov, first deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers, E.K. Nazarov, minister of finance of the Turkmen SSR, and K.M. Orazov, first secretary of the Maryyskiy Obkom.

Addressing the deputies, K.M. Orazov thanked them for the confidence they had shown in him and declined to accept the nomination. The Supreme Soviet voted by a majority to comply with his request. The two other candidates for the office of chairman of the Council of Ministers delivered their programs.

The following deputies took part in the discussion: R.A. Murtazov, director of the Chardzhou Oil Refinery, Kh. Degshanayev, chairman of Nebit-Dag's Kum-Dag Community Soviet Ispolkom, R.P. Pendzhiyev, first deputy chief of a Turkmen SSR Gosnab administration, M. Orazliyev, leader of a team of painters of the "Turkment-sentrostroy" Construction Administration, E. Dosmamedov, deputy chief of the Nebit-Dag Industrial Transport Administration, R. Meredov, chairman of Telmanskiy Rayon's Kolkhoz imeni Kalinin, Ye. Khodzhayev, chief editor of the journal TURKMENISTAN KOMMUNISTI, S. Rozmetov, chairman of Tashauzskiy Rayon's "40 let TSSR" Kolkhoz, M. Sopyyev, chairman of Ashkhabadskiy Rayon's "Sovet Turkmenistany" Agro-Firm-Kolkhoz, G. Nurullayeva, lecturer at the Turkmen Polytechnical Institute, A. Bordzhakov, manager of the Turkmen republic office of the USSR Gosbank, N. Bazarov, chief of the Central Asian State Shipping Company Administration, B.A. Ishankuliyev, first secretary of the Tashauz Gorkom, and O. Gumyev, leader of a brigade of Oktyabrskiy Rayon's "Sovet Turkmenistany" Kolkhoz.

Kh. Akhmedov obtained a majority in the secret ballot for the election of a candidate for the office of chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers. By show of

hands vote the Supreme Soviet unanimously appointed Kh. Akhmedov chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers.

S.A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, expressed to the republic's new head of government warm congratulations, good wishes and words of encouragement as he starts work in his new position.

The Supreme Soviet then heard the report of Deputy V.Ye. Abramov, deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic Gosplan, on the State Plan of the Economic and Social Development of the Turkmen SSR in 1990 and on the course of fulfillment of the State Plan of the Economic and Social Development of the Turkmen SSR in 1989 and the report of Deputy E.K. Nazarov, minister of finance of the Turkmen SSR, on the Turkmen SSR State Budget for 1990 and fulfillment of the Turkmen SSR State Budget in 1988.

A supporting report on these items was delivered on behalf of the standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet by Deputy A.D. Bordzhakov, chairman of the Planning-Budget Commission.

The following deputies took part in the discussion of questions of the republic state plan and state budget: N. Achilov, chairman of the Chardzhou Oblispolkom, S. Meredov, first secretary of the Murgabskiy Raykom, M. Abalakov, second secretary of the Ashkhabad Gorkom, N.G. Durdymedov, chairman of Kalininskiy Rayon's Kolkhoz imeni Lenin, B.D. Ilyasova, worker at Krasnovodsk's "Turkmenrybprom" Production Association, M.K. Shabasanov, minister of municipal service of the Turkmen SSR, Z.K. Yelliyeva, pediatrician at Ashkhabad's Clinic No 8, B.A. Ishankuliyev, first secretary of the Tashauz Gorkom, A. Charyyev, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Goskomvodselsstroy, N. Ashirov, first secretary of the Tedzhenskiy Raykom, S.N. Muradov, rector of the Turkmen Polytechnical Institute, and A. Durdyev, minister of trade of the Turkmen SSR.

Closing remarks on the question of the State Plan of Economic and Social Development of the TuSSR for 1990 and the course of fulfillment of the State Plan of the Economic and Social Development of the Turkmen SSR in 1989 were delivered by Deputy V.Ye. Abramov, deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the republic Gosplan.

With regard to the proposals and observations submitted by the standing commissions and expressed by the deputies the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on the State Plan of the Economic and Social Development of the Turkmen SSR for 1990 and a decree on the course of fulfillment of the State Plan of Economic and Social Development of the Turkmen SSR in 1989.

The Supreme Soviet also enacted the Law on the State Budget of the Turkmen SSR for 1990 and a decree on

confirmation of the report on the fulfillment of the State Budget of the Turkmen SSR in 1988.

The Supreme Soviet then ratified edicts of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, adopting the pertinent laws and decrees in respect of them, which will be published in the press.

This concluded the 11th Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet 12th Session.

Uzbek CP Views Party Organization Tasks at 24 Nov Plenum

Information Report

90US0328A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
25 Nov 89 p 1

[Unattributed information report: "On the Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The 18th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee took place on 24 November 1989. Uzbek CP Central Committee First Secretary I.A. Karimov delivered the address "The Results of the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the Tasks of Republic Party Organizations."

In the debates on the address the following comrades spoke: A.I. Fazylbekov, first secretary, Tashkent party gorkom; T.A. Yeshimbetova, presidium chairman, Karakalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet; A.I. Yakubov, first secretary of the board of the Uzbek SSR Writers Union; A.F. Klepikov, first secretary, Syr-Darya party obkom; N.A. Umerov, editor, newspaper LENIN BAYRAGY; B.P. Kariyeva, chairman of the board of the Union of Uzbek Theatrical Artists; N.N. Yakubov, first secretary, Samarkand party gorkom; R.M. Khudaybergenova, first secretary, Khorezm party obkom; Ye.A. Gubina, weaver, Tashkent Textile Combine; P.K. Kadyrov, Uzbek people's writer; S.N. Rakhmanova; director, Kokand Sewing Factory imeni Akhunbabayev; D. Dadazhanova, secretary, Namangan party obkom; A. Askarov, academician secretary, Division of History, Linguistics, and Literature, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, and L. Kayumov, department head, Tashkent State University.

Along the lines of the issue under discussion, the plenum adopted the detailed resolution and measures of the Uzbek CPSU Central Committee for the realization of the CPSU platform, "The Party's Nationality Policy under Current Conditions." A decision was made on the formation of a Central Committee department of interethnic relations, as well as a Central Committee commission on issues of interethnic relations. Uzbek CP Central Committee first secretary I.A. Karimov was confirmed as chairman of the commission.

The Uzbek CP platform for the elections of Uzbek SSR people's deputies and local soviet deputies was examined and confirmed at the plenum. During the course of the

discussion of the draft platform the following comrades spoke: M. Dzhumaniyazov, first secretary, Urgench party raykom; M.U. Abullayev, first secretary, Kumkurgan party raykom; A. Muminov, first secretary, Komsomolabad party raykom; Kh.A. Pirnapasov, first secretary, Bukin party raykom, and Zh. Suyunov, deputy chairman, "Agropromstroy" Kara-Kalpak ASSR republic association.

The plenum considered organizational issues. In view of the fact that G.Kh. Kadyrov was confirmed deputy minister of the USSR electrical equipment and appliance manufacturing industry, he was released from his responsibilities as member of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro. S. Mamarsulov, first secretary of the Tashkent party obkom, was elected Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro member.

Changes in the personnel of the Central Committee Ideological commission were introduced, as well as in the Commission on Issues of Socioeconomic development. D.Kh. Khamidov, secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, was confirmed as chairman of the Ideological Commission.

The norms of representation and the procedure for electing delegates to the 22nd Uzbek CP Congress were considered and confirmed.

The plenum participants heard and took notice of information from P.B. Dogonkin, department head of the Organizational Party and Cadre Policy Department on the realization of critical comments and proposals expressed in the speeches at the Uzbek CP Central Committee plenums in the current year.

CPSU Central Committee senior official V.N. Laventyev participated in the work of the plenum.

With this, the Uzbek CP Central Committee plenum finished its work.

First Secretary Karimov on Party Tasks

90US0328A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
25 Nov 89 p 1

[Speech by I.A. Karimov: "The Speech of Uzbek CP Central Committee First Secretary I.A. Karimov"]

[Text] Comrades!

Today, the Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum is faced with discussing one of the most burning issues of public life—the issue of the development and improvement of interethnic relations in the republic. The party emphasized that any nationality problems require a weighed, broad approach on the basis of deep analysis and objective evaluations of each concrete situation. They must be resolved calmly, and extraordinarily responsibly, within the framework of socialist democracy and legality, and above all by means of steps toward one another, without detriment to the interethnic unity of the Soviet people.

These issues were discussed from all sides at the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee with a sense of great political responsibility and on principle. A document of primary significance was developed and adopted—the CPSU platform determining the nationality policy under modern conditions.

The speech of M.S. Gorbachev and other plenum materials give an objective, weighed evaluation of the historical experience in resolving the nationality issue in our country, and its conditions today; the paths and means for its political resolution were precisely determined on a genuinely democratic basis.

The party attaches particular significance to the optimal correlation of the nationality and the interethnic in the modern climate. We speak of the creation of conditions for free and complete development of each nation and the consolidation of the Union, the combination of the aspirations of nations toward independence and the objective demand for a deepening of inter-national ties. The key aspect here is the realization of the Leninist principle of self-determination as a complex process of confirmation of national dignity and self-awareness, the strengthening of the republics' sovereignty, their political and economic independence, and the granting of new status to Soviet autonomy within the framework of a single union state.

Issues of harmonizing interethnic relations have particular significance in the conditions of our republic, with its diversity of national and linguistic population groups. And today we must thoroughly, and from principled positions, examine the entire aggregate of problems associated with this, problems which in many ways determine the moral-political climate in society, and people's mood and interrelations. Their real evaluation in both the historical aspect and modern state must form the basis for developing a well-thought plan of action for all echelons of the republic's political system, responding to the party's strategic course for the resolution of the problem of harmonizing interethnic relations.

I. Certain Historical Aspects and the Current State of the Nationality Issue in the Uzbek SSR.

At all stages of our history, the nationality issue has been one of the central issues of the party's policy. The principles of the rights of nations to self-determination, on the state structure of nations and nationalities, and their basic equality are asserted in the fundamental Leninist works, in the party documents. V.I. Lenin wrote "The single correct attitude to the interests of nations will be their maximal fulfillment and the creation of conditions which will exclude any possibility for conflict on this ground."

In the first years of Soviet power after the victory of October, in complete accordance with Leninist principles, the party consistently followed a course toward overcoming national inequality, ensuring self-determination, the free development of all nations, and

rendering all possible assistance and support to previously oppressed peoples of the national outlying districts.

For resolving these problems, commissariats for national affairs were specially formed on all levels of state power; along with national-state formations there were created territorial national regions and local soviets. Concrete steps were taken to expand the functions of languages of the indigenous nationalities of Turkestan, outstripping the development of the economy and culture of the national regions, involving their populations in active political life, fortifying the unity of the workers of all nations, founded upon the communality of interests in socialist construction.

The implementation of this policy, in spite of all the contradictions of the subsequent path, created the conditions for profound changes in all spheres of life in Soviet Uzbekistan.

In the political area—this is overcoming the remnants of pre-capitalist relations, the formation of socialist statehood. The declaration of the Turkestanskaya ASSR, the subsequent national-state boundaries and the formation of the Uzbek SSR, created the opportunity for the institution and the development of the national-state, economic, social, and national-cultural foundations of society, and awakened the enormous potential at the republic's disposal for constructive work.

The self-determination of the Kara-Kalpak people became an historical reality within the framework of an autonomous republic. Organs of representational authority, political and public institutes were formed; paths of radical reformation in socioeconomic, spiritual, and cultural life were opened for the peoples of Uzbekistan. The integrational processes also within the framework of the union state were actively conducive to this; they were conditioned by the unity of political and economic interests. They objectively led to the surmounting of the de facto inequality of nations inherited from the feudal-colonial past, and to the formation and consolidation of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR as one of the greatest spiritual values of socialism.

In the economic area—an industrial base of production was created, without which there cannot be national and social progress. In the years of the first 5-year plans, 60-79 percent of the capital investments directed toward these goals were covered from the union budget. Industrial enterprises were re-based in the republic; raw materials and equipment were sent to these. It was rendered much assistance in the preparation of qualified engineering cadres, and in the formation of a national working class.

With the support of other regions of the country, a major program of socialist reconstruction of the rural economy, and its transition to an industrial base was implemented. The sphere of land and water utilization expanded many fold, without which it would have been impossible to

provide a living for the republic's burgeoning population. Uzbekistan turned into the country's major producer of cotton, silk, karakul lamb fur, fruit and vegetable production, and took up a worthy place in the general union division of labor.

A multi-national population composition formed in the republic, characterized by the unity of productive and social activity, and by attitudes of respect and good neighborly relations.

The solidarity of the Soviet peoples withstood honorably a test of strength during the years of the Great Patriotic War. In short periods, Uzbekistan accepted over 100 evacuated major industrial enterprises, and developed production. The republic supplied the front with arms, ammunition, and agricultural products. Hundreds of thousands of evacuees found housing and shelter here. Uzbekistan became the native home for tens of thousands of orphans. The republic shared its land with peoples unjustly removed from their indigenous areas. Its finest sons and daughters defended the country's freedom and independence shoulder to shoulder with brothers and sisters from all republics.

During the postwar years, Uzbekistan was actively involved in restoring the economy, and greatly assisted the liberated regions in eliminating the destruction. Economic links with other regions of the country, founded upon relations of the friendship and cooperation of all the brotherly republics was strengthened. To speak picturesquely, we have always been together, both in joy and in sorrow. Let us just recall the history of the restoration of a Tashkent destroyed by an earthquake.

The creation in Uzbekistan of a major multi-branched economy is the direct result of the implementation of the party's nationality policy; this economy is organically integrated into the country's unified national economic complex. In addition to cotton spinning, the republic holds a high place in the production of fruit and vegetable crops, natural gas, aviation technology, production of agricultural and construction and road machine building, the cable and electrical equipment industry, and other branches.

Significant changes have taken place in **cultural development** as well. The year 1920 will never be expunged from the memory of the generations, when at Lenin's decree on the creation of the Turkestan State University, a famous science train was dispatched to Tashkent with eminent scientists and teachers. Thus was laid the foundation for the formation of a higher school in the Central Asian region and the creation of conditions for the training of highly qualified cadres. During the years of Soviet power in Uzbekistan, the national theater, musical and fine arts, and national cinematography were formed and fortified. Rich traditions accrued in Soviet Uzbek literature. In an historically brief period, the republic became one of the major scientific and cultural centers, playing a noted role not only in the union state,

but in the development of multi-plan interethnic links with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Such are the actual facts of our history, the real results of the nationality policy, results which could only have been achieved in the unified and consolidated family of Soviet peoples. And to cross all this out, to declare that Soviet power has not led to any noticeable changes in the lives of peoples, to appeal for national specification means the distortion of life's truth, harm to the unity of the Soviet peoples, and to one's own nation.

At the same time, the deformations of the periods of the cult of personality and stagnation, and the excessive bureaucratic centralization of the administrative-command system negatively affected Uzbekistan's political, economic, and social-cultural development.

In many ways, the republic's state sovereignty remained formal; its independence in the resolution of the most important regional problems was limited. The departmental approach of the centralized organs, the ignoring of objective economic laws, the specifics of historical development, the region's natural resources, land, and water conditions led to an atrophied, one-sided development of the national economy, primarily of raw materials, significant disproportions in the development and distribution of productive forces, and the social infrastructure. Problems of the ecology and the population's employment were sharply exacerbated.

These causes, as well as the planning of socioeconomic development without consideration for the actions of demographic factors led to a widening gap from union-average indices for national income and per capita income of the population, and serious lagging in the people's provision of a standard of living. The unrestrained, unfounded pursuit of gross cotton output, leading to the monoculture of the cotton plant, the disregard of scientifically based agricultural systems, and the exclusion of feed and foodstuffs crops also had their effect.

The republic's entire population, workers of all nationalities, are experiencing for themselves the negative influence of these factors.

In evaluating the current sociopolitical situation, the negative role of the simplified, superficial, and sometimes neglectful approach to the objectively formed contradictions between the development of nations and bringing them closer together, and of the dogmatic views must be taken into consideration on the path to their resolution. The groundless repressions, especially with regard to the national intelligentsia and the forced relocation to Uzbekistan of entire peoples by the Stalinist regime have laid their imprint upon the nature and trends of development of the interethnic processes.

Even in the recent period, the indiscriminate, frequently unfounded and poorly conceived approaches to the so-called "cotton matters" have had negative effects, as well as the serious errors and extremes in the selection

and indoctrination of national cadres, and voluntarism in ideological work, in the evaluation of historical and cultural values, folk customs, and traditions. All of this has caused the workers' dissatisfaction with the resolution of the problems troubling them, and has created tension in interethnic relations, adding to them a particular urgency.

The tragic events in Fergana Oblast became a serious lesson for us. We saw clearly what sort of hard-to-correct consequences the endeavors of the anti-perestroyka, corrupt elements to exploit the republic's complex situation may lead to, heating up nationalistic moods and destabilizing the situation.

Above all, events have shown the political unsoundness of many party workers and soviet cadres, their incapacity to foresee extraordinary situations, prevent mass disorders, excesses, cruelty, and human victims. The helplessness of the law enforcement organs was manifested, inactivity, and sometimes direct connivance with the extremists.

We have given these events a harsh political evaluation. The guilty have been brought and are being brought to party and criminal accountability. They all, whoever they are, whatever nationality they belong to, must be given and will be given strict punishment.

It is appropriate today to inform the plenum participants of everything connected with the tragic events in Fergana, and of everything which preceded them; the actions of certain responsible individuals in the complex situation of that period in many ways still require comprehension and the appropriate conclusions.

I have had to say, and I will repeat myself once more, that I cannot and will not ever agree with the hasty, completely unfounded attempts to simplify the events, to lay the responsibility for what happened on the entire Uzbek people, indiscriminately pinning labels on it, as the central press has unfortunately set its hand to do. Internationalism, benevolence, spiritual goodness, and hospitality are inherent in the Uzbek people. And we will never allow our people to be smeared, the foundations of our friendship to be shattered; we will offer the strongest resistance to all those who would want to split the single family of Soviet peoples.

II. Socioeconomic Problems in the Modern Nationality Policy in the Republic

Comrades!

In speaking of the need to bring interethnic relations in the republic into harmony, we must distinctly recognize that as was noted at the September Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, nationality relations do not occur in their pure, refined form. This is always a totality of economic, social, and other problems, directly touching

upon the vital interests of every person. Thus the restructuring of the nationality policy should begin with the resolution of the tasks forming the basis—economic and social tasks.

Without casting the policy of perestroika in doubt, people are justifiably dissatisfied with its results. And the urgency of the tension, including the tension in interethnic relations, is first and foremost conditioned by the fact that every family, every person living in the republic, regardless of nationality, feels for himself that today it is becoming ever more difficult to provide himself with all that is necessary for normal life activity. Even everything which is being built in the republic will scarcely suffice to cover the population growth (approximately 650,000 people annually). The standard of living lags significantly behind the union-average indices, and is practically not increasing.

And consequently, our chief task is to ensure the progressive development of the republic's national economic complex, and to overcome the socioeconomic tension on this basis. The Central Committee Bureau viewpoint on resolving this problem, as developed with the participation of all oblast party organizations, is conditionally expounded in the Uzbek CP Central Committee draft platform for the upcoming elections, offered for the attention of the plenum participants. Thus I will pause only on the most important, key aspects.

In many ways, the resolution of national and interethnic problems in Uzbekistan is conditioned by issues of the effective employment of the population. In the republic today, approximately one million mobile units of labor resources are unemployed in the social production sphere. The integrated full-ranging program adopted for their rational utilization is in fact practically not being realized due to the lack of a deep scientific study. The lagging behind its planned indices is growing from year to year and has already exceeded 250,000 people. Many of the events of recent times have as their cause people's lack of employment. The growth in the proportion of youth among the unemployed population, comprising 51 percent (in rural areas, 54.1, as compared with 46.7 percent in 1979), is particularly disturbing. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that our population's growth rate is three times higher than the union average.

At the same time, the relative resettlement of rural areas under conditions of a chronic shortage of qualified work forces in the cities is a characteristic trait of the republic. Even at present, the load of arable land per able-bodied kolkhoz worker is 1.31 hectares, while the norm is 6-7 hectares; in individual farms, especially in the Fergana valley, this index is lower still. This inevitably leads to a lack of growth, and in some locations, also to a decline in the income of rural families (which are, as a rule, large). And if we take into consideration that the overwhelming majority of the rural population is made up of people of indigenous nationalities, then it is not difficult to see these factors' unfavorable influence upon the state of interethnic relations as well.

What are the paths to solving these problems? The most accessible measure is increasing the shift coefficient of the operational industrial enterprises.

It does not require much wit or energy to find reserves of work spaces to set people up in work, based upon a simple arithmetic calculation according to statistical data. But in fact, an entire range of problems must be solved here, and most importantly, all the restraining factors must be defined and eliminated with the participation of the enterprise managers themselves; in many ways, these factors do not depend upon them.

What do I have in mind? This is the predominant concentration of industrial enterprises in major cities, where the housing shortage and the undeveloped infrastructure limits the opportunity for relocating a significant number of people there. This is the glaring shortage of qualified cadres in the professions which determine scientific and technological progress. This is the lack of an active system for training such cadres for the republic's national economy, especially in the industrial branches.

I would like to go into more detail on the latter point, as the problem of the formation of an industrial class of the indigenous nationality is linked not only with the republic's present but its future as well. Judge for yourselves. Out of 460 day-student professional training schools [PTU], only one in five trains workers in modern industrial professions. Only one in three PTUs has complete academic complexes at its disposal. Their needs for modern equipment for educational purposes are poorly fulfilled by leading enterprises. The transition to a system of enterprise and PTU contracts led to a sharp reduction in the scale of training of working cadres which even previously had not satisfied the republic's growing demand.

At many enterprises of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, machine building, construction industry, and light industry, work positions systematically remain unfilled; their quantity has exceeded 25,000. And almost half of them are in the city of Tashkent or in Tashkent oblast. And in the majority of cases, there is one reason—serious shortcomings in the calculation of the able-bodied population and the organization of training of labor cadres in an entire range of specialties. Therefore, today, the newly operational capacities of the Dzhizakskaya Hosiery Factory, the Fergana branch of the aviation association imeni V.P. Chkalov, the train coupling plant in the city of Leninsk, Andizhan Oblast, and a number of others cannot be brought on line fully.

It should be directly stated that the miscalculations of the Andizhan (comrade M.M. Aripdzhanov), Fergana (comrade Sh.M. Yuldashev), and Syr Darya (comrade A.F. Klepikov) party obkoms and oblispolkoms have had their effect here not only in solving the economic problems but in the organization of professional orientation for youth, especially that of the indigenous nationality.

All of this is the direct consequence of the fact that many enterprises of union subordination, rather than training cadres in the villages, sometimes take the easier route of inviting prepared workers from other regions of the country, thus complicating the employment problem of the local population. This increases tension for the housing problem in the cities, and hinders the formation of a national brigade of the working class. As a result, the proportion in the republic of the local population among the workers of machine building enterprises is somewhat over 27 percent, and in labor collectives such as the "Sredazkabel" production association, the "Tashsel-mash" plant, and the excavator labor collective, it is less than 25 percent. I think it appropriate to remind the manager-communists (comrades N.L. Shpil'kov, V.D. Karlov, and A.N. Sumbulov) of these and many other enterprises that the task of the formation of a working class from among the indigenous nationalities goes back to the best traditions of proletarian internationalism, and obligates them to a great deal.

The main thing here is to alter the psychology and thinking of individual yet frequently encountered "awful theoreticians" who, under such circumstances, attempt to introduce a contrived, and I would say deeply harmful, theory about the local population, particularly Uzbeks, being incapable of working under conditions of major industrial production, and more inclined to working in the processing branches, in the service sector, etc.

Such reflections demand the most serious condemnation. The fact of the matter is that we ourselves, the leaders of the republic, the leaders of oblast and city echelons have never seriously considered and have never attempted to cardinaly change the unsuitable practice which had come into being. And as if that were not enough, there have also been those who agree with such hackneyed and convenient dogma.

The one clear thing is that the existing system for training workers and engineering-technical cadres requires radical renewal. At the order of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, the republic Gosplan and the Ministry of Education are now working through concrete proposals on this score.

This becomes all the more important because for the exhaustive resolution of the issue of the population's rational employment, we cannot avoid implementing a range of measures associated with eliminating structural disproportions, and our economy's debut on a qualitatively new level.

The fundamental position of principle upon which it is necessary to base this is that Uzbekistan is not a base of raw materials, but an equal economic partner to other union republics. It is necessary to break through the situation, which formed under the influence of the administrative-command system, where more than 60 percent of the total volume of the republic's industrial

production was based on non-labor intensive production, turning out raw materials and semi-finished goods. The implementation of major measures for the priority development and placement in Uzbekistan of labor- and science-intensive enterprises producing goods finished at a high level is needed.

These are, in the first place, enterprises of light and local industry, and other branches producing consumer goods. Secondly, these are enterprises of the modern branches, determining scientific and technological progress—instrument-making, electronics, and the electrical equipment industry and others. That is, production lines such as will ensure the employment of a large number of highly qualified workers allowing an increase in production of the technologically complex products people need. And what is especially important is that they guarantee the workers a normal salary, since on a per capita income level the republic is in one of the lowest places in the country.

The implementation of such a program requires that the approach to training worker cadres be radically changed. We understand that it is not simple to prepare a highly qualified technical production worker from young village men and women. Yet this is a task of economic, social, and great political significance. The enterprise managers bear particular responsibility here. Unfortunately, not all of them understand this.

A characteristic example of this is the Akhunbayevskiy ball-bearing plant (comrade Zh. Salakhitdinov, director). Despite the presence of unengaged labor resources in the region, the production capacities introduced 3 years ago were only half operational. A substantial portion of the equipment stands idle due to the shortage of trained workers qualified in repairs, adjustments, and rigging.

This is not an isolated example. The Surkhan plant, the Kokand footwear factory, and dozens of other enterprises come up against such problems today. The situation is exacerbated by the organization inertia of party, soviet, and management organs.

The republic Council of Ministers and the Namangan oblispolkom (comrade B.Zh. Khakimov) simply cannot finally resolve the issues of completing the construction and retooling to furniture production of the Namangan wood housing construction combine. As a result, 75,000 square meter buildings have stood idle for over 2 years; up to 4,000 workers could have been employed in them, producing R100 million worth of furniture annually.

The party obkoms and oblispolkoms must understand that ensuring the population's rational employment is first and foremost not an economic, but a most important political task. And we are no longer going to acquiesce to underestimating it.

The structural perestroyka of the economy, the implementation of a program for training qualified labor cadres are calculated for an extended period. Yet the

tension in matters of the population's employment have worsened to an extreme, and even today require concrete measures providing a rapid effect.

The path toward solving this problem lies in the creation of small industrial production lines, shops, and branches right in the republic's rural areas and small cities. And the basic accentuation should be not upon those requiring high qualifications, but relatively labor-intensive finishing stages of the technological cycle—the gathering of simple ready-made items or units; the preparation of sewn items from ready-cut pieces, packing boxes, and so on. This was done, for example, at the kolkhoz imeni Kim Pen Khva, Srednechiriskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast, which created a shop for sewing garments for pre-school children.

Another realistic trend for the specialization of such production lines is the primary processing of agricultural products, the conservation of fruits and vegetables right on the farms. For these purposes, a program of organization and production of the necessary equipment by the republic's labor forces has been developed. It is necessary to establish strict party control over its unconditional implementation.

And finally, as is done today at the "40 Years of October" kolkhoz, Bagatskiy Rayon, and at other farms in Khorezm Oblast, the creation of private production lines and businesses for producing construction materials from local raw materials, and the formation of small mobile construction organizations, erecting individual housing units and outbuildings, etc. at the order of the population are seen as having good prospects. Considering the sharp expansion of land allotments for village farmsteads, the demand for such production will grow.

Implementing these measures will create a large number of work spaces in the near future without significant capital investment. In addition, other regions of the country experiencing a shortage of labor resources are showing great interest in the creation of such a network of small production outfits in our republic. Recently, during Tyumen Oblast's Culture Days, we achieved complete mutual understanding in these matters with CPSU obkom first secretary comrade G.P. Bogomyakov. The Siberians are prepared to help us in developing a network of small branches and shops, supplying it with raw materials, semi-finished goods, receiving a portion of the finished production in return. Moreover, this will serve as an impetus to the development of communications in the areas of science, education, and culture, that is, it will actually be conducive to fortifying the inter-national solidarity of the peoples of the Soviet Federation.

Multiphased ties with Leningraders are being fine-tuned. In return for the fruit and vegetable produce we supply to them by contract, they will expand the green houses in the farms of Tashkent Oblast, and provide the material and equipment resources in short supply, help in cultivating the production of construction materials, and

create a joint forest industry farm. In the next 2 years, the construction of three fruit and vegetable processing enterprises is planned by them, with foreign firms.

The following group of issues is related to the social reorientation of the economy, and the intensification of attention toward people's needs and demands. The Central Committee considers its primary task to be rendering genuine assistance to low-income strata of the population, large families, pensioners and invalids, and student youth. Despite the existing tension with material and financial resources, we have found the opportunity to direct already in 1990 an additional R142 million to strengthening the social defense of the low-income category of the population at the expense of funds from the republic and local budgets, and the mobilization of other sources.

Thus, over R100 million is allocated for organizing free meals for general-education school pupils from grades 1-5, and for assisting pregnant women suffering from anemia. The norms of expenses toward food service in boarding houses will be increased substantially. Kolkhozes will be allowed to make supplemental allocations in village hospitals and kindergartens at the expense of state purchases of agricultural products.

The material situation of war and labor veterans, pensioners, and citizens living independently will improve. The task has been set to direct over R7 million rubles to increasing stipend and pension size, allowing the level of welfare of 55,000 people to be raised. For these purposes, it is necessary to introduce more broadly the experience of the Malika knitwear association, the Kommunizm kolkhoz and the Kyzyl-Ravat sovkhoz of Namangan Oblast and other organizations in paying supplements to pensions and stipends at the expense of the enterprises' own funds.

An improvement in the working and living conditions of education, health maintenance, and social services workers is envisaged. Starting as soon as next year, privileges in payment for communal services to those residing in private apartments in cities will be extended to them. It is planned that extremely needy families of teachers, doctors, medical personnel, and young specialists will be allocated housing space, and resort vacation packages by special designation. Approximately 78,000 students of higher and intermediate educational institutions living in apartments will receive a certain monthly compensation.

The Central Committee's general position on these problems is expounded in the draft of the pre-election platform, and it will adhere firmly to the platform. The planned range of measures for the advanced development of the social infrastructure, improvement in people's welfare, and the recovery of the ecological situation must be taken into the strictest party control. And here the republic government, local soviets, and economic organs of all levels and echelons must manifest heightened responsibility.

You know of the broad public resonance received by the recent Central Committee and Council of Ministers resolution on the further development of private farm plots of kolkhoz workers, sovkhoz workers, and citizens, and of individual housing construction. The range of urgent problems slated for expeditious resolution, associated with self-provision of rural families with basic foodstuffs products, filling the kolkhoz markets, increasing and accelerating the introduction of housing, and increasing the population's employment—these measures have become a most important factor in the stabilization of the moral-political situation in the republic.

Moreover, swinging and procrastination on these matters cannot be tolerated. According to preliminary calculations, over 500,000 families remain unserved with receipt of land or expansion of land parcels. Despite the fact that by the end of 1989, is necessary to supply all needy families with personal plots, in Fergana, Samarkand, and Surkhan Darya oblasts, this work has been only 20-28 percent fulfilled. A recent review showed that the leaders of Syr Darya and Kashkar Darya oblispolkoms (comrades A.A. Aydarkulov and V.I. Suskin) are dragging out the realization of the given resolution.

It should be emphasized that the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers (comrade I.Kh. Dzhurabekov) did not conduct the needed organizational work for its implementation and control. In the Kara Kalpak ASSR, the Kashka Darya, Syr Darya, and Surkhan Darya oblasts the measures to provide rural farmsteads with livestock and feed are coming to naught.

And it is even more impermissible to denigrate the workers' trust in favor of one's personal advantage, as was done by the leaders of Tashkent Rayon. Can this be a party approach to the cause when despite the existence of a waiting list over 2,000 people long for receiving land parcels, the party raykom second secretary V.V. Shamygiya, department heads, and other apparatus staffers become members of an orchard and vegetable cultivation society, which is allocated land parcels without waiting? And Keles gorispolkom chairman Z.D. Latypov gets set up in a house in the rayon, while already having modern housing. And how do we understand the position of rayispolkom chairman S.Sh. Tashkhodzhayev, who unstintingly allocated cars to managers and commercial workers, ignoring the privileges granted by law to war participants and invalids. All this is the result of the unprincipled raykom first secretary A.T. Turakhonov, who closed an eye to all these outrages.

The Central Committee drew the necessary conclusions from this. I would like to emphasize once more that we will allow no one to undermine the authority of the party and Soviet power with irresponsible actions.

The restructuring of the agrarian sector, and the social restructuring of the village demand a great deal of attention. The problem worrying everyone, without exception, is overcoming the cotton plant monoculture.

We received support from the union Government. For 1990 and subsequent years, the cotton fiber production plan has been established at 1.5 million metric tons, or 215,000 metric tons less than what was produced in 1988. And the proportion of cotton in individual farms is being reduced to 56-63 percent. That is, an actual basis is being created for the general inculcation of scientifically founded crop rotation, and a significant irrigated area is being freed up for the cultivation of foodstuffs crops and feed crops.

The issues of eliminating the price disproportions which had come into being have long since become pressing. While the average labor investment throughout the country for the production of one quintal of grain is 1.6 man-hours, the analogous result in cotton growing reaches a figure 22 times higher than that. However, the wholesale price of cotton exceeds that of grain by a factor of only 3.5-4. It is not surprising that such incongruities are frequently perceived as an infringement upon nationality rights. It must be said that we have found understanding in the union organs on this matter. The allocation of resources to supplement the raw cotton price already in the current year has allowed the tension to be reduced to a certain extent. And this was immediately manifested in a growing concern for the final product of their labor on the part of the cotton complex toilers. Despite the late-ripening harvest, the plan for cotton production was fulfilled in the optimal time periods, without the involvement of city dwellers or school children, and with minimal participation from student volunteers.

The success currently achieved in the cotton fields is doubly precious to us. Precious because the spring element and the summer dryness had threatened a major portion of the harvest. The truly heroic efforts of all village toilers were needed in order to fulfill our duty to the republic and the country. And the workers of Uzbekistan, who have survived many groundless, insulting, and humiliating accusations in connection with "cotton" affairs, have proven that cotton is cultivated by honest, conscientious labor, which must receive a worthy assessment.

In the coming year of 1990, the increment for cotton will grow something over two-fold, and the price of one metric ton of raw cotton will exceed R1,000 as opposed to the R806 average in the current year. The work on a radical revision of prices for cotton is continuing, and will be brought to its logical conclusion.

Today, in expressing heartfelt gratitude to and recognition of the kolkhoz workers, sovkhoz workers, machine operators, agricultural and water management specialists, city dwellers, and student volunteers, the CP Central Committee feels that everyone who has made a contribution to the cotton victory must receive a material and moral reward. Party, soviet, and management organs are called upon to see to it that each front-rank worker be given suitable incentive. And this should be done under ceremonious circumstances, publicly and openly. In

view of this, the Central Committee Buro is introducing a proposal on holding during the second half of December the traditional "Cotton Festival" ["Pakhta Bayrami"]. I am certain that the Central Committee members will support this.

One of the root issues of our policy is a substantial elevation of the culture of village life. We are deeply indebted to the peasants, the majority of whom are not provided with drinking water and natural gas, children's pre-schools, schools, hospitals, or clinics. And immediate measures must be taken to decisively and rapidly raise the social sphere in the village.

In a word, we are speaking of implementing a broad range of measures for the radical perestroika of the republic's entire economy and social sphere; of measures based upon deepening the economic reforms, working out a new economic mechanism, expanding and strengthening direct relations with other regions of the country on a mutually advantageous basis. And for this, it is necessary to broadly utilize the entire arsenal of means and rights at our disposal; these will increase significantly with the republic's transition to regional economic accountability, and the fortification of its economic independence.

III. Cultural-Moral Problems of a Contemporary Nationality Policy in the Republic

Comrades!

The harmonization of interethnic relations assumes a strong amalgam of economic measures and the renewal of the spiritual-moral sphere.

An evaluation of the current state of our national-cultural life is unthinkable without taking the experience of history into consideration. While in the early years of Soviet power, Leninist principles of ensuring the full-blooded spiritual development of all peoples, raising their national cultures, and their mutual enrichment were steadfastly brought into life; this course was subsequently distorted. As emphasized in the CPSU platform, both in theory and in practice, lines for forcing nations to become more similar came to power, actually leading to the belittlement of national diversity and particulars in spiritual life.

There began a groundless curtailment of the network of schools in the native language, and of other national-cultural loci. Under slogans of combatting feudal vestiges, in the thirties and forties, and the early fifties, a number of prominent Uzbek scientific and cultural figures came under accusation of and were repressed for nationalism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism; they included A. Kodiri, U. Nosyr, Aybek, Sheykhzade, Shukurullo, Shukhrat, Turab, Tula, and others who tried to preserve and enrich the centuries-old cultural legacy, traditions, and customs of the Uzbek people.

Measures have been taken in recent years to restore historical truth and justice with regard to such prominent figures of our culture such as Chulpon and Fitrat, who made an indubitable contribution to the development of the republic's literature and art. In the Uzbek CP Central Committee at the present time, work is underway on matters of reviewing decisions made earlier, and the restoration of their good name to a number of representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, who had done a great deal for the development not only of Uzbek, but of all multi-national Soviet culture.

The extremes allowed in the past, as well as the artificially propagated process of de-nationalization morbidly broke through to the national self-awareness, causing an aspiration to "defend" the uniqueness of our own culture, and exacerbating interethnic relations.

All of this was supplemented by the practice of the "residual" attitude toward the cultural sphere. These tendencies remain to be broken, substantially expanding the opportunity for realizing the vital national-cultural demands of all the republic's residents. At the present time, the population's needs for receiving an education in their native language, and training nationality cultural cadres are being met more completely. The number of schools with various languages of instruction, and of faculties and departments in VUZs is increasing. The number of artistic collectives of various nationality groups is growing. Sections of nationality writers are working under the Uzbek Writers Union. The thematic and linguistic specter of the press, radio, and television programs is expanding.

However, our vital tasks and opportunities in these great political issues are far from exhausted. Indifference is frequently shown in the provinces; measures taken to meet the national-cultural needs of the republic's population are tied up in red tape.

For example, how long may the decision on organizing national-cultural centers in Tashkent be drawn out, a question quite justifiably posed by the representatives of the Kazakh, Korean, and other nationalities as well? It seems that there is a well-known Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet decree on this score. But the Tashkent gorispolkom, citing the lack of a registration procedure, hands it off to the Ministry of Justice, and it to the republic Council of Ministers, and the matter does not move. Could such an attitude be permissible today?

Today, it is urgently necessary to remove all obstacles on the path to creating such centers. The local soviet ispolkoms must demonstrate maximal attention and expedience in this matter. The Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, Tashkent gorispolkom, and Ministry of Culture should also accelerate the practical work in the organization of the republic interethnic cultural center, whose task is to actively assist in the population's inter-ethnic harmony.

Cultural institutions really must become objects for our concern. Can we really speak of a fully valid education, and the satisfaction of people's national-cultural needs if in Bukhara Oblast for example two-thirds of the clubs located in equipped premises, and in Andizhan Oblast one in seven, require major repairs, or if Samarkand's Theater imeni Chekhov closes because it is unheated?!

The strengthening of the material base, of cadres, of spiritual demands—all of this must be in our field of vision. This relates in full measure to matters of the historical and cultural legacy, and the renaissance of unjustly forgotten folk traditions and rites. First experience indicates that the broad strata of the population support the concrete steps taken in this area by the Uzbek CP Central Committee. The recommendations of the Central Committee's Ideological Commission on holding ["Navruza"] were received with approval. We must, while taking into consideration the situation of the workers, continue and deepen the work begun, directing concentrated attention toward the development of progressive traditions and rites, both among the indigenous population and the other nationalities as well.

Today, language issues are at the epicenter of general attention, and this is no coincidence. Language is a nation's spiritual nerve, and on the basis of its condition, the health of any nation may be determined unerringly. Our position with regard to language is clear and unambiguous. The lawfulness of the Uzbek language achieving the status of the official language causes no doubts. There cannot be a spiritually complete individual, or the development of a nation, or its future, without a knowledge of one's own language.

Yet we most definitely do not hold with those who attempt to set up the Uzbek people's sincere aspiration to develop its language in opposition to the Russian language, to bring us away from our inter-nationalist positions. While respecting our language, as representatives of any nation do, we understand full well the role and significance of the Russian language in the solidarity of all peoples of our country. This language does not reduce the authority of any other languages, but on the contrary, strengthens mutual communications among the peoples, ensuring movement toward progress.

We have the same respectful attitude toward all the other languages of the peoples living in Uzbekistan. All conditions must be created for their free, full-blooded development.

Naturally, during the course of the preparations and the adoption of the Law on the Official Language of the Uzbek SSR, we passed through a complex path of searching, arguments, and doubts. It seems that in the final redaction, the law took into itself weighted and thoughtful decisions which do not infringe upon the rights of any one nation or nationality living in the republic. The matter now is one of bringing the law to life. The republic Council of Ministers must, with all

care and responsibility, think through a concrete program for realizing the law. Party, soviet organs, and the ideological aktiv are called upon to ensure its phased inculcation, maintaining the necessary tact, and cutting off any attempt to exacerbate relations on the basis of language.

This also, to a large extent, touches upon the sphere of national culture. Let us say, in accordance with the Law on the Official Language of the Uzbek SSR, it is necessary to ensure the general introduction of synchronic translation of dramatic and musical productions. It is advisable to create a regional film fund of motion pictures dubbed in the languages of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The issue of publishing the republic newspaper in the Kazakh language is being resolved, as well as the issue of expanding the opportunities for television and radio broadcasts in the languages of those nationalities living in the republic. Our mutual cultural contacts with brotherly republics must be developed on a solid, long-term basis, suffused with genuineness, and not display inter-nationalism. In a word, we are obligated to do everything possible in order that the palette of Uzbekistan's cultural life and our friendly relations reflect all the many colors of national hues.

In this area, we expect a great deal from the representatives of the large detachment of the republic's cultural and artistic figures. We are heartened by the growing creative and public activity of many of them, and the constructive approach to solving the problems facing the republic.

Today, no small amount of work is being done to unify and consolidate all the healthy forces of the creative intelligentsia, to restore with it the dialogue that had been destroyed in the recent past, and to ensure the respectful attitude and conditions necessary for the growth in activity in all trends of multifaceted Uzbek culture and art.

We must all grasp the simple truth that the growth of our people's spiritual culture, civic activity, and political self-awareness are unthinkable without a multilateral and harmonious development of the very centers of culture, without material and moral incentive, without the support of the intelligentsia, especially that of the talented youth, which has always been and will always be the conduit for this culture within the masses.

A republic such as Uzbekistan, with its ancient history and culture, having the priceless legacy of Beruni, Ulugbek, Alisher Navoy, Furkat, Mukimi, and other great thinkers and teachers of the people from the past must today create all the necessary conditions so that the logical and consecutive chain of history and culture not be broken.

We are now obliged to admit that having a watershed, placing a boundary between the party organization and the creative intelligentsia, as was done in the not-too-distant, yet irretrievable past, means committing a

serious error. We must give ourselves a strict accounting in how, relying solely on the intelligentsia, its healthy forces, we may influence people's frame of mind, and bring all our strategic and current plans to life. These are plans whose purpose and sense lies first and foremost in elevating the people's welfare through cultivating and enriching spiritual culture, through the harmonious intellectual development of each person.

Therefore it is not in division, not in opposition to the intelligentsia, but in consolidation, in the association of all spiritual forces that we see the most important condition for solving the problems of the republic's further national, socioeconomic, and spiritual development. Moreover, we firmly expect that non-traditional, creative approaches and ideas, the bearer of which are scientific, literary, and artistic figures, will help in finding the key to solving many vital problems. This is why constant interaction and close cooperation with, and the most concentrated attention toward the intelligentsia must become the norm of the activity of each party committee, of all our cadres. And all issues must be resolved on the basis of equitable, benevolent, and principled positions, upholding the ideological values and foundations of socialism.

In order that we not be limited to appeals alone, as has frequently been the case until this time, it is necessary for all party, soviet, and economic organs to radically change their attitude toward the creation and fortification of cultural locations, construction and outfitting of clubs, theaters, libraries, and cultural centers. We should put a decisive end to the residual principle of fund and resource allocation for these noble purposes linked to the people's spiritual development. It is necessary to implement a breakthrough in this area immediately. The priorities of culture must already form the backbone of the plan for 1990, which will be submitted tomorrow for general discussion by the republic Supreme Soviet, and will receive the utmost support in the studies for the 13th 5-Year Plan.

IV. Tasks of the Republic Party Organization for the Ideological-Political and Organizational Provision of the CPSU Nationality Policy

Comrades!

The perestroika of the CPSU nationality policy, the practical realization of the complex problems of the further national, socio-economic, and spiritual development of Uzbekistan as a sovereign republic with full rights, and the harmonizing of interethnic relations requires a different, higher quality of ideological and organizational work of all echelons of the Communist Party.

It is first and foremost necessary to disclose in a convincing, well-reasoned, and graphic manner the principled innovation of the party platform adopted by the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum: to restore and develop in it the Leninist principles of nationality policy, with consideration for modern conditions. To

show that it responds to the interests of all nations and nationalities, each person, regardless of his national affiliation, and our entire multi-national community as a whole.

The party has taken upon itself the heavy weight of correcting the deformations in interethnic relations which had been permitted in the past, and confirms this new course with practical actions. A graphic example of this is the recently adopted USSR Supreme Soviet Declaration on recognizing as illegal and criminal all repressive action against peoples who have been subjected to forced relocation, and the unconditional restoration of their rights. This document responds to the feelings of historical justice of all peoples, the innermost hopes of hundreds of thousands of residents of the republic of the Crimean Tatar, Meskhetian Turk, German, and other nationalities. We share their joy over this just act.

The concepts of the republic's sovereignty, republic and local self-management, and economic accounting are very concrete. Great measures for the more complete satisfaction of the national-cultural demands of the Uzbek people, the representatives of all the nations and nationalities living in the republic are being executed. This work will grow, and will encompass ever new spheres of nationality relations in the country, and in Uzbekistan.

But this process may not be and must not be elemental. It must develop the unremitting ideological and organizational leadership of the commissions and departments of the CPSU Central Committee, party obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations. We are obligated to direct the growing national self-awareness and public activity of the masses to a constructive channel. We must not permit this to turn into a naturally destructive flood. This is our highest political responsibility for the fate of all nations and nationalities inhabiting the republic, for the fate of our multi-national state, for the fate of perestroika and socialism.

It should be frankly admitted that the activity of individual echelons of the republic party organization, its ideological aktiv, do not respond today to the demands of the sociopolitical situation. As recently conducted public opinion polls indicate, people are seriously troubled by the tension in interethnic relations that has arisen in a number of regions. They do not perceive a firm, active position on the part of party, soviet, or law enforcement organs. Many leader-communists decline to have systematic, broad contact with labor collectives or at the population's places of residence, avoiding the problems troubling people and answering the pointed questions.

Moreover, there have been more than isolated cases of leaders playing up to the unhealthy moods, giving over their ideological positions to the extremist-minded forces.

Such forces have recently been noticeably active in Andizhan and a number of other oblasts. Various pamphlets of a nationalistic and anti-Soviet nature have frequently begun to appear in public places. Rallies are held at which appeals and various types of fantasies are expressed quite openly, pursuing a goal of disinforming the population and heating up the public atmosphere. Today it must be admitted that these actions are not receiving the necessary resistance and explanation. Many city and rayon party committees are in no way capable of renouncing the methods of mass-scale political work which have outlived their day; they permit complacency and a lack of self-criticism in their evaluation of public life.

The position of some of our communists also causes bewilderment, at least. Only yesterday, while occupying prominent posts in the leadership, they were calling for the production of 7 and 8 million metric tons of Uzbek cotton. But today, obviously playing up to the destructive moods, they have completely changed their tune, and are already agreeing to a complete rejection of the need to cultivate the cotton plant, and groundlessly reject the positive nature of the measures adopted for the stabilization of the plan for the cotton complex, price increments, etc. And it is already completely impermissible that their position is hardly meeting with any well-reasoned criticism. The leaders of the republican organs of administration prefer to remain mute on this issue. And the role of silent encouragement does not at all become our party press.

Due to the fact that we have not set up our political accentuation precisely, the provocational attempts to diminish our internationalist achievements, to propagandize for separatism and national differentiation, and to sabotage the call for the Uzbek youth to join the ranks of the Soviet Army do not cease. In view of this I would like to emphasize once more that the expansion of democracy and glasnost, and pluralism of opinions does not at all mean a rejection of our ideological principles. The position of casual observers, the fear of the crowd, the situational nodding to the fault-finding, separatist moods have never become people on a moral level, all the more so those who claim leadership posts. And today, such a lack of ideological principles is simply incompatible with being in the party.

A weighted, adjusted approach must also be ensured with regard to religion. On the one hand, we should steadfastly bring to life the principle of freedom of conscience, and respect for the religious feelings of the faithful. The peacemaking and charitable activity of religious formations deserve support. Yet freedom of conscience does not mean freedom to flout state laws, to teach intolerance and enmity on religious grounds, as is done by individual sects holding extremist positions.

Yes, we need today a consolidation of forces, just as we need air to breathe. And for this sake, we are prepared to enter into a dialogue with various societal currents. But this is consolidation of healthy, constructive positions,

without deviating a single step from the principles of socialism, its political and spiritual values.

The resolution of all issues of modern nationality policy is inextricably linked to the unfolding reform of the political system. Party committees are obliged to assist in the confirmation of the local soviets' genuine sovereignty, and the elevation of their authority as the chief link in self-management.

Yet growing rights also signify a growing responsibility, first and foremost for the development of the social sphere, and the improvement of people's living conditions. Unfortunately, not all of our workers understand this. Recently, while forming a plan for the republic's economic and social development for 1990, we came across cases where the leaders of a number of ministries and oblasts insistently achieved the razing of buildings without any concern as to how they were going to meet the people's needs.

Thus, the Samarkand oblispolkom (comrade Kilichov) lowered the production volume of the national economy to such an extent that as a result, the population's per capita monetary income could be R100 less in the coming year. The Bukhara oblispolkom (comrade Gataulin) wanted to have a lower plan for wholesale goods circulation and paid services. But the oblast still lags behind average republic indices significantly in this trend. The Kara-Kalpak ASSR Council of Ministers (comrade Tadzhiyev) attempted to reduce milk and meat purchases. The Kashka Darya oblispolkom (comrade Suskin) planned to reduce meat consumption by 3 kilograms, and milk consumption by 8 kilograms. And after all, unlike in previous years, these oblasts had been given the right to keep all meat production for its own consumption. But as you see, they got the right, but the responsibility to the population has not yet been perceived.

Each of us must firmly understand that he is working not for a report, and not for the superior authorities. We are working for people. And they are giving a harsh and final evaluation on each of us. They will express this evaluation at the impending elections of Uzbek SSR people's deputies and deputies to local soviets. There is only one way for us to win the trust of the masses—daily concern and tireless work for people's well-being.

The elections will not be held under simple circumstances. We must account for ourselves completely, for the fact that in the struggle for representation in the republic's highest bodies and in local organs there will include those who would drag us into fruitless rallies and fault-finding, distracting us from the solving the problems of perestroika. Thus, without simplifying the circumstances, but without showing nervousness, the party committees must precisely determine their position, and firmly defend it, strengthening the agitation-propaganda work by the concrete resolution of socially significant tasks. And, sparing no effort, they must struggle so that active advocates of perestroika, the best representatives

of all strata of society, those who think about the fate of the people, and walk together with the people, living through its problems and hopes be elected deputies, regardless of their positions, ranks, or party affiliation.

Overcoming the difficulties and phenomena of stagnation in interethnic relations, and the republic's successful and stable development are possible only in the body of the Soviet Federation, in the brotherly family of Soviet peoples. We have no right to deviate from the position of principle in these matters.

At the same time, we must consistently pursue a course of expanding the republic's rights and sovereignty in all areas of socioeconomic, political, and cultural life. It is already necessary in the near future to simultaneously work through the issues associated with the strengthening of the legal status of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, the increase in the autonomous republic's independence in resolving issues within its competence, and the expansion of its representation in the leading organs of the Uzbek SSR. We must resolve, jointly with the Supreme Soviet and the republic government, a large group of issues, taking into consideration the more complete satisfaction of the needs and demands of the national minorities living within the territory of Uzbekistan.

The resolution of many issues will require coordination of efforts on an inter-republic level. Today, elements of such interrelations of the Uzbek SSR with the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are being formed during the course of the joint resolution of the ecological problems of the Aral Sea area, in the sphere of production, education, and culture. We must also in the future develop our comradely relations with the brotherly peoples of the region, viewing this as a necessary condition of the strengthening of the entire union. Government within the **principles of a federation, as our internationalist duty.** We were born neighbors on this land, and we must cooperate, find a common language, and build our future together.

The realization of the nationality policy assumes a serious **perestroyka of cadre work.** Undoubtedly, while resolving cadre issues, the line for purging the body of cadres of workers without initiative, individuals who have compromised themselves, and the strengthening of all sectors of party, society, and management building by honest, new-thinking people with initiative will be pursued unflinchingly.

However, we may not close our eyes to the fact that until recently, in pursuing this line, we had not fully gotten away from an indiscriminate, campaign-like, and accusatory approach to cadres.

Here is one characteristic example in this vein. Recently, the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro rescinded its previously adopted decision on announcing harsh party punishment for G.Z. Zakhritdinov, former deputy chairman, Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers; A. Makhmudov, former deputy chairman, republic Gosplan;

A.A. Azimbekov, former minister of automotive transportation, and Sh.Kh. Niyazbekov, former department chief, department of transportation and communications, Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs. As it was explained, the January 1988 decision was made in violation of the principles of collegiality and judicial norms. And in essence, people were punished for the branches' shortcomings, which they had attempted to combat. And such cases are not isolated.

As you understand full well, these extremes have nothing in common with the Leninist principles of cadre selection and placement, and must be resolutely condemned and corrected. Today, moving to the top of the list in resolving cadre issues are competence, a business-like attitude, high responsibility to matters entrusted, an attentive attitude toward people and their interests, personal modesty and irreproachable honesty.

At the same time, no opposition to people recommended for leading positions must be permitted on the principle of nationality or language. The composition of the leading cadres, the elected aktiv must be inter-national, formed on a democratic basis, stemming from equal rights in these issues of representatives of all nationalities living in the republic.

It is necessary to direct particular attention to the nomination of young local cadres with good prospects who understand the situation, regional conditions and particulars. At the same time, we are obliged to concern ourselves with the preservation of continuity, with consideration of the opportunity to return to active work those who enjoy merited authority and respect among the workers and the population.

A differentiated, very attentive, and objective approach to people is required in each such case. It is necessary to take into consideration that a permitted injustice also has its effects on the fate and future of those closest to them and their children. We are obliged to impress and prove that social justice and truth, despite any tests, must triumph nevertheless. It is a good thing, however, that this justice triumph with our participation.

Communists and party organizations are called upon to advance the consolidating force in all processes of harmonizing interethnic relations. It is very important to always be with the people, to overcome the difficulties with it, to resolve the complex issues of perestroyka with it. We simply have no other path for strengthening the authority of the party organization and justifying people's trust.

Today, on the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress and the 22nd Uzbek CP Congress, each party committee and party organization is obligated to analyze its work demandingly and critically, and to adopt concrete measures for its further perestroyka, in order that it respond to the interests of the people. It must not be forgotten for a moment that people will give their evaluation of this in the coming elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets of people's deputies.

There is laboring today in the party organizations and labor collectives, in the republic's soviet, state, and economic organs an overwhelming majority of healthy, qualified forces which enjoy the full trust of the Central Committee; cadres capable of resolving the most difficult tasks. This has been proven on more than one occasion in the past; this is convincingly confirmed in

the present. And we are convinced: They are capable of proving this in the future as well.

I think that I will express a common opinion if I say in conclusion that the communists of Uzbekistan have enough political will, determination, and purposefulness to take our republic to new frontiers of socioeconomic and national progress.

Estonian Labor Collectives Union Outlines Program

Republic Demilitarization, Independence Sought

90UN0513A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 28 Nov 89 p 2

[Estonian Telegraph Agency (ETA) article by F. Kaazik and A. Ploompuu: "Estonian Labor Collectives Union Supports Independence"]

[Text] Formed less than a year ago, and now including over 1,100 Estonian labor collectives in its membership, the union has become a notable public politico-economic organization. So it was said at a working session of the Estonian Labor Collectives Union [STKE] that took place in Tallinn City Hall on 26 November. In order to discuss today's most crucial problems in political and economic life, and to define the Estonian Labor Collectives Union's place in Estonia's political life, 4,013 delegates, representing 817 labor collectives, had assembled there. Many guests were present—representatives of a number of movements, associations, and organizations, as well as journalists.

Yu. Nugis, chairman of the STKE Board of Directors and USSR People's Deputy, presented the political report. He noted that the union, heretofore being tied up mainly with maintaining economic stability, has not always been able to participate in the resolution of important political issues. Lessons have been learned from the mistakes, especially since a new political situation has now set in and we stand on the threshold of new elections.

Yu. Nugis stressed that the Estonian Supreme Soviet had passed a historic and, considering the current political situation in the USSR, unprecedented resolution on 12 November. But what will happen next? He noted that the republic's Supreme Soviet has reserved unto itself the right to conduct negotiations on the restoration of Estonia's sovereignty by parliamentary means. Of the three possible alternatives—forming a federation, creating a confederacy, or restoring Estonia's statehood—in the Labor Collectives Union's opinion, one may talk seriously only about the last. The STKE feels that it is proper and possible to negotiate treaties with the USSR only after Estonia's state status, which can only be as the independent Estonian Republic, shall have been established. Thus only the path to restoring Estonia's statehood should be followed.

While seeing the reestablishment of independent, democratic statehood as its activity's primary goal, the STKE views the development paths for the goal's attainment in separate segments. The Labor Collectives Union is striving for political and economic stabilization of Estonia's social life, for democracy, for the right of nations to self-determination, and for guarantees of human and civil rights and increase in the freedom of enterprise. No one political organization has a right to possess constitutionally based preeminence in Estonia.

The STKE thinks that the IME [Self-Managing Estonia] program now in Estonia is the only reform plan for restoring the economy to date, which creates the prerequisites and conditions for the economy's getting out of the crisis state. So it was said, by the way, even in the general-meeting participants' report sent to Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet M. Gorbachev and all USSR People's Deputies. The Labor Collectives Union considers it essential to establish political guarantees, the main prerequisite of which is ensuring that Estonian SSR property is independent and separate from USSR property, for the transition to economic accountability [khozraschet] and genuine economic autonomy. All forms of property defined in the constitution, and enjoying equal protection in the eyes of the state, must perform their functions in the economy. Its accessibility, on mutually advantageous terms, with respect to all states, enterprises, and firms will become the base of Estonia's economic activity.

The Labor Collectives Union condemns the Stalinist-Brezhnevist national policy that conservative forces now are counting on to achieve destabilization of the political situation. Every person must be assured of both his or her human and civil rights by constitutional guarantees in order to eliminate interethnic tensions in Estonia. The Labor Collectives Union [STK] directs its activity toward the creation of precisely the kind of democratic society that will give all residents of Estonia, regardless of their nationality, a sense of assurance.

The need to demilitarize Estonian territory or, in other words, to take the USSR military bases out of here in stages on the basis of the treaties negotiated between the Estonian Republic and the USSR in 1939, is stressed in the report. It is necessary to free Estonia of nuclear weapons and get down to cooperation in putting the idea of nuclear-free Northern States into practice. The negotiations with USSR administrative agencies on our young men's having the opportunity to perform their active service in the army in Estonia should be stepped up.

"After the elections to local self-government organs that will take place in December," said Yu. Nugis, "deputies who have received their mandates by an honest ballot will have been elected here for the first time in 50 years. If these deputies were to assemble in one place, in a people's congress, and there, finding support in the voters' expressed will, were to adopt a historic resolution on Estonian state status, this, for both Moscow and the West, would be the sort of fact with legal force that could not be disputed. Only after the adoption of such a resolution would it be proper to begin negotiations on economic and political relations with the USSR...." Such a people's congress may, in the words of Yu. Nugis, have the function of a constituent assembly.

Yu. Pyarnits, deputy chairman of the STKE, presented a supplementary report on the economy's present state.

and a supplementary report by E. Lippmaa, an academician and a USSR People's Deputy, was devoted to ecological problems and their relation to the society's life.

More than 20 persons, representatives of labor collectives belonging to the Labor Collectives Union, as well as representatives of other organizations and movements, spoke in the discussions. Both sensible analysis and noteworthy proposals were voiced, but there was also much emotion and contention. In any case, the speeches' main drift may be briefly summarized by the words of the Saaremaa Pre-election Union's telegram addressed to the general meeting: "All as one man—for Estonia!"

The general-meeting participants adopted the Estonian Labor Collectives Union's constitution and program. A political declaration, declarations on the elections to local self-government organs and the preservation of law and order, and a proclamation on the necessity to carry out radical economic reform in Estonia also were adopted.

The Labor Collectives Union's revisory commission and council of representatives were elected. The Labor Collectives Union's newest member—the Small Enterprise Association—requested that five seats on the council of representatives be held in reserve.

There is no doubt that the politicians and economists, our republic's Supreme Soviet Deputies, and, of course, the people themselves will carefully study the almost unanimously adopted documents of the general meeting (It would be more correct to say "congress"). The initial information has already been made public, and it may be expected that people's reactions will be far from unambivalent. "The masks have been discarded!"—and thus, in all probability, may one commentate these resolutions. Indeed, by proclaiming an independent, democratic Estonian State as an equally enfranchised member of the international community to be their activity's ultimate goal, the meeting's participants have frankly proclaimed the unviability of the heretofore existing Soviet Socialist partnership. And, although this is regrettable, the increased activity of conservative forces and the central authorities' tactic of delaying the making of decisions have pushed them into such a choice.

I should like to present an excerpt from the STKE general meeting's main report in order to avoid the use of thoughts and statements out of context, unintentionally or deliberately, and their manipulation.

"We support the restoration of Estonia's independence only by parliamentary means.... Moscow must take into account that, although it can recognize our resolution as null and void, it cannot change the people's striving for freedom."

Leader Nugis Interviewed

90UN0513B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 23 Nov 89 p 1

[Interview with Yulo Nugis, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy and chairman of the Estonian Labor Collectives Union, by M. Yurgen in Moscow, date not given: "USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy and STKE Chairman Yulo Nugis"; (Text from NOORTE KHYAEL of 22 Nov)]

[Text] What Will Happen in the USSR Next Year Is Financial Collapse—Estonia Does Not Need Political Races Now—Our Goal: A State That Is a Legal Continuation of the Estonian Republic

[Yurgen] In an interview that took place a few months ago and will be published in the November issue of the magazine KULTUUR YA ELU, you said, in analyzing the scenarios of Estonia's future, that it is too early to leave. We should wait at least a year, and then our time will come. On Saturday, 25 November, you will make a political speech in Tallinn City Hall, at an Estonian Labor Collectives Union [STKE] congress. In the speech, will you stick to what was said earlier?

[Nugis] Events have been developing so rapidly in the interim that the picture of the future is clear—our time has come. A few months ago, we could not foresee the events that have taken place in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, what will happen in the Soviet Union next year has become clear to us. It is financial collapse. And, apparently, we shall not have parliamentary means by the end of the year. Even now the time is an unsafe and not entirely convenient one, but the subsequent processes no longer will be of benefit to us. The Soviet Union is also beginning to use our own weapon against us. It sets everything adopted by our Supreme Soviet at naught, and may set us considerably farther back than we were before initiating our legislative method.

[Yurgen] What can our further steps be?

[Nugis] Estonia's new self-government organs will be elected in an honest way on 10 December. If we assemble all honestly elected rural-district managers [starshiny] and city mayors, and all deputies of self-government organs, 4,000 to 5,000 persons in all, in one place, this will essentially be a genuine representation of the Estonian people. A decision passed there will fully meet the criteria of a referendum. What they will decide—there is not the least doubt about this.

[Yurgen] An Estonian Congress will be unnecessary then?

[Nugis] After such a step, Moscow probably would undertake to clarify relations. But I do not mean to say that an Estonian Congress is unnecessary. It would probably give us additional confidence and moral strength, and this is essential to us. However, the first session of the parliament elected on 18 March will have crucial significance. Undoubtedly, it will go down in our history as an especially inspiring one. We shall proclaim

to all mankind, in accordance with the resolutions of 16 November 1988, that we, who have never joined the Soviet Union, are now the Estonian Republic and will, in the future, maintain relations with all nations according to the normal customs.

[Yurgen] How shall we be able to counter the autonomous oblast idea?

[Nugis] The law provides that an autonomous oblast may be formed only with the permission of the republic's highest governing organ. And, on the whole, this is not a serious matter. The last Intermovement rally at city hall was essentially a lost cause. However, its participants still have not come to understand this. Apparently they think that electric power will remain in their hands, and they will be able to pressure us with that. But what will they eat, poor souls, there among the mountains of ashes? And how will the barbed wire be stretched along Pikk and Lay Streets or Nekrasov Street in Tallinn? No, this is a matter that must not be taken seriously.

[Yurgen] You were recently in the United States. How did Estonia's economic program seem to the economists and politicians there, who usually have a patronizing great-power mentality?

[Nugis] The Estonia and Baltic Republics issue is just as much a matter of principle for the United States as the prestige of its banks is to Switzerland. When the United States retains the position of not recognizing the annexation of the Baltic Republics, this shows the whole world that the United States, as before, can be firm on other points. Thus did a high-level State Department official explain America's position to me.

Economically, our situation has greatly changed over the 50 years, but it is not so terrible that Estonia may be entirely disregarded. Besides, we shall not be disrupting any sort of harmony in the Western market. Thus we should not be rejected. Estonia is like some small, little-known man who, no longer through third-party intercession, will be admitted to the great world market.

[Yurgen] And now about the STKE role in this situation.

[Nugis] In this situation, the STKE does not intend to claim priority for itself or elevate itself above other movements. On the contrary, we call for everyone's unanimity. We ought not to look for each other's faults and the ways in which we differ. Political races are not needed in Estonia now. However, if we lined up our political forces according to their significance, it would be very hard, indeed, for Moscow to dispute the STKE opinion. It is impossible to constantly ignore the workers. The STKE's ultimate goal—still an economically and politically independent state, recognized on an international scale, that is a legal continuation of the Estonian Republic. When we attain this goal, our functions will have been performed, and the STKE, perhaps, will become a moderately liberal coalition party in the future.

[Yurgen] And what will become of USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Yulo Nugis?

[Nugis] I shall remain a resident of Estonia because foreign citizens will probably be excluded from USSR Supreme Soviet membership.

When I talk about all of this, I have a good, comfortable feeling in my mind. We have no other choice. We shall no longer have another time.

MVD Official on Organized Crime

90UN0427A Moscow *AGITATOR* in Russian No 18,
Sep 89 pp 37-37

[Article by Aleksandr Ivanovich Gurov, doctor of jurisprudence and USSR MVD administration chief: "Organized Crime"]

[Text] Today, more and more frequently and with alarm the question resounds, "What is this organized crime, what is the danger of it, and can it be combatted successfully?"

The editors asked Aleksandr Ivanovich Gurov, doctor of jurisprudence and USSR MVD administration chief to respond to these questions which trouble many.

Organized crime did not arise today or yesterday. Its primitive forms (bands, gangs) have always existed. But it was in the mid-sixties that this phenomenon began to acquire a qualitatively new content, which was directly associated with economic relations. Unlike the American mafia, which, as we know, developed on the basis of prohibited types of trade (control of prostitution, games of chance, sale of alcohol and narcotics); in our country, the "godfathers" were born and soon came into their rights on the basis of mismanagement and gross violation of distributive relations. Our own bosses appeared; they surrounded themselves with bodyguards, divvied up spheres of influence, and crushed minor groups in cruel competition. Perhaps that is how everything would have remained were there not fairly strong professional crime in the country, which has begun to be intertwined with the economic crime.

Organized crime is developing primarily on the basis of the shadow economy, a monetary potential which, according to some specialists' assessments, is from R70 million to R90 million. You will agree that the opportunities for criminals are major.

Quite recently our dictionaries precisely mentioned that "corruption is characteristic of the bourgeois state and society." Yet, as it turned out, our bureaucrats and other political figures also take bribes and exploit the rights associated with their positions for mercenary interests.

Here is an example. A criminal group was disclosed which worked in the consumer services system of Kharkov Oblast, and certain other regions of the Ukraine and the RSFSR. Some 250 people were brought up on criminal charges. Along with the dealers, a number of official individuals from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Trade Unions and 16 associates from the law enforcement organs of Kharkov and Crimea oblasts were convicted of receiving large bribes.

Criminal organizations, underground business, and corruption—these are the very constituent parts which determine the essence of organized crime. Its variety, which in effect copies the analogous phenomenon in Western countries, presents the greatest public danger

where several groups unite under common leadership. Fortunately, there are not many of these.

May they be fully regarded as a "Cosa Nostra"-type mafia?

Quite conditionally, at least because they operate primarily within the shadow economy. Without exceeding 200-300 accomplices, these groups for the most part act as parasites on the problems of the economy, especially on the notorious deficits. Their damage is the greatest when they manage to draw into their network the bureaucrats of the management system and the state apparatus.

Organized crime activates the criminal element, organizing them not only for the perpetration of mercenary transgression, but for mass unrest.

A few words on a unique grouping having no analog in criminal practice—"thieves within the law," of whom there would seem to be few, only about 500. Yet is not a matter of quantity. Each of them has his circle; he pays the criminal elements, creates monetary funds, and hands down "court" decisions. Many corrective labor institution and criminal investigations staffers polled feel that a portion of the "thieves within the law" are "controlling" entire regions.

A difficult situation has now arisen in certain regions of the country, for example, in the Central Asian and Northern Caucasus republics, the Baltics, in the Ukraine, and in the region of the Far East, where the most dangerous representatives of the criminal milieu are running things in the area of the economy; there are major plunderers and dealers.

What is the crux of the matter here? It is above all necessary to recognize that the task of combatting this phenomenon is not just the function of the militia. A broad-scale program of measures is necessary here.

As we know, the temporary committees for combatting crime have now begun their activities. I think that they could also take upon themselves the function of coordinating the disparate departmental forces for the creation of a powerful strike force with the goal of inflicting a palpable blow upon the criminal clans. The social and criminological situation for this has ripened.

It is likewise desirable that with our help they fully analyze the reasons for the blocking of many sensible proposals, especially those of a legislative nature, and finally move them from the standstill by using the power granted to them.

There is a special subdivision of the USSR MVD for combatting organized crime; ones similar to it are being created in a number of republic ministries, UVD [internal affairs administrations] of krays, oblasts, and major cities. Yet this obviously is not enough. Powerful specialized subdivisions with vertical subordination are needed.

And, finally, the laws. None of this will work without them.

Take that same racket. How can criminals be caught if they send in third parties, and do not do their purchases themselves? Many people simply have not believed in defense against threats; they had no hope of being guarded against infringement until the corresponding laws were adopted. For example, while during all of 1988, only 600 incidents of racketeering were discovered, in the first 4 months of 1990 alone, 1,507 declarations were received, resulting in 1,107 criminal cases.

On an annual basis, thousands of kilograms of gold, platinum, silver, and other valuable materials are confiscated from criminals. It would be possible to put 50 percent of this into the fight against organized crime, stimulating those who disclose and unmask the association.

Understandably omitting the details, it should be said that the work of separating and eliminating criminal groups is now being conducted in all locations.

The process of accumulating experience in such work is underway; its sharpest points are aimed at those who abet the leaders of the criminal milieu. This experience shows that it is possible to combat organized crime. Yet a mandatory condition must be joint, coordinated efforts of the operations services, investigations, the courts, the procuracy, and the KGB. It should be noted that the lack of inter-departmental coordination is being gradually eliminated, albeit with difficulty.

The fight against organized crime is only starting to come around. However, the evil has been called by name, and this is already the first step in conquering it.

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MVD Official Interviewed on Counterfeiting

90UN0445A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
2 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with N.P. Sobol, first deputy chief of the Main Administration for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by V. Romanchin: "Be Careful: It Is Counterfeit!"]

[Text] The public is seeing the veil of secrecy lifted from one more subject—counterfeiting.

[Sobol] Most often we see counterfeit banknotes in denominations of 5, 10, and 25 rubles and infrequently notes worth 30, 50, and 100 rubles. And although the consequences for counterfeiting are fairly severe—up to 15 years of imprisonment, and where there are aggravating circumstances the penalties go even higher—they do not stop our home-grown "swindlers." During just

1986-1988 326 crimes were registered, including 24 committed by rings of criminals. And 104 counterfeiters were uncovered.

[Romanchin] Nikolay Pavlovich, how does our country look in comparison with others?

[Sobol] The scale and extent of this type of illegal activity is significantly smaller in our country. According to data from an Interpol report, more than 46 million dollars were confiscated in the United States during 1986. That includes 7.24 million dollars withdrawn from circulation. In the USSR over the last 3 years a little more than 16,000 counterfeit rubles and 233,180 counterfeit U.S. dollars were confiscated. But that does not give us cause for complacency.

[Romanchin] Counterfeiting did not spring up yesterday. It obviously has its history.

[Sobol] Counterfeiting has an ancient history. For instance, Mexicans were able to counterfeit pods of cocoa in those remote times when they were used for currency. Money was counterfeited in tsarist Russia. Back then the penalty for it was serious: Thousands of people were exiled and put to death for counterfeiting.

[Romanchin] The modern counterfeiter, apparently, has the latest technological means at his disposal.

[Sobol] It really is true. If earlier criminals usually had to sketch their counterfeit currency, now they generally employ the modern technology of printing enterprises and use high-quality materials, engravings, special paper, and dyes. All this gives them the opportunity to obtain a "product" of high quality. The degree of resemblance of the counterfeit money unfortunately is such that it cannot be easily distinguished from the real thing.

I would like to offer one example. In Vinnitsa oblast a criminal ring of 11 people was uncovered. It was headed by one Kosmach, unemployed, and a toolmaker named Kostyuk. At one of their apartments they set up a genuine laboratory for manufacturing counterfeit money. They used modern equipment and photocopying. They managed to print counterfeit banknotes worth 25,000 rubles and Foreign Parcel Trade checks worth 100,000 rubles. All the members of the ring were sentenced to terms ranging from 6 to 15 years.

[Romanchin] Where do criminals usually obtain the scarce materials, special paper, and dye?

[Sobol] In our country we have about 7,000 printing enterprises and more than 50,000 sites with modern duplicating equipment. And annually about 3,500 violations of the rules on procurement, use, and custody of equipment and supplies are uncovered here. We have discovered instances where the equipment of state enterprises and organizations was used to manufacture counterfeit money.

Take for example the case of the Stavropol counterfeiter Baranov. In the course of 3 1/2 years he passed false

banknotes in 105 cities in the Soviet Union. The loss to the state was measured in hundreds of thousands of rubles. And he did not obtain the raw materials and supplies in any one place, but rather at common printing enterprises at dirt-cheap prices.

[Romanchin] Nikolay Pavlovich, do the officials at the BKSS [Main Administration for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] have to deal with counterfeit foreign currency?

[Sobol] With the worsening shortage of fashionable goods, there has been a rise in the number of cases involving counterfeit foreign currency. Lately the organs of internal affairs halted the activities of four rings that had organized mass printings of counterfeit U.S. banknotes. There are also more crimes involving foreign currency imported from abroad for distribution on the territory of the Soviet Union. We have registered 38 such cases just recently. It is more difficult to uncover these crimes because we are not yet a member of Interpol.

[Romanchin] What does the modern counterfeiter look like? What is his social portrait?

[Sobol] On the whole these people have a criminal record, are not working anywhere at the moment, and 50 percent of them are from 18 to 30 years old. Half of all counterfeiters lead dissolute lives and do not have families.

[Romanchin] Is there much counterfeit money circulating around the country right now?

[Sobol] Any one of us could come in contact with 10-ruble notes bearing the different numbers and series of the so-called "Urals version." They are printed on a homemade, thick paper which does not give off the distinctive crackle. The watermarks that look like small stars are placed asymmetrically and have elongated rays of different lengths.

Treasury notes with the following numbers and series should also not be trusted: Kh-4012450, GYe-6776965, OG-8360697, GL0117106, ChI-5065148, and ChS8678823. These counterfeits are printed on simple paper, and the watermarks that look like small stars are missing. The paper is softer, and the characteristic crackle is muffled. The small printing on the ribbon in the Emblem of the USSR cannot be read.

You may also meet 25-ruble banknotes, series AS, GO, and PR, printed on chalky, smooth paper without watermarks and containing grammatical mistakes in the text that guarantees the security of the notes against assets of the state. If you do find any of these notes I have mentioned, you should not give back the suspicious note but rather contact the nearest militia department and try to detain the person passing the note.

[Romanchin] What can be done to protect our system of currency and credit from counterfeiters?

[Sobol] First of all we must consider improving the protective properties of our currency so that a counterfeit note can be detected much more easily. We are already examining the question of changing the range of dyes. This would make our work easier. And considering that counterfeiters are demonstrating more interest in foreign currency and especially in U.S. dollars lately, the time has come to establish close contacts with Interpol. That organization has accumulated substantial experience in the struggle against counterfeiters.

Commentary on New Judicial System Law

90UN0295A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "The Law and Our Life: I Vote for Jurors"]

[Text] When I was listening to the November 13 debates on the judicial reform law, I thought: it's as if the authors of the proposed bill had stopped short of a line beyond which lay a new trial—with jurors (whatever they are called)—but were still wary of crossing that line. The members of the Supreme Soviet were more decisive. And the line was crossed.

A new type of trial has at least been announced. It remains to be instituted. All in all...what's done is done. I, for example, can easily understand the cautious position taken by the committee that deals with legislation, legality, and enforcement, in the name of which A.M. Yakovlev proposed the bill. It is, after all, very much an essentially new, fundamental reform, the intent and consequences of which will be revealed only in the course of its implementation. I fear that all has not yet been weighed, calculated, and measured. The idea—and it has been in the air for a long time—is attractive, what's there to argue. But...

Let's consider what a jury trial implies and imagine at least preliminarily how it could be set up in practice.

When proponents of this idea, now enacted into law, used to run into the objection "Are we ready for this?" their rejoinder was that when Russia had only just thrown off the "dark and outmoded" yoke of serfdom the jury system was swiftly instituted, and it immediately occupied its proper place in public-governmental life. They also cited the modern West (especially the English trial system).

Correct. In both instances there were jurors. However, each case is different.

Many countries have it firmly established that if the accused confesses his guilt a jury trial is precluded; the verdict loses its meaning; the guilty party is not guilty. In essence the jurors are posed the following question: "Has it or has it not been proved?" Whereas the confession, procedurally guaranteed by the presence of a lawyer from the moment of arrest, is considered the "queen of proofs," on which we rain down thunder and lightning.

Our future court may follow that path, that is, jurors designated only when the accused denies his guilt. But we must also consider the experience of the United States, for example. There so-called "deals" are widespread. The prosecution and the defense (with the consent of the accused, of course) agree that the criminal will confess to a lesser crime and the prosecution will drop the greater one. This precludes a jury trial, which American jurists consider cumbersome, although they have no plans to change it. In a "deal" both sides are satisfied. The only question is whether or not that constitutes justice.

In Russia the fact of a confession did not preclude a jury trial. Moreover, a confession and even the jurors' belief in the guilt of the accused did not prevent them from returning a verdict of "not guilty." Evidently this is a conscientious, purely Russian innovation. However, it made collisions between the law and conscience inevitable: "Whosoever is just is cruel," said Russian jurists. Prominent Russian jurist N.P. Karabchevskiy wrote: "The jury trial is a special type of trial, invested with an adjunct of the legislator's and the public's trust that is exclusive to it and that endows it with the right and the possibility of being governed in its sentencing exclusively by the influences of its conscience." Jurors were called "uncontrolled judges of conscience," for it was extraordinarily difficult to reverse their verdict, and an innocent verdict virtually impossible to reverse in the absence of a mistrial.

By the way, that "conscientiousness" of the court that does not put an equal sign between "committed" and "guilty" was by no means the exclusive brainchild of Russian liberals. V.I. Lenin was not one of them, yet he wrote that the judicial power is "obligated in determining measures of punishment to take into account all local circumstances, thereby retaining the right to say that although the law was undoubtedly violated in this instance, certain circumstances well known to the people involved and brought to light in the given trial, compel the court to admit the necessity of reducing the punishment with respect to certain persons or even of acquitting them."

So if one has to choose, then I'm in favor of the "Russian path." Our court, the current court consisting of a chairman and two public assessors, knows nothing about this practice. Here the jury trial comes to a standstill. But if we simply replace public assessors sitting on either side of the judge with twelve jurors sitting to one side, having changed nothing else, will justice change? Hardly. For this the entire judicial pyramid must be changed at the base. For these are two fundamentally different courts.

The court must take its basic issue—the issue of guilt—and decide it and take responsibility for its decision, i.e., for the fate of the people, society itself, which entrusted this mission to its representatives; the state is wholly removed from this process, for no juror is allowed to

serve in the judiciary. The entire cassational-supervisory system gets turned on its head. I cannot predict how it will look, but that it must be fundamentally different is without a doubt. Will the oblast court or even the Supreme Court be able to overturn the jurors' verdict? Even if it is considered faulty? The "cost" of preliminary investigation will be completely different, for the jurors will not be informed of its conclusions but will see only what goes on in the courtroom.

We must give account to ourselves for the fact that, relatively speaking, the "absoluteness" of the verdict will be striking at our as yet rather uniform sense of justice. For people of duty and conscience—and only they can be jurors—find it relatively easy to acquit the accused based upon his personality, his social position, his motives, and the circumstances of the crime ("Oh, judges, I loved him, oh, judges, I killed him" is a weighty argument in an acquittal). And what if the jurors are faced with a member of a co-operative, a tradesman, or a high-placed official? Will jurors' consciences allow them to convict a man if public opinion, emotions, "conscience" itself are against him but there are no or insufficient proofs? After all, their verdict may mean loss of life.

No, a new court would bring changes not only to legal proceedings but to the entire public psychology, so to speak.

Thus, I'm in favor of it. However, as you see, I have many questions. Here is one completely "frivolous" one: Where are we going to put twelve jurors in our courtrooms? Out of approximately 4,500 courtrooms you'd be hard put to find even one situated in a building befitting a civilized trial. There is, understandably, a solution. For every inhabited place possesses perfectly suitable structures. So that it is not a question of their presence so much as of dislocating institutions and organizations. By the way, according to A. F. Konya, "the last time" the courts shared buildings with the Senate, the war department, and the Moscow district court was located in the Kremlin. Are we going to opt for such a decisive dislocation?

The law has been passed, however. In the end, the new court of the mid-nineteenth century was also perceived as shaking foundations. But it did enter the life of the state and society and occupy its rightful place.

Presumption of Innocence Issue Examined

90UN0411A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 22, Nov 89 p 71

[Letter from M. Koshkin, lawyer and member of the Moscow City Board of Lawyers: "What Could Be More Humane Than the Presumption of Innocence?"]

[Text] I have noticed that your journal already has addressed the issue of the correlation between value by virtue of class and general human worth on at least two occasions. It appears that this issue has an important significance both for plans to raise the general political

awareness of the population and for the whole process of democratization of Soviet society and internal party life. It demands a detailed analysis; and one from the most diverse points of view: economic, social and ideological. The present urgently reminds us of yet another research "slice"—the legal issue, or a rule-of-law state if the problem is taken in a broader sense, in the context of the legal government.

Until recently, the very concept of a rule-of-law state ironically was enclosed in quotes and not used without the epithet "bourgeois". It never occurred to anyone that the concept of a rule-of-law socialist state would become the fundamental legal policy of the CPSU or that, toward the end of the 20th Century, the principle of the supremacy of law from the French Enlightenment would become an integral part of the ideology of the building of communism.

It must be said also that, under the predominance of Vyshinskiy's theory of evidence, presumption of innocence was portrayed as a purely bourgeois principle and acquired its constitutional validity (and even its declaration) only in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR! We pose the questions: can the fundamental principle of law which guarantees the inviolability of the individual be exclusively class-based, and what could be more human and more humane than the presumption of innocence in the legal realm?

Recent changes in the legislation on state crimes bear eloquent witness to the new balance in criminal law of class and general human ideas. And so, heretical thinking is not punishable today unless that thinking is purely destructive in nature.

Our electoral practices and experiences in the work of the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies has shown that many supposedly "bourgeois" procedural methods can be used to their full effect under the conditions of socialism. Sometimes, it is true, the understanding of the meaning "separation of powers", "parliamentarism" and the like, is not entirely correct from the lawyer's point of view. In a word, to establish a rule-of-law state everyone must be educated about the law.

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Belorussian SSR Crime Commission Reports Findings

90UN0235A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 12 Oct 89 p 1

[BELTA report: "An Extraordinary Situation—Extraordinary Measures"]

[Text] At the meeting of the temporary committee for combatting crime in the Belorussian SSR, conducted by Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman N.I. Dementyev, immediate measures for strengthening the maintenance of public order in the republic's cities were discussed, the experience of the work of the public formations

for increasing discipline, public order, and crime prevention at the Rassvet kolkhoz imeni K.P. Orlovskiy, Kirovskiy Rayon, the Podolskiy sovkhos, Ostrovetskiy Rayon, and the Luch Minsk footwear production association were approved. Information from the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Justice on the improvement of legislation for the decisive intensification of the fight against crime was also heard.

Belorussian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs V.A. Piskarev noted that in the republic, the rate of growth in crime levels has decreased. Fewer crimes were committed in September than in August.

However, there are no grounds for complacency. Today, there are 300,000 registered for crime prevention with the internal affairs organs. But at the same time, the criminal world is growing younger, and pulling adolescents into its orbit.

As a rule, there are no criminal transgressions in places where the streets are controlled by the patrol-sentry militia service. Here are perpetrated only 4 out of 900 robberies. However, the militia cannot take the entire territory under its protection: In the republic's capital and cities today, the militia is understaffed by 2,000 militia men.

The hope is in workers' brigades. Some 28 such organizations now unite 1,500 people—this is significant assistance. With their participation, this year alone militia details solved 5,000 crimes.

It was said at the meeting that the militia's material-technological base is weak; the transport is worn out, its radios useless; there is a continual fuel shortage.

The situation remains alarming. And as ever, the street remains the main arena for crime. In comparison to last year, the number of crimes grew by 3,000 (97 percent), and in public places, by 4,000. The most unfavorable situation is on the streets of Minsk, and the oblast centers, Orsha, Polotsk, Mozyr, Soligorsk, Baranovich, Borisov...

This year alone, over 4,000 automobile thefts and larcenies have been perpetrated. For criminals, the field of activity is wide, for the majority of automobiles in Minsk, for example, are out in the open. The shortage of garage space is understandable, but how can the lack of paid, guarded parking lots be explained? Of the 120,000 automobiles in Minsk, 33,000 spend the night in garages; 15,000 in paid lots, and the rest, wherever they can. How many years is it now that the Minsk gorispolkom cannot resolve this problem at all.

The militia detains 90,000 lawbreakers on the streets; 85,000 of them are sent to medical detoxification centers. Drunkenness is regaining strength.

In its time, the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet recommended the creation of mobile groups to combat drunkenness, to study the situation conducive to it taking root in everyday life and in production, to visit families with

members inclined to drink. Now, these groups have dissipated even in places where they had previously worked successfully. And after all, one out of every four crimes is committed while intoxicated.

The need to create non-departmental guarding in rural areas was also discussed at the meeting. Village stores, hospitals, post offices, and savings banks must be taken into control. Every rayon needs R70,000 to do this. That is not very much when we consider that without guarding, valuables worth significantly more are stolen. A total of R9 million is needed in the republic. These funds are being transferred to the militia by many enterprises. The militia's charitable fund has recently reached R900,000.

The meeting participants noted that however much the law enforcement organs try, victory in fortifying public order will not be attained without general participation. A moral atmosphere must be created in the republic which will become a hindrance to crime in and of itself. And in this regard, many labor collectives and public formations have found their own modes of work.

For example, at the Rassvet kolkhoz imeni K.P. Orlovskiy, a special brigade for maintaining public order has been created. Its fighters receive additional monthly payments, and compensation for use of personal automobiles and motorcycles during raids.

And a public commission to combat drunkenness is functioning actively at the Podolskiy sovkhov, Ostrovetskiy Rayon. It does not just listen to the subdivision leaders at its meetings; it conducts raids to uncover malicious home-brewers. During such raids in the surrounding woods this year, seven home-brew stills and 3.3 metric tons of home-brewed beer were destroyed, and 14 cases of drunkenness were considered.

All unfortunate families have the commission's constant attention. Activists visit them frequently to converse with children and parents; some are invited to the activists' meetings.

Collective responsibility for the state of law and order has been introduced in Minsk's Luch footwear production association. Its essence is that each brigade receives a 10-percent increment to the 13th pay period if there have been no violations of public order and labor discipline during the year.

The temporary committee for combatting crime in the Belorussian SSR recommended that the oblast and local soviets' ispolkoms study the experience of these collectives.

V.G. Baluyev, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Committee for State Security, V.I. Goncharik, chairman of the Belorussian trade union council, USSR people's deputies, leaders of the republic's law enforcement organs, and legal scholars participated in the discussion.

Disappearances of Soviets in Paris, Madrid Unexplained

18001637A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Sep 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Reprint of article by A. Urvantsev: "Top Secret: The Mystery of the Disappearing People"; (incomplete version published in JPRS-UPA-89-060)]

[Text] It was reported in the press that a collector of pictures, G. Basmadzhan from France, who was staying at the hotel Rossiya, disappeared under mysterious circumstances. I heard that such a fate has befallen some of our compatriots abroad. Tell us about this in more detail. (A. Ignatyev, Moscow.)

Our story has a detective beginning and a tragic outcome. On the 1st of March of this year [1989 - JPRS], an employee of the Soviet trade delegation in Paris, B.N. Levkovskiy, disappeared. According to the testimony of his colleagues, he got into his car at the end of the working day and went home. His co-workers had never seen him more alive...

The next day, what had happened was reported to the police prefecture. And yet after two days, our workers by chance noticed his automobile on a bridge across the Seine. It was parked near the bus stop. From that moment there arose the questions, answers to which the Soviet side has not to this time received.

According to the evidence of eye-witnesses, the police examined the automobile and its contents. It was Soviet citizens who first informed the USSR embassy about the discovery of B. Levkovskiy's car. The impression took shape that notwithstanding our persistent demands about speeding up the search for the missing Soviet citizen, the police had not made energetic steps in this plan. And here is the finale: the body of B. Levkovskiy was discovered by workers in the Seine on 22 March. This time employees of the embassy and trade delegation were invited to identify it.

A preliminary forensic-medical examination was made by French authorities. It established: death had come approximately seven days after Levkovskiy's disappearance as a result of mechanical suffocation, after which the corpse was evidently thrown into the river. We note that such a conclusion was made by the French themselves.

Then began the incomprehensible. The Soviet side expressed anxiety in connection with the obvious delay in issuing the official forensic-medical examination report on the causes of death of the employee of the trade delegation. It was only in the middle of June that copies of these documents were received.

And contrary to the first conclusion in the official from Paris, it was written that B. Levkovskiy's body was found in the river not two, but three weeks later, and that the car was parked by the bridge on the day of his death. And that its owner allegedly threw himself into the water. The

suicide version is refuted by the fact that [kistological] aspects were discovered in the lungs of the deceased which testify to a violent death previously.

Notwithstanding the many obvious contradictions, the French court did not raise it as a criminal matter but qualified the end of B. Levkovskiy as a suicide.

"This is completely absurd," said K. Medvedev, deputy general director of V/O "Vneshposyltorg" of the Ministry of External Economic Ties. "I have known Boris Nikolayevich for many years in joint work in the union. Over the course of seven years he headed the firm 'Promtovar'. He was respected in the collective, they loved him for his kindness and responsiveness. He was a cheerful person by nature. He did not take decisions in the heat of a moment, he weighed his every step thoroughly. As a specialist, he knew all the subtleties of our business. This was his second long posting in France. He did not have enemies, he established friendly business relations with the firms. The trade delegation elected him deputy secretary of the party organization. His colleagues often turned to him for advice and help. I often talked with B. Levkovskiy on the telephone concerning work. And if something serious or a more fateful difficulties had arisen in his life, then he would have told me without fail, as an old friend, or he would simply have hinted at them. His death is an inexplicable tragedy. To whom was it necessary?"

And here is the testimony of his wife:

"On that last day he came home to eat lunch," Galina Dmitriyevna says with tears in her eyes. "At 14:00, as usual, my husband left for work. I waited for him until late in the evening. But later I felt that something was wrong, and I started to phone the trade delegation, but I did not get through. I stood waiting thus by the window all night. Early in the morning my son and I ran around looking for him, he on one street, I on another, in hopes of seeing his car. I remember now with horror how I decided to send a 14-year-old boy to search for his father on a deserted street early in the morning. In the morning I roused everyone at the trade delegation to their feet..."

There is one more detail of no small importance in G. Levkovskaya's story. Galina Dmitriyevna recalled:

"My husband once told me that the security services were interested in him. Their representatives came to some firm with which he had business relations and asked what kind of person he is. Why did he previously have a green-colored car but now a white one? My husband drove an old green-colored "Zhiguli." But then the trade delegation received new cars. They assigned one of them to him. I reassured him: I said the special services have the kind of work where they have to be interested in everyone..."

Why, to what end were the employees of the special services interested in B. Levkovskiy? Why have the French police not raised criminal matters up to this time? And why, despite the reciprocal agreement not to

give any reports to the press about events until an official investigation is completed, did there appear in a series of French newspaper verbose conclusions about the causes of death of the employee of the Soviet trade delegation within a week of his death? In particular, the opinion was expressed that someone was simply settling personal accounts with him, and so on. In August the tone of the publications changed. There were even hints that Levkovskiy was allegedly a Soviet intelligence agent, although this is total nonsense.

Another of our fellow countrymen, Vladimir Valentinovich Aleksandrov, was abducted on 1 April 1985 in Madrid. V. Aleksandrov was the author of the scientific model of climate changes on the planet in the event of the rise of nuclear war. The scholar was giving lectures in auditoriums in a series of Western countries. The entirety of the tragic element and fate of the scholar's family: his wife, A. Volgina was not able to bear the grief, and she died at the age of 50, tormented and driven to despair.

Turning to the President of the USA, George Bush, the mother of Vladimir Valentinovich, M. Aleksandrova, wrote in an open letter: "Soon after his desertion, in October 1985, the American journalist Ralph de Toledano reported in the 'Washington Times' newspaper that mathematics scholar V.V. Aleksandrov was immediately taken to Washington to the CIA. Journalist Andrew Rivkin wrote in the journal 'Science Digest' in July 1986 that he had been kidnapped by agents of that department."

Already more than four years have passed since the disappearance of the talented scholar, and to this day nothing is known about his fate.

Both B. Levkovskiy and V. Aleksandrov were abroad on official business, consequently they were protected by certain international agreements and by their status they were given concrete international legal rights. Who disposes of their fates, ignoring all international agreements?

According to intelligence reports from competent Soviet sources, in 1988-89 in France alone, 12 of our fellow citizens have disappeared. We grant that some of them voluntarily expressed a wish to remain in the West. Then why was the Soviet side denied meetings with each of them? It really is important to meet with the person for oneself, to make certain that he is alive and that he voluntarily made the decision to remain in that or another country, without pressure or working up from the side. In answer to all the corresponding requests of our officials, a stock answer was received from the French side: "the people you are searching for have asked for political asylum" or "they are outside of the boundaries of France..."

Where are the guarantees that our compatriots did not share B. Levkovskiy's fate?

Concerning the disappearance of French millionaire Garig Basmadzhan, we remind you that he came to our country at the invitation of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR and V/O Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga.

"He is our longtime friend, and he collaborated with our union for many years," said the deputy general director of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga A. Velostotskiy. "As a big connoisseur of our art, he did much towards organizing the export of pictures of Soviet artists. After the earthquake in Armenia, he organized several art auctions and made over the entire proceeds to the fund to help the victims. The collector had his own gallery in Paris, named after M. Gorky. G. Basmadzhan exhibited canvases by our artists, and then sold them not only to art lovers in France but in other countries as well. The exhibition-sales organized by him of the canvases [poloten] of Soviet painters were successful. The collector took part in many international auctions, to which he had been invited as an expert on Russian and Soviet

art. In the last year, the collector organized an exhibition of canvases of Russian artists from collections in the West. The exposition was sent to the Tretyakov Gallery and the Hermitage. The exhibition was given a very high evaluation by specialists and art lovers. By agreement with the Ministry of Culture of the USSR, he offered as a gift to the Soviet Union five pictures by famous Russian artists. In addition, G. Basmadzhan speaks Russian well and has lasting connections with Armenian settlements in other countries.

This time we had negotiations with him on routine questions. But to our great regret, they were cut short...

Nothing is known about him since the 29th of July. His disappearance was immediately reported to his sister in Paris, B. Basmadzhan, who then flew to Moscow. A large operational-investigative group from the USSR MVD as well as the USSR KGB service conducted an investigation.

Kezbers on Soviet-German Accord Commission Report

90UN0346A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
15 Nov 89 pp 3, 4

[LATINFORM dispatch giving abridged text of report: "On the Work of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Evaluation of the Political and Legal Consequences for Latvia of the Soviet-German Agreements of 1939-1940: An Address by the Deputy Chairman of the Commission, I.Ya. Kezbers"]

[Text] Along with you, we have been thinking and talking about questions of the future, resolving them and approving decisions which will serve the further formation of a democratic Latvia. This goal is also served by honest evaluation of our recent history. Today, I have been empowered by the commission to speak about events of the past, to give the evaluation of the commission which, back at the beginning of the year, was doubted by official circles in the center, and here too; there was a lack of knowledge and even a lack of desire to talk about the truth concerning a fifty-year old injustice, illegal acts, and lies relating to six European states which, beginning on 23 August 1939, took various paths of development.

In its work, our commission made use of the results of an analogous commission of USSR peoples deputies as well as of documents, facts, and maps that were earlier kept secret from the people. Latvian historians and jurists, who served both as members of the commission and were invited as experts, also spent a great deal of effort on establishing the truth. Three eye-witnesses from those days also worked in our commission—comrades Ya. Gustsons, P. Dergach, and M. Vulfson, who themselves took part in the events of those years and, because of this, made a special contribution to the work of our commission. Here, I would like to stress once again that the commission worked on several variants and that we received a large number of concrete suggestions both from the Ministry of Justice and from Baldone, Bauska, Tukums, and Liepaya as well as from individual persons and groups. This was a collective effort and I have been directed today to report on its results.

The commission, having studied the Soviet-German agreements of 1939-1940 and their consequences with regard to Latvia, has ascertained that:

1. The nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union of 23 August 1939, signed by the Stalinist leadership of the Soviet Union and plenipotentiary representatives of fascist Germany, facilitated the unleashing of the Second World War by the Nazi reich. The peoples of the Soviet Union paid for this with the deaths of millions of their sons and daughters. The consequences of the pact and of its secret annex were also tragic for the peoples of Latvia.

2. A secret supplementary protocol, which was carefully concealed from the peoples of the USSR, was amended

to the pact. Behind the backs of the peoples and governments of six sovereign countries (including Latvia), this protocol determined their inclusion within the spheres of interest of fascist Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union. Both in form and content, this document is in complete contradiction to Leninist principles of foreign policy and to the generally accepted fundamental norms of international law. It predetermined the loss by the Latvian Republic of its sovereignty and independence and then, also, its illegal, forceful inclusion within the USSR.

3. The Soviet government's implementation of the secret supplementary protocol of 23 August 1939 involved violation of a system of treaties based on recognition of the rights of peoples to free self-determination, including the 11 August 1920 peace treaty between Soviet Russia and the Latvian Republic, the 5 February 1932 nonaggression treaty between Latvia and the USSR, the effectiveness of which was extended in 1934 to 31 December 1945, and also Article 10 of the Charter of the League of Nations.

4. On 5 October 1939, an unequal treaty on mutual assistance between the USSR and the Latvian Republic was imposed on Latvia under threat of the use of force. This document provided for the stationing, at corresponding bases in Latvia, of a number of Soviet troops that was 1.5-fold greater than the total numerical size of the Latvian Republic's army of that time. Thus, the treaty of 5 October 1939 fundamentally limited the sovereignty of Latvia and put an end to the status of absolute neutrality that had been proclaimed by her government on 1 September 1939. As future events showed, the establishment of Soviet military bases at the most important strategic points in Latvia helped the USSR to carry out its policy of ultimatum force with respect to the Latvian Republic in the summer of 1940.

5. The USSR governmental note of 16 June 1940, which made ultimatum demands of the government of the Latvian Republic, lacked any kind of factual or juridical basis. The note was accompanied by a direct threat of the use of military force by the Soviet government and by a demand for immediate replacement of the existing government of Latvia as well as for the free entry of Soviet troops onto the territory of Latvia. This was in violation of the generally accepted principle of international law regarding noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, and was also in contradiction to Article 5 of the 5 October 1939 mutual assistance treaty, which stipulated that implementation of this pact should in no way affect the sovereign rights of the parties to the treaty, in particular, their state structures, their economic and social systems, and their military establishments.

The entry of additional Red Army units into the territory of Latvia on 17 June 1940 qualifies as an act of unprovoked aggression against a sovereign state and member of the League of Nations, as a violation of international law and of bilateral obligations undertaken by the USSR.

6. With the participation and under the pressure of the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples Deputies, A. Vyshinskiy, and of employees of the Soviet government, the government in Latvia was replaced and unconstitutional reelections to the Sejm were hastily held. In them, only the Block of Latvian Laboring People, sanctioned by the Soviet representatives, presented a unified pre-election platform. During the election campaign and on the voting days, the basic principles of the Constitution of the Latvian Republic were violated, and the laws on elections that were in effect during the democratic republic were ignored. The authorities illegally removed all candidates of newly formed institutions who were not included in the sanctioned list, and the results of the elections were falsified in many places. The presence of a large contingent of the Soviet armed forces on Latvian territory had a direct influence on the expression of will by the residents of the republic. The elections took place under conditions of the political and social tension which had accumulated since 15 May 1934, during the years of the authoritarian regime.

7. The election platform of the deputies from the Block of Latvian Laboring People, while promising the voters of Latvia democratic freedoms, social progress, and the independence of Latvia, did not mention the possibility of the proclamation of Soviet power by the Sejm and of Latvia's entry into the USSR. Thus, the deputies from the Block of Latvian Laboring People had neither the moral, nor the political right, nor the authority, already during their first session, to reach this decision with regard to a change in the government system and in the state and legal status of Latvia. The decision of the Sejm to fundamentally alter the character of power was ratified neither by a survey of the population nor by a referendum, as was required by the Constitution of the Latvian Republic that was approved in 1922.

Latvia's entry into the USSR was proclaimed by a sejm that did not possess appropriate constitutional powers and authorities. This was an act carried out without considering the will of the citizens of Latvia for the sake of achieving the great-power goals of Stalinism. This was confirmed, even before the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that ratified the annexation and incorporation of Latvia, by V. Molotov, who declared that, in this way, the USSR had regained territory which had belonged to it from time immemorial.

8. From the viewpoint of the laws of the Latvian Republic and generally accepted international legal norms, any juridical consequences of the activities of a sejm elected by illegal means, including its decision concerning a change in the state structure in Latvia, is characterized by the commission as being juridically null and void from its inception, and the "Declaration of the Entry of Latvia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," passed by the Sejm on 21 July, is considered illegal from the moment of its passage.

Realization of the secret, illegal Soviet-German agreements in 1939 and 1940 is an international crime, and the terror that was introduced into Latvia with regard to the Latvian people and the other peoples of Latvia—is a crime against humanity.

Evaluation of the tragic events of the past—of the Stalinist policy of seizing Latvia and the entire Baltic region—is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for normalization of interethnic relationships and the development of republics that have equal rights, common goals, and full freedom in choosing their own course.

This is a bitter truth. But historical injustice has to be evaluated objectively. Having come to this conclusion, the commission is convinced that this work must be continued only in an atmosphere of further democratization of our country, without great emotions. Remember that history cannot be rewritten, and it cannot be improved. But a democratic Latvia can be formed if we follow a prudent and well-considered path of parliamentary development. We are not talking about revenge or an attempt to exacerbate the situation. What we are talking about is historical justice, about a process of self-purification from the Stalinist heritage, without which further development of democracy is inconceivable, either within the Soviet Union as a whole or within our republic.

And, in conclusion, concerning the further activities of the commission. We are only at the start of our work. First of all, we would like to ask your permission to familiarize an analogous all-union commission with our conclusions and to provide it with the documents that we have at our disposal and which were obtained from archives existing within our republic. We will continue our study of documents, for there are very, very many of them and they demand a serious scientific approach and research. Many documents from that time are not available to the commission. We will continue publication of historical evidence, and I am speaking primarily about the documentary base and also about memoirs and other materials which up until now have not been available to our historians, politicians, and other interested persons. In my view, if you accept these conclusions and consider that work is being carried on in the right direction, we will have to make a fundamental examination of the political calendar connected with the events of 1940 in Latvia. Such, in short, is the assessment of our commission, which the members of the commission directed me to present here, at today's session.

Response to KGB Colonel on Repressions

Moscow KGB Associates

90UN0223A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 34, 19-26 Aug 89 p 25

[Article by associates at the KGB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast: "Are You Not Ashamed Now, Colonel Karpovich?"—The following items were published in response to the article by Retired KGB

Colonel Ya. Karpovich titled "It is Shameful to Remain Silent" published in OGONEK No 29, 15-29 Jul 89 pp 6-9. A translation of this article appeared in FBIS-SOV-89-163-A.]

[Text] Are You Not Ashamed Now, Colonel Karpovich?

There are various kinds of teachers, but the most respected are those chosen and acknowledged by the students themselves. We students of USSR KGB Col Yaroslav Vasilyevich Karpovich called him "Yaroslav the Wise" among ourselves. This was not just an acknowledgment of his age and rank. He had behind him the front, Stalingrad and experience in the investigative organs in the '50s. Following the successful Cheka operation against the NTS [National Labor Union] he skipped a level and was awarded the rank of colonel and decorated with the Order of the Red Banner and the honored Chekist badge. Even after reading the OGONEK article "It is Shameful to Remain Silent" signed by him, we have continued to give him his dues for what he has accomplished.

However, we also recall how, as a high-ranking leader, Yaroslav Vasilyevich skillfully directed the efforts of his subordinates in the critical sector of the battle with "enemy ideological sabotage," now condemned by him. He infected us with his personal example and personally explained to us whom to combat, how and by what means. He was essentially a sort of solid drive belt in the policy conducted during those years. The indestructible and logical conclusions, the operational adroitness and the class substantiation of the need for our labor which he proclaimed at that time automatically evoked respect not just in the young KGB workers but also in the colleagues of his own age.

Many young officers passed through his hands. He transmitted knowledge and experience to them. Furthermore, our young outlook on the world was shaped under his direct influence.

Upon reading Yaroslav Vasilyevich's article in OGONEK, we, who only yesterday considered ourselves to be his students, suddenly come up against some new form of "mimicry," in the terminology of Ya. Karpovich himself. Just what made a courageous and meritorious man casually adjust his vital concept, the validity of which he had always tried to convince us, to conform to a falsely repentant confessionism and erase from memory his former convictions: his pride and his testament to "uncompromisingness"?

The human memory is a reliable tool. Archives can help the memory, however. And they hold Ya. Karpovich's secrets, inseparably linked to their times.

We turned to these documents in order to understand the instantaneous rebirth of a man who selected repentance not in fact but in the form of high-sounding words.

Reading Ya. Karpovich's article, one automatically asks himself whether this is that same brilliant polemicist,

that expert on law, who could skillfully explain everything even to his enemy and make an accurate assessment of a phenomenon or an individual?

Unfortunately, his usual logic fails him today. When he talks about the activities of the Chekists during the '70s, Karpovich does not even attempt to view them in the context of that sad period in our history, now called the period of stagnation.

The Cheka veteran's memory is failing him. His comrades were not standing behind those who operated the controls of the bulldozers razing the exhibit on Profsoyuznaya. We only saw irresponsible people pushing the youth toward extreme steps. It was precisely the Chekists who, as negotiators, conducted long talks with the opponents on both sides of the artificially erected barricades of ideology and esthetics: the amateur artists on one hand, and cultural organs and the USSR Artists' Union on the other. They tried not so much to reconcile as to reduce the extremism of the former and the impenetrable conservatism of the latter. And, strange as it seems, it was precisely our position which ultimately played a significant role in the establishment of the paintings section at the Joint Committee of Painters and Graphic Artists.

It was precisely because, contrary to the prevailing opinion, we frequently saw the impoverished state of young actors, directors and writers that we "bombarded" the different levels of authority with alarming reports, which subsequently became the basis for the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on working with the creative youth.

And what about the "foul smelling" case of the "Metropol" almanac? Yaroslav Vasilyevich is being cunning. He knows very well, after all, whose efforts turned a phenomenon of literary life into a political scandal. One has only to recall that Vasily Aksenov transmitted the manuscript of the almanac to the West long before the Writers' Union saw it, a fact of which many "Metropol" contributors were totally ignorant. No, it was not the Chekists, as the author writes, who "let the jinni of hooliganism and banality out of the bottle," and the assessment of this literary event was not made under pressure from the state security organs. The statement that the Chekists were to blame for the writer's estrangement from the homeland is particularly laughable.

Ya. Karpovich knows this, but for some reason he remains silent, although it is shameful to remain silent... He has forgotten about his past assessments of the writer's activities and about his profound relief at V. Aksenov's departure. How Karpovich's former stance differs from the one he declares in OGONEK! But it is not just a matter of Aksenov. Only yesterday Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was also not a "thing of national pride" to Karpovich. He kept the writer's manuscripts securely locked away in a safe in order to prevent his subordinates, God forbid, from reading them...

And it was certainly not for Tsvetayeva and Gumilev that Yaroslav Vasilyevich personally handled the arrest of the luckless underground publisher. He forgets that he himself directed the action and that the individual was convicted not for "ideologically alien" literature but for illegal business under the corresponding article of the law. There was a court, there was a prosecutor and there was a lawyer. And the sentence was legal and valid, like many other sentences handed down at that time under the Criminal Code of the RSFSR in effect.

With respect to the problem of the "refusniks,"—with which Ya. Karpovich himself dealt, incidentally—it would be appropriate to remind him that the struggle was not with them but with those actions which they were encouraged to engage in by foreign well-wishers, on the one hand, and by our Soviet bureaucrats on the other. Incidentally, many of them were permitted to leave only after we intervened.

We talk a lot about a law-based state, inserting our own meaning into the term. But it is precisely the inevitability of punishment for the commission of a crime which is the basis of this category. Remember the axiom in Roman law: "The law is harsh, but it is the law." And as long as a law exists, it should be implemented. It is another matter that the laws which existed during those years served the interests of the system of administration by decree, a fact acknowledged today not by Karpovich alone.

All sorts of things went on during those years. The Cheka organs represented a cross section of our society, reflected the entire spectrum of conflicts, just as it does today. Just why does Ya. Karpovich take such a detached view of the life of the KGB organs today?

And those whose orders Karpovich obeyed were not such "arrogant ones" as they appear to him today. Until recently he referred to them differently. And they respected him, not failing to note and show gratitude for his success in the battle with the ideological enemy, to the achievement of which he directed all his know-how and the full force of the operational apparatus under his authority. Directed it, if the former Ya. Karpovich is to be believed, with a full sense of responsibility and profound conviction that he was doing the right thing.

We want to raise an objection to his statement today: No, it is not true that "the organs have buttoned their lips," as he put it. Supporting the restructuring with all our hearts, we are striving to rigidly reassess our work in the past and in the present. So that never again will there be a repetition of the ugly situation in which the KGB was placed in a position of defending local interests having nothing to do with maintaining state security.

We are for glasnost! But we are for glasnost with a high degree of moral accountability for one's words and their consequences. There is no place here for conjecture and gossip halfway erased from memory, void of historical

background and removed from the context of the times. The truth has only one foundation: the facts, with all their contradictoriness.

Just when was Col Ya. Karpovich being sincere with us? Then or now? Just where were you before?

...It is sad to see repentance come to an individual only when, in comfort and ease, with a good pension and monetary security, he tries to achieve cheap popularity by such less-than-honorable means.

Signed: V. Vlasov, A. Mikhailov, N. Kavalev, M. Ovchinnikov—20 signatures in all

Associates at the KGB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast

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Letters to the Editor

90UN0223B Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 42,
14-21 Oct 89 p 25

[Letters to the editor: "Within an Aureole of Secrecy: Follow-up on a Published Article"]

[Text] Ya. Karpovich's article "It is Shameful to Remain Silent!" published in issue No 29 of OGONEK and the response to it from associates at the KGB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast (OGONEK No 34) evoked a great deal of interest in the readers.

After the Patriotic War ended I, G.T. Pushkarev, volunteered under a Komsomol assignment in April 1946 to serve in the KGB, and I am not sorry that I became a Chekist. If I could begin my life all over, as the saying goes, I would repeat my Cheka life.

After graduating from the Higher Party School I, Yu.P. Gorlach, served as organization department chief on the republic committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in Dnepropetrovsk. At the party's assignment I voluntarily joined the KGB and have reached the level of chief of the oblast department.

We are ashamed for our colleague Ya. Karpovich, whose article was published in OGONEK, ashamed for a former Chekist and Communist with the rank of colonel.

How could one compromise an organization which is highly respected and prestigious to this day, which was able during the most difficult years to emerge from that period without a single black mark on its record? On the contrary, it proved itself to be an honorable, conscientious organization devoted to our great homeland. The KGB is the only branch in the nation which still enjoys prestige. We are among the common people today, and we hear them say: "You see. The press has now gotten around to you. Your very own people are compromising you."

We know people who joined the KGB from party organizations and performed splendidly in the struggle with the bands of Ukrainian nationalists, risking their lives every hour. They performed excellently, dying at the hands of the bandits, but they preserved the honor and dignity of the Chekist. We also know and if necessary, will name, a former KGB Directorate investigator for Dnepropetrovsk Oblast who joined it from the procurator's organs and was convicted of taking bribes.

In your article, respected editors, you and Karpovich both have written about some sort of "black marks" on the history of the ChK [Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Counterrevolution and Sabotage]. That is nonsense. There have been and are no "black spots" on the history of the ChK. We Chekists recall very well that during all our active years we implemented the will of the people, the will of the party. We Chekists are not to blame for the fact that there were incompetent people among the leaders—and not even the KGB leaders but the party leadership. We Chekists implemented party instructions among the people within the framework of ideological work.

During these periods of "black spots," the Chekists engaged in rooting out the activities of agents of German and other anti-Soviet centers. They engaged in and are presently engaged in finding spies, terrorists, drug addicts and many other kinds of renegades, of which, unfortunately, there are many roaming our sinful nation. During those periods we searched out avengers, German stooges, traitors and their accomplices. We battled the Bandera and Melnikov bands. We performed a great deal of painstaking, preventive work.

We retired Chekists are very sorry that there are possibly even now in the KGB organs people like Karpovich, who, after retiring, will sully their friends, colleagues, comrades-in-arms and co-workers. All regular workers in the KGB organs, both locally and at the center, should bear this in mind.

G. Pushkarev and Yu. Gorlach, Dnepropetrovsk

The KGB was long an area closed to criticism. Why? It is only because of the Congress of People's Deputies that we have begun talking aloud about its role in our much-suffering life. The NKVD and KGB have on their consciences terrible and heinous crimes beyond human comprehension. No Genghis Khan has ever caused our nation as much sorrow as these "warriors" caused it. Not just they, however, but the entire party-administrative apparatus of the past was to blame for the deaths of millions: the best part of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the command corps of the army, the old Leninist party members.

Just when will these butchers stand trial before the nation? How long will they calmly write their memoirs about how they served the people honestly and justly? How can we talk about a restructuring when we have not legally identified all of these crimes? Why has no one at the highest party and state level assessed candidly and

from a standpoint of principle the establishment of such an organization as the VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary commission For Combatting Counter-Revolution and Sabotage]?

There are many other questions. Who monitors the KGB? Are legal standards being worked out to ensure the inviolability of the individual and his protection against the organs? Or do our rights exist only on paper? Come to think of it, what rights? Censorship and serfdom continue to exist in the form of registration, subjugating questionnaires, the passport system and so forth.

Writing about this does not mean being against one's state. On the contrary, it is participation in the state's democratization. These things need to be discussed not just in the press. Referendums should be conducted and a truly scientific poll of public opinion should be taken on all important problems in a democratic, law-based state.

T. Reprintseva, tekhnikum instructor, Lvov

I was breathless as I read Ya. Karpovich's confession "It is Shameful to Remain Silent!" in issue No 29 of OGONEK, which lifted the veil from the activities of state security organs during the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era. The article is just, objective and extremely important. Our society is being renewed and a state based on law is being created.

I myself worked several years in state security organs in Zhitomir, Lvov and Rovno oblasts. As a demobilized front-line soldier, the party raykom and the rayon military commissariat assigned me in 1947 to work in the organs. I shall not hide the fact that I was flattered. When I encountered the practical "work" however, in which the number of arrests, interrogations, summons, and so forth were planned in advance, I began to see things clearly. I recall how the Bandera families were evicted. Many people fell into that category, and no consideration was given to whether they were sick, old people or children. Later, when I worked in the MGB (KGB) in Rovno Oblast from 1950 to 1970, I understood that our work was evaluated according to the number of arrests of anti-Soviets. This produced a marathon race for subjects to arrest.

The so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists were the object of the race under the Brezhnev-Suslov regime of administration by decree. A wave of the director's baton initiated the persecution of O. Gonchar, G. Tyutyunnik and R. Ivanichuk. The organs began singling out people who told jokes, listened to Voice of America or Radio Liberty, and so forth.

In his substantive article Comrade Karpovich did not explain the fact that under N. Khrushchev the MGB (KGB) organs were cut by 40-50% and the rayon KGB sections were eliminated.

It is valid to ask why we need such an enormous, highly-paid KGB staff today. People's deputies A. Sobchak, Yu. Vlasov and B. Yeltsin and writer V. Kondratyev properly raised in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA the question of reducing the enormous staff to reasonable levels and the fact that the KGB associates should not engage in activities which are not a part of their functions.

I. Prisyazhnyuk, war and labor veteran, Rovno

I think it was difficult for retired KGB Col Ya. Karpovich to read the rebuke by his former co-workers, who are "not ashamed."

Yaroslav Vasilyevich Karpovich interrogated me on 20 March 1964 in a well-known building concerning the printing of O. Mandelstam's poetry. I recall that Comrade Zaytsev, a superior sent as a reinforcement from the party organs, would join us in the room. He spoke with me in a disgusted, hostile and aggressive manner.

Yaroslav Vasilyevich and I argued. He would heatedly disagree with my assessment of the moral makeup of his co-workers and of the "benefit" to the nation, the people and the cause of socialism from their zealous activity. To me he seemed like a sincere person who had gone astray. I was pleased when I read his confession. At least now....

We can see, however that the others... are not ashamed. They are always ready! And if they are ordered once again....

Their letter and N. Yegorychev's commentary confirm the correctness of Yuriy Vlasov's speech at the Congress of People's Deputies.

I fear they are not going to let us live humanely anytime soon!

*Candidate of Technical Sciences S. Poradek,
section head at the All-Union Scientific
Research Institute of Roads, Moscow*

Respected Comrade Karpovich, your article ranks with the excellent speeches delivered at the Congress of People's Deputies by Yemelyanov, Popov, Sakharov, Vlasov, Yeltsin, Yu. Afanasyev, Yevtushenko and others. Everyone knows that the KGB wages war against its own people, and you therefore reported nothing new. People are afraid to say this aloud, however. You have done so.

This letter is from a KGB veteran and party member. You will recall that Comrade Yeltsin spoke during the discussion of Kryuchkov's candidacy and said: "I served as first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast CPSU Committee for 10 years, and during that time the KGB organs did not turn up a single spy in the oblast." In addition, I can say that the situation did not change following Yeltsin's departure for Moscow in April 1985. During the past 10 years new buildings have also sprung up for the KGB workers in Sverdlovsk, as well as in Ufa.

Our oblast is closed to tourists, and there is no real work. Work has to be thought up—that is, they have to perform the role of "secret police." Active recruitment of workers is conducted at enterprises and establishments, and the staff is replenished mainly with party functionaries.

The KGB is unquestionable an odious organization in the eyes of the people, mainly for past lawlessness. In order for the KGB to become a real intelligence and counterintelligence service, it would have to be protected against incompetent leadership by the apparatchiks, because experience has shown us what this leads to.

Although I am confident that the restructuring will get around to the organs, I am not revealing my name even to you, Comrade Karpovich, because nothing has changed in our Sverdlovsk administration. Thank you for your honesty.

Comrade V., Sverdlovsk

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**Belorussian SSR Civil Defense Official on
Chernobyl Clean-up**

90UN0237A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 13 Oct 89 p 1

[BELTA report: "The Deactivation Continues"]

[Text] The state program for the elimination in the republic of the effects of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] accident will be adopted at the upcoming session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. It has multiple trends, and provides for securing the safe everyday activities of the population in regions subjected to radioactive contamination. An important role in the program is given over to the civil defense forces. Yu. Sivakov, Belorussian SSR Civil Defense headquarters deputy chief describes the measures taken to improve the radiation situation in the regions which have suffered.

Beginning in May 1986, deactivation work has been conducted on a wide front in the special attention zone. Over the period which has transpired since the accident, all populated area of permanent control in Gomel and Mogilev oblasts has been treated three, and in some cases, four times.

As experience is accrued, and with consideration for the dynamics of the radiation situation, a gradual transition is being realized from deactivation of a locale to engineering deactivation. The range of the latter, in addition to special treatment, comprises the sanitary purification and good order of settled points.

The engineering deactivation work is planned well in advance on the basis of introducing a passport system in all populated areas in the zone of constant control, without exception. The requirements for efforts and the means for their implementation are determined upon taking into consideration the analysis of the data obtained; a concrete program of actions is developed for each year and is presented for the Government's ratification.

Thus, for example, a second deactivation of the locales in the populated area included in the roster of evacuated localities is stipulated by the 1989 program. In the remaining points where the cesium-137 contamination density exceeded 15 curies/square kilometer, a range of ordering and deactivation measures continued. In 622 populated areas with contamination density ranging from 5 to 15 curies/square meter, we have begun selective treatment according to the results of deep radiation investigation.

This same program stipulates plans for engineering deactivation over the entire territory of the republic where it is necessary. In addition, an individual, concrete task-plan for civil defense subdivisions has been drawn up for each populated area.

Our formations were directly deployed in the contaminated regions. Our fighters' lives and activity meshed in close contact with the local party and soviet organs. In

each populated area treated, the start of work waited upon a deep radioactive investigation of the "hot spots." Contaminated ground in dangerous nidi was cut out and hauled away to storage sites. Plots so processed were subsequently either covered with clean soil and sown to grass, or paved over with asphalt.

Particular attention was paid to the detailed treatment of schools, children's pre-school institutions, public facilities, and production sites.

As a result, regardless of the populated area's overall contamination density, the gamma-background in these areas was reduced to 0.05-0.07 millirems/hour. Analogous work was conducted everywhere that people spend the majority of their time.

In time, old wooden structures, fences, roofing and roofs became secondary sources of elevated gamma-background. Their destruction and replacement is an integral part of improving the radiation situation. Our subdivisions made a great contribution to improving the network of inter-farm roads in Mogilev Oblast. In this year alone, 320 kilometers of roads are planned, with 245,000 cubic meters of roadbed laid.

It must be noted that over the period which has transpired, all subdivisions of the civil defense have made a weighty contribution to ensuring the population in the contaminated areas of their safe daily activity. Under extreme conditions, far from family and day-to-day life, the fighters displayed the remarkable qualities inherent in the Soviet people. Diligence, kindness, compassion to those near, an ability to surmount difficulties—this is what distinguished our personnel. In all locations, and not to the detriment of the main task, assistance in resolving managerial problems was rendered to the kolkhozes and sovkhoses; work was done on the residents' private plots, especially where there were no able-bodied family members.

The fact that over the period when the work was conducted in Mogilev Oblast this year there were no cases of violations of law and order, automobile accidents, deaths, or trauma is the great service of the civil defense subdivision personnel, leaders of local party and soviet organs, and of course, the commanders and political workers of all echelons of control. The deserved authority of subordinates and the local population was won by officers N. Ivanenko, A. Liplyanskiy, A. Demin, V. Vinichenko, V. Andreyev, A. Busygin, S. Ilin, and many others.

The engineering deactivation of populated areas has yielded a definite effect. The gamma-background in the area's treated sectors is being reduced by a factor of 2.5-3. The contamination density of cesium-137 is being significantly reduced. For example, in the village of Radilevo, Krasnopolskiy Rayon, the gamma-background before conducting the engineering deactivation was 0.24-0.75 millirem/hour; after treatment, it was 0.04-0.2 millirem/hour.

Specialized medical investigation of the residents of a number of populated areas showed that the dose of internal radiation they received over the period which has elapsed since the accident was several times less than that predicted.

At the same time, no significant reduction in the average exposure dose magnitude has been observed. In our view, this can be explained by the fact that due to the limited possibilities of the civil defense forces, far from all of the territory has undergone treatment. Vacant land, inaccessible places, and areas adjacent to populated points remain untreated. From these there is the transfer of radionuclides in dust, wheels of the equipment,

animal hooves. Stoking ovens with firewood from the local forests is conducive to secondary contamination.

The problems associated with the legal basis for razing wooden structures contaminated beyond acceptable norms have not been resolved. Many issues arise surrounding the civil defense forces' provision with the financial resources necessary for the work. There is no close interaction between farm organs and the civil defense organs in bringing the territories which have suffered into good order.

All of these negative situations must be overcome through joint efforts in order that the efficacy of the deactivation work planned for the next years be raised.

Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Examines Republic Health Program

90UN0508A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
16 Nov 89 p 3

[Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Information Sector press release: "Improve People's Living Conditions"]

[Text] At a meeting held on 13 November, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers examined a draft of the Comprehensive Program for the Preventive Treatment of Diseases and the Development of a Healthy Life-Style for the Ukrainian SSR Population in the Time Period to the Year 2000.

Such a document has been prepared in our country for the first time. A pressing need for it is occasioned by the demographic situation's having worsened in the republic during the last decade, and the population's state of health is causing serious alarm. With the birth and death rates that took shape in the last decade (15 and 11.7 per 1,000 residents, respectively), annual population growth amounts to less than 200,000 persons. The proportion of aged people in its overall total is increasing. The Ukraine holds only 20th place in the world in average life expectancy—71 years. Mortality is increasing among inhabitants able to work.

Many factors exert a negative influence on the people's health: unsatisfactory living conditions, environmental pollution, improper nutrition, stresses, and the population's inadequate level of physical and hygienic education. The research conducted provides evidence that, in the complex of factors determining a person's state of health, 50 percent are attributable to his or her life-style. Thus it is impossible to overcome the negative trends through physicians' efforts alone. This is especially so because the health agencies have been concentrating their attention on quantitative indices—increasing the numbers of hospital beds and outpatient visits, and augmenting medical staffs—whereas preventive treatment of diseases must become the backbone of their work.

Therefore, in March of this year, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers charged the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health, together with the other republic ministries and departments directly involved in handling the care and build-up of people's health, with developing a comprehensive program for the preventive treatment of diseases and the establishment of a healthy life-style in the Ukrainian SSR population for the upcoming decade, which program would set the basic directions of such work by state institutions, agencies of local government, labor collectives, and public organizations and coordinate their activity in this important job.

The submitted draft will be amended, taking the observations and suggestions voiced during its discussion into account, and adopted by the republic government in the near future. It is expected that oblast/city executive committees and the Ukrainian SSR ministries and

departments will provide for the development of similar programs, based on the Comprehensive Program, in the oblasts, cities, and rayons, in the various fields of endeavor, at enterprises, in organizations, and on the farms. In preparing the social and economic development plans, provision will be made for the necessary funds and material resources to perform the tasks stemming from the Comprehensive Program.

A Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Social Security [Minsobes] report on the work being done in the republic to improve the living conditions and care of elderly citizens and disabled persons was heard.

It was noted that the benefits have been broadened and the minimum pensions increased for certain categories of such citizens as a result of a vigorous social policy's implementation in the country. Enterprise and collective-farm collectives are showing greater concern for veterans. Valuable experience in this area has been acquired in Cherkassy and Poltava Oblasts. A network of social assistance departments is being developed and 11 regional social service centers have been created for retirees in the republic. During the current 5-year plan's first 3 years, 1,800 accommodations were added in apartment and dormitory building homes for the elderly and disabled, and 2,200 were added in collective-farm veterans' homes.

However, the Ministry of Social Security and other Ukrainian SSR ministries and departments still are insufficiently availing themselves of the existing opportunities to improve the living conditions and medical, commercial, and everyday [customary] and community services for elderly citizens and disabled persons. Displays of mere formality and an indifferent attitude toward these citizens' needs are occurring, and proper control over adherence to the law on benefits and preferences for disabled war veterans and the families of deceased servicemen is not being exercised. The veterans' needs for fuel, house repair, and medical aid are not being fully met.

No changes for the better have occurred in supplying citizens of advanced old age with inexpensive clothing and footwear. The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Light Industry is not meeting its established quota for producing and supplying these. The opening of special "Goods for Older Persons" shops and salons in oblast centers is being delayed. Retirees and disabled persons are given very little opportunity to participate in socially useful work.

The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Construction and the republic's Ukrainian Agricultural Construction Committee [Ukragrostroy], Main Administration of Kiev Municipal Construction [Glavkiyevgorstroy], and Ministry of Social Security, some oblast executive committees, and the Kiev City Executive Committee have an irresponsible attitude toward organizing the construction of apartment and dormitory building homes for the elderly and disabled. Almost a fourth of the funds

allocated for this is not used. The start of such institutions' construction is being delayed in Voroshilovgrad, Donetsk, Odessa, Chernovtsy, Kiev, and Kharkov oblasts; and the placing of such institutions in operation this year is threatened with stoppage in Dnepropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankovsk, Nikolayev, Ternopol, and Kherson oblasts. The quotas for constructing residence halls for citizens of advanced old age without families are not being met.

The reports of Comrade Yu.P. Gudze, Ukragrostroy deputy chairman, and Comrade A.V. Mamichev, Ukrainian SSR deputy minister of construction, to the effect that the 5-year quota for constructing the apartment and dormitory building homes will be met by their subordinate contract organizations, were taken into consideration, as well as the report of Comrade S.V. Drobo-shevskiy, deputy chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Executive Committee, on putting an apartment and dormitory building home in the Tomakovskiy Rayon village of Vladimirovka into operation during the first half of next year, and the report of Comrade A.N. Yagodinskiy, first deputy chairman of the Ternopol Oblast Executive Committee, that such an institution will go into operation next year in the Melnitsa-Podolskaya suburban settlement.

The serious shortcomings in the work on improving the living conditions and care of elderly citizens and disabled persons, establishing control over the construction status of apartment and dormitory building homes, and fully staffing the latter were sternly pointed out to Comrade Yu.N. Sivovolov, Ukrainian SSR first deputy minister of social security.

The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Social Security was charged with analyzing in detail the forms and methods of activity in its subordinate enterprises, institutions, and organizations directly responsible for creating proper living conditions for war and labor veterans, disabled persons, and citizens without families and unable to work, bearing in mind that increasing the care for these people and maintaining a sympathetic and attentive attitude toward them must become their primary duty. The appropriate ministries and departments were tasked with significantly improving the medical, commercial, everyday, and community services to these categories of citizens.

Matters of increasing the republic control agencies' coordination work were examined.

Because the USSR Constitution charges the people's control organs with coordinating the work of control agencies, it was suggested that the Ukrainian SSR Committee of People's Control establish a coordination council, under the committee, consisting of representatives from the agencies legislatively vested with the right of interdepartmental control. Besides the aforesaid committee, the republic's State Planning Committee, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Construction Committee, State Committee for Material

and Technical Supply, State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, State Committee for Statistics, State Committee for the Protection of Nature, State Board of Arbitration, Ukrainian Republic Banks of the USSR Specialized Banks, and Ukrainian Republic Administration of the USSR State Committee for Standards have such rights.

It was recommended that similar councils be established for coordinating the inspections conducted by oblast, city, and rayon controlling agencies.

The councils' chief task—to unite controlling agencies' efforts in order to bring about comprehensive control over resolution of the most important socioeconomic problems while preserving each agency's independence and its responsibility for carrying out the control functions with which it is charged.

Religious Film Festival Held in Moscow

18004000A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Jan 90
Morning Edition p 6

[Article by M. Murzina: "A Showing of Films About the Russian Church"]

[Text] There is an unusual film festival being held at the Novorossiysk movie theater in Moscow. It is the First All-Russian Festival of Documentary Films on the Russian Orthodox Church.

The festival will go on for one week. The closing ceremony will be held on 14 January when awards will be announced. The panel of judges will view more than 40 films. There will be two awards presented, one for best full-length film and one for best short film. The prizes are small bronze sculptures of Sergey Radonezhskiy and Georgiy Pobedonosets.

During the opening ceremony in the welcoming speech by Vladimir, Metropolitan of Rostov and Novochoerkassy and Patriarchal Exarch of Western Europe, jury chairman, it was noted that this festival should become traditional.

Georgian Writers' Union Makes 'First Official Visit' to Israel

18130028A Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO in Georgian No 47, 24 Nov 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Secretariat of the Board of the Georgian Writers Union"]

[Text] A meeting of the Secretariat of the Board of the Georgian Writers' Union was held recently. A report was given concerning a visit to Israel by a Georgian Writers' Union delegation by Georgian Writers' Union Board Chairman Mukhran Machavariani, who headed the delegation.

He reported the following: We can say without exaggeration that the official visit of the Georgian writers' delegation to Israel was of landmark importance in the

life of our literary organization. This visit laid the groundwork for our independent, direct contacts with writers' organizations abroad. Our delegation, which consisted of me, Georgian Writers' Union Secretary Enver Nizharadze, and Merani Publishing House Editor-in-chief Ushangi Rizhinashvili, was in Israel from 17 to 27 October at the invitation of the Israeli Writers' Association. These ten days were very useful and fruitful for the Georgian delegation. A number of contracts and agreements were drawn up, and they will undoubtedly serve as excellent propaganda for our centuries-old Georgian literature throughout the world. They will serve to expand and give new impetus to contacts between the Georgian and Israeli writers' unions, now that the groundwork has been laid.

In March of this year, as is well known, Georgia was visited by an Israeli Writers' Union delegation, which included Moshe Dori, the president of Israel's P.E.N. Club, David Markish, who was then the chairman of Israel's Russian-language Writers' Union, and Ben-Zion Tomer, the poet and playwright who is chairman of the Israeli Writers' Union's Foreign Commission. It was at that time that agreements were drawn up and the first steps were taken toward establishing literary contacts. On the basis of the agreement we took to Israel an anthology of modern Georgian poetry which is to be published in Hebrew.

We consider very important an agreement that was drawn up with the Israeli journal TEL-AVIV REVIEW; according to the agreement, one whole issue of the journal next year will be devoted to Georgian literature and will appear in English. In addition, negotiations are almost completed with the same journal, on the basis of which, starting next year, it is to publish a literary miscellany titled "Modern Georgian Literature" in three languages—Hebrew, English, and French. If everything goes right, the next item on the agenda will be to convert the literary miscellany into a journal. The miscellany/journal will be distributed all over the world. We can say without exaggeration that the groundwork is being laid for a big endeavor, one which could not even have been dreamed about before. If we act wisely, we will have a magnificent opportunity to make the world acquainted with Georgian literature, and, in general, with the Georgian nation's heroic past and present day. We are

awaiting representatives of the TEL-AVIV REVIEW in Tbilisi, where the agreement will be finalized.

We drew up an agreement with the literary journal ITON-77, one issue of which will be devoted wholly to Georgian literature.

On the basis of an agreement with Ephraim Bauch, the chairman of Israel's Russian-language Jewish Writers' Union, the works of Georgian writers are to be published in Israel in Hebrew and Russian, while we are to acquaint Georgian readers with their works.

An agreement was drawn up to exchange delegations of writers. Our Israeli colleagues invited us to send our Georgian writers to stay in their facilities, and we accepted with pleasure.

During the visit we met with the leadership of Israel's P.E.N. Club and talked about setting up a P.E.N. Club in Georgia.

We had a very interesting meeting with Shamai Golan, the chairman of the Hebrew-language Writers' Union, who gave us a copy of Boris Gaponov's Hebrew translation of "The Knight in the Panther's Skin" for the Writers' Union library and commented on the translator's masterful skill. The epic poem has been enthusiastically received by Israeli readers. Mr Shamai Golan thanked us for awarding the Shota Rustaveli Prize to Boris Gaponov's work. He is going to pay us a return visit in Georgia.

We had official meetings with the mayors of Tel-Aviv, Ashdod, and Haifa, and in the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry we met with Georgian Jews from Jerusalem, Nazareth, Ashdod, Tel-Aviv, and Hulon, with Israeli parliament member Ephraim Guri, ALIA SAKARTVELODAN editor Abram Sepiashvili, and DROSHA editor Khaim Khubelashvili. The well known scientist Gershon Tsitsuashvili presented us with his own Georgian translation of four books of the Torah....

During this brief visit, in short, the groundwork was laid for a number of mutually beneficial initiatives, and we may hope that literary contacts between Jewish and Georgian writers will become deeper and will promote mutual understanding and closeness between these two ancient and cultured peoples. An interesting discussion was held on these matters at the meeting of the Secretariat, and a concrete plan of action was drawn up.

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